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A b s t r a c t
Mobile location-based services have raised privacy concerns amongst mobile phone users 
who may need to supply their identity and location information to untrustworthy third 
parties in order to access these applications. Widespread acceptance of such services may 
therefore depend on how privacy sensitive information will be handled in order to restore 
users’ confidence in what could become the “killer app” of 3G networks.
The work reported in this thesis is part of a larger project to provide a secure archi­
tecture to enable the delivery of location-based services over the Internet. The security 
of transactions and in particular the privacy of the information transm itted has been the 
focus of our research. In order to protect mobile users’ identities, we have designed and 
implemented a proxy-based middleware called the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  together with its O r ie n t  
P ro to co l, capable of translating their real identity into pseudonyms.
In order to protect users’ privacy in terms of location information, we have designed 
and implemented a L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm that intentionally downgrades the quality 
of location information to be used by location-based services. The algorithm takes into 
account a blurring factor set by the mobile user at her convenience and blurs her location 
by preventing real-time tracking by unauthorized entities. While it penalizes continuous 
location tracking, it returns accurate and reliable information in response to sporadic location 
queries.
Finally, in order to protect the transactions and provide end-to-end security between all 
the entities involved, we have designed and implemented a Public Key Infrastructure based 
on a Security Mediator (SEM) architecture. The cryptographic algorithms used are identity- 
based, which makes digital certificate retrieval, path validation and revocation redundant in 
our environment. In particular we have designed and implemented a cryptographic scheme 
based on Hess’ work [108], which represents, to our knowledge, the first identity-based 
signature scheme in the SEM setting. A special private key generation process has also been 
developed in order to enable entities to use a single private key in conjunction with multiple 
pseudonyms, which significantly simplifies key management.
We believe our approach satisfies the security requirements of mobile users and can help 
restore their confidence in location-based services.
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C h a p t e r  1
I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1 Introduction
This research project aims to provide software tools that enable mobile network operators to 
deploy mobile services based on the location of their users over the Internet. In particular, 
we focus on providing techniques that safeguard end-user privacy. The framework proposed 
in this thesis also aims at facilitating software development regarding location information 
manipulation by factoring out location related functionalities. It relieves developers of the 
burden of dealing with location information acquisition and security.
In this introductory chapter we provide a brief description of the technological and regu­
latory environments in which such location-based mobile services will operate. We state the 
fundamental challenge that we tackle throughout the research work carried out and give an 
overview of the structure of the dissertation.
1.2 Drivers
This section intends to point out the main factors tha t fostered the emergence of location- 
based services. In particular, we comment on some advances made in the field of mobile 
telephony during the past decade. We also emphasize the recent need for mobile phone 
location information management and describe the new regulatory framework designed to 
help emergency services deal with mobile users’ emergency phone calls. Finally, we give a 
short introduction on wireless Internet access technologies and show how all this relates to 
the advent of location-based services.
1
The concept of mobile telephony has been adopted in a short period of time. According to a 
recent study [158], the number of mobile phones in the world reached 1.2 billion in 2003, with 
production in excess of 450 million mobile phones the same year. The estimated number of 
units for 2006 exceeds 2 billion. With an ever increasing performance and miniaturization, 
mobile phones a ttract more and more users, reaching almost 70% of people in western 
countries. In some countries like India, the number of mobile phone users has already 
outstripped traditional landline connections [23]. Although it took near 50 years for landline 
personal communications to catch on, mobile telephony has been adopted in less than a 
decade. This can be explained by the fact that in general, developing countries find mobile 
phone infrastructures to be a very cost-effective solution for deploying telecommunication 
networks. In [26], the ever increasing number of mobile phones sold is also explained by 
the high rate of mobile phone replacements, which today account for more than 80% of all 
mobile phone purchases.
In this thesis, we will consider mobile devices that operate within mobile phone networks. 
In particular, we will consider handsets that are GSM, GPRS as well as UMTS enabled. More 
precise information about the nature of these wireless networks is provided in Section 2.4. 
Mobile phones can be used to send and receive voice calls like normal fixed line phones. In 
addition, basic handsets already support simple utility software such as calendars, calculators 
or alarm clocks. More advanced terminals, also known as “smart phones” , present enhanced 
features such as the ability to download applications like games or even the possibility 
to browse the Internet. In fact, today’s mobile terminals share a lot of similarities with 
computers. They are typically controlled by microprocessors that can run at a speed close 
to 200 Mhz using up to 32MB of ROM and RAM. They also run an operating system and 
can include a Java Virtual Machine tailored to mobile environments used to run either pre­
installed applications or downloaded code. Today’s mobile phones can also support a wide 
range of protocols used in the wired world such as POP3, IMAP4, and SMTP and of course 
TC P/IP. However, even though their limited size and weight constitute an advantage as 
far as mobility is concerned, they considerably reduce mobile phone capabilities in terms of 
display and user interface. To overcome the problem, accessories such as enhanced keyboards 
can be connected to  the mobile phones. Alternatively, mobile terminals can be used as 
accessories, providing a laptop computer with mobile network connectivity wherever the 
wireless network coverage is available. In this case, the laptop only uses the mobile device 
as a means to connect to Internet using a wireless connection.
1.2.1 M obile Telephony
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As mentioned in Section 1.2.1, the number of mobile phones is already significant compared 
to the number of landline phones. As a result, an increasing percentage of emergency calls are 
made using mobile phones. Location information is very helpful to emergency services as it 
enables them to save time and lives by knowing precisely where their help is needed. While 
locating landline phone users consists in looking up subscriber addresses in an electronic 
directory, retrieving mobile phone users’ location has proved to be problematic.
In 1996, the United States’ Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a man­
date that required network operators to provide emergency services with callers’ location 
information in order to assist emergency victims promptly. In order to fulfill the necessary 
requirements, the program called E911 for Enhanced 911 was divided into two different 
phases. The first one, already implemented, required th a t the callers’ phone number as well 
as the location of the base station serving their mobile phone to be forwarded to emergency 
services using network-based or handset-based methods; see Section 2.5.1 for further devel­
opments. The second phase required network operators to be able to locate mobile phone 
users with even more accuracy, as described in Table 1.1. Mobile operators have however 
been quite reluctant to implement E911, seeing no potential benefit in deploying costly high- 
accuracy location technologies. The full implementation of E911 is due for completion by 
the end of the year 2005 and wireless carriers are already struggling to meet the deadline.
1.2.2 L ocation Info rm ation  Provision
S o lu t io n s 6 7 %  o f  ca lls 9 5 %  o f  ca lls
Handset-based 50 meters 150 meters
Network-based 100 meters 300 meters
Table 1.1: Accuracy Required by the FCC for Locating Mobile Phones.
A similar initiative was launched in the E.U. by the European Commission in 2003. 
The location enhanced 112 emergency service (E l 12) [133] is an E.U. recommendation that 
aims to provide information about the callers’ location in both fixed and cellular-based 
networks. While E911 took almost 10 years to implement, E112 may greatly benefit from 
the U.S. experience and be adopted more quickly [142]. As opposed to the situation in the 
U.S. in 1996, E l 12 benefits from a more favorable environment. GSM networks constitute 
the most widely used standard for 2G networks throughout Europe, which gives all the 
countries a common base to s tart implementing the recommendation. High-accuracy location 
technologies have also received comprehensive testing and are now seen as revenue generating 
network upgrades.
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1 .2 .3  W ire le s s  I n t e r n e t  C o n n e c t iv i ty
W ithin a few years, the Internet has evolved to become the most popular and comprehensive 
source of information. This networked environment radically transformed the way people 
interact with each other and do business. People quickly adapted to free access whatever 
their location, provided they had access to a computer. W ith the advent of mobile commu­
nications, a need for mobile internet access consequently arose. However, while GSM mobile 
networks could offer a reasonable bandwidth to support voice communications, they were 
not initially designed to transfer data such as web pages. A first solution was proposed in 
1999 by the WAP forum [5] under the name of Wireless Application Protocol. It consisted 
in providing an architecture tha t would tailor the Internet stack protocols to mobile phone 
weak capabilities; see Section 2.4.4 for further descriptions of WAP and related technologies. 
Once implemented, WAP was presented as the technology tha t would let one access the In­
ternet through her mobile phone. However, Internet web pages had to be either converted or 
generated from scratch by content providers in order to adapt the new lightweight standard. 
Furthermore, handsets were technically limited and people became disappointed when they 
experienced slow and expensive connections combined with a poor WAP content delivery. 
As a result, WAP never really took up, not because the technology was not good enough 
but because of the way it had been marketed.
At the same time, a similar initiative was launched in Japan in order to enable mobile 
phone users to access the Internet from their mobile device. Running on more powerful 
wireless networks, I-mode was primarily introduced as a value added service and not only 
allowed users to access real Internet content but also provided them with an always-on 
connection with a more flexible billing' scheme. Similar wireless networks such as GPRS 
or UMTS will soon be available worldwide and already allow for data transfers at a higher 
bandwidth than before. Furthermore, mobile handsets have evolved into “smart phones” ; 
see Section 1.2.1, and are now comparable to portable computers. While the first approach 
to mobile internet access consisted in adapting the existing Internet technologies to mobile 
phone usage, the trend is now for mobile devices to access the wired Internet with very little 
or no modification to the standard protocols.
1 .2 .4  C o n c lu s io n
Mobile telephony has recently witnessed some profound technological evolutions that influ­
enced the regulatory framework in which it operates. In particular, mobile phone networks 
and terminals are now powerful enough to support wireless connections and avail of Internet 
services like normal desktop computers. New regulations now require mobile network oper­
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ators to be able to locate each of their mobile subscribers. While this location information 
could be restricted to internal use only, it is very likely tha t it will be made available to 
external third parties that may, in turn, provide location related services to both desktop 
and mobile users. Mobile phone network operators are indeed looking for new sources of 
revenues and consortiums such as the Parlay Group [202] push the development of mobile 
data services by proposing technologies to help them open their networks [136, 203],
1.3 Location-Based Services
The advent of mobile computing devices combined with the deployment of wireless networks 
and positioning technologies has given birth to a new field of research known as c o n te x t-  
a w a re  c o m p u tin g . Context-aware computing encompasses the study of applications that 
consider the environment or c o n te x t  in which they operate as a runtime parameter. Several 
definitions of c o n te x t  have been proposed in [19, 50, 32], W ithin the scope of this thesis, 
c o n te x t  refers to mobile users’ characteristics and properties, namely, users’ identity and 
users’ physical location combined with a time reference. We also consider a subset of this 
field known as lo c a tio n -a w  are  c o m p u tin g , whose applications are only triggered by users’ 
location. In this section, we define the concept of location-based service (LBS), which is the 
most common form of context-aware computing applications, as well as a taxonomy that 
classifies the different sorts of LBS.
1.3.1 Definition
W ithin the scope of this thesis, we refer to a Location-based service, or L B S ,  as a service that 
offers to its users a value-added service that exploits the location of a set of mobile entities at 
a particular time. From a more technical point of view, we see a L B S  as a context dependent 
web service. The W3C Web Services Architecture Working Group [213] defines a web service 
as a “a software application identified by a URI, whose interfaces and bindings are capable 
of being defined, described, and discovered as XML artifacts. A Web service supports direct 
interactions with other software agents using XML-based messages exchanged via Internet- 
based protocols” . Apart from the L B S  itself, we identify two different actors involved in 
the provision of L B S .  L B S  users or S u b je c ts  are the service requestors and can use either 
fixed or mobile devices in order to avail of the location dependent service. Located entities 
or T a rg e ts  typically hold a mobile device that connects to a wireless mobile phone network 
such as the ones described in Section 2.4. T a rg e ts ' mobile devices have to be locatable as 
defined in Section 2.5.1, so that their location can be determined and transm itted by some 
entity to the L B S .  In some cases, a L B S  user may play the two different roles at the same
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time. For example, she may be considered both as a Subject and as a Target when requesting 
a LBS that necessitates her own location.
Finally, we are interested in the deployment of commercial wide-area LBS. Indeed, while 
some of the LBS considered in this thesis may only be used within a building, we will 
not focus on indoor specific LBS. Wide-area LBS can potentially be accessed from all over 
the world, provided the wireless network coverage is efficient enough to allow for Targets 
positioning. We also assume a commercial relationship between Subjects and LBS providers 
such as the ones existing between e-commerce web sites and their users.
1 .3 .2  C la ss if ic a t io n
From a technical point of view, a LBS can be assimilated to a web site that generates context- 
related content for its users. From a more functional point of view however, the definition 
given in 1.3.1 suffers from a lack of precision regarding the different types of location related 
services that exist. In this section, we present a classification that categorizes the different 
kinds of LBS.
Giaglis et al. [93] have established a taxonomy of LBS and classified the different services 
in 6 categories. The results of the study are shown in Table 1.2.








Mobile yellow pages ***
Infotainment services
Advertising Banners, Alerts, Advertisements




Billing Location sensitive billing **
Table 1.2: Accuracy Required by the FCC for Locating Mobile Phones.
Since several kinds of LBS exist, it is very likely that every one of them has different 
needs in terms of accuracy of location information. For example, car traffic management 
LBS will have low location information accuracy expectations compared to people tracking 
LBS. This is mainly due to their relative speed: the slower the speed the better the accuracy
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should be in order to offer LBS users a meaningful service. Therefore, the authors believe 
that a useful LBS classification should also take location accuracy needs into account.
From the classification ¡proposed, we also identify two different types of LBS.
- User-triggered LBS are location-based services that deliver a context related service 
upon user query or user presence in a predefined location. For example, LBS such as 
information services, advertising or billing services fall into this category. We will refer 
to this kind of services as pull LBS.
- Self-triggered LBS tend to perform intermittent or continuous user tracking. For ex­
ample, fleet management LBS continuously track someone’s assets over time. Also, 
some advertising LBS can perform intermittent tracking, provided they can link some­
one’s location with her identity. From now on, we will refer to this kind of service as 
tracking LBS.
1 .3 .3  C o n c lu s io n
Mobile network operators have recently invested a lot of money in third generation network 
licenses and network infrastructures; see Section 2.4.3 for further details. They are still 
looking for the killer application that will help them generate new revenue streams in order 
to reduce their debt and increase their Average Revenue Per User (ARPU). Location-based 
services may represent a good opportunity for them to do so. However, LBS technologies 
already raise security and privacy concerns amongst potential users [128, 31]. The fear of 
privacy invasion where people’s location information would be disclosed to some central 
authority is already here and recalls unsurprisingly George Orwell’s novel 1984■ LBS ac­
ceptance will therefore depend on the deployment of sound security practices and privacy 
techniques, able to convince their users that their privacy will remain safe [82],
1.4 Privacy and Context Data Security
Location-based services technologies are now available and test-bed applications are starting 
to flourish. However, LBS development is hampered by people’s concerns related to the 
disclosure of their location information [153], Potential LBS users do not feel comfortable in 
giving away their location, a characteristic now considered as a private piece of information. 
This loss of control over personal information is however a privacy risk inherent to most 
context aware applications. If not considered carefully, this threat can potentially lead 
to disturbing or even dangerous situations. In particular, some location-based advertising 
practices could be perceived as spam if someone’s location information was given away to
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some non-trustworthy entity. Such organizations could also build up some personal data 
collections and sell them to other entities without user consent, as it happens nowadays 
with email addresses collections. More serious threats could involve criminals stalking and 
tracking mobile users, a problem that would become even more significant if the latter were 
young teenagers for example. Analyzing tracking information can also help malicious entities 
learn about someone’s interests or habits and by cross analyzing data from various sources, 
this can disclose even more private details such as where someone lives.
In this section, we explain some security related terms and tailor their definition to the 
field of context-aware computing. We also give an overview of the privacy regulations in 
place in different countries.
1 .4 .1  D e f in it io n s
LBS security services are very similar to the services the Internet provides to secure online 
transactions. In this section, we describe them in our context and illustrate their use by 
considering the following scenario. ’’Friend Finder” is a LBS that lets its users find out 
where their friends are located in real-time. A Subject S  wants to query the service in order 
to locate a Target T.
First, S  needs to prove to the LBS that she is really who she claims to be in order to avail 
of the ’’Friend Finder” service. After identifying herself to the LBS, she needs to provide the 
LBS with an evidence that will enable her to verify S ’s identity. This is equivalent to showing 
a passport when entering a foreign country. This process is known as Authentication.
Then, S  needs to be authorized by T to access her location information. This authorized 
access may depend on multiple parameters, such as S ’s identity or attributes for instance. In 
this case, the security service offered can be referred to as Authorization. If the parameters 
involve anything other then the S ’s attributes, such as the date and time of the day or even 
T ’s location itself, the concept of Access Control over a particular resource is generally used 
to describe the security service.
Once access to T ’s location information has been granted to S, the LBS needs to retrieve 
T ’s location details, process them and deliver the value added content to S. Eavesdropping or 
monitoring unprotected internet connections is known to be a relatively easy task to perforin. 
In order to protect e-commerce transactions and in particular location data transmissions 
and retention, cryptography (see Section 2.2.1) is generally used to ensure that sensitive 
information is not disclosed to unauthorized parties. This security service is known as 
Confidentiality.
Finally, S  receives the location related content from the LBS. While some LBS may pro­
vide some services free of charge, it is very likely that most of them will require their users 
to pay for the content they receive. In order to ensure that neither S  nor the LBS can deny 
having requested or offered a service without the other party consent, mechanisms known 
as digital signatures (see Section 2.2.2) are generally used to enable the Non-Repudiation 
security service. In this context, digital signatures also allow for the detection of unautho­
rized location information alteration during the data transmission and this way ensures the 
Integrity of messages sent from one entity to another.
1 .4 .2  R e g u la t io n s
Mobile network operators already know to some extent where every mobile phone user is 
located. This is necessary to implement a cellular network and usually, most people trust 
them not to misbehave with this data. However, the new positioning technologies described 
in Section 2.5.1 enable much finer grained location requests than before. Furthermore, this 
location information will be soon made available not only to emergency services but also to 
independent third parties in commercial relationships with mobile network operators.
In order to help preventing malicious usage of location information, some regulations re­
garding to the collection and processing of personal data must be enforced in non-emergency 
situations.
European Union
A detailed description of the European legal framework regarding to this issue is available in 
[153]. The two principal directives dealing with personal location information are presented 
here.
The General Privacy Directive (95/46) [200] deals with the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data. According to 
this directive, the entity that performs data collection on a subject must inform the subject 
as well as a special authority that decides what processing is allowed, taking into account 
the purpose data collection. More sensitive data such as racial or ethnic origins for example 
are treated in a stricter manner. The Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 
(2002/58/EC) [201], which replaced the Privacy in Telecommunications Sector (97/66/EC) 
Directive, specifically addresses the use of location data. Article 9 of the directive states 
that:
“Where electronic communications networks are capable of processing location 
data other than traffic data, relating to users or subscribers of their services, 
these data may only be processed when they are made anonymous, or with the
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consent of the users of subscribers to the extent and for the duration necessary 
for the provision of a value addressed service. ”
This article clearly shows that the European Commission encourages ’opt-in’ privacy 
policies [20] by giving users the right to express consent prior to the use of the location 
information. This automatically gives privacy protection by default to every user as well as 
a total control on which service will have access to their location information.
U n ited  States of A m erica
While the European Union chose to address privacy concerns at an early stage of location 
positioning systems deployments, legislation regarding to location privacy came very late in 
the U.S.A. Defined in 2001, the Location Privacy Protection Act [204] proposes to regulate 
location information collection, use, retention or distribution and advocates “opt-in” privacy 
policies. The Wireless Privacy Protection Act [205] of 2003 goes even further by proposing 
to amend the Communications Act of 1934 with the following statement:
“To require customer consent to the provision of wireless call location informa­
tion. ”
However, as stated in [21], the legislation is very unclear: for example, according to 
the law, location privacy is only considered when making voice calls. Browsing the web 
on a mobile phone or sending SMS messages could potentially expose users to location 
disclosure. This lack of regulatory guidance lead to a lot of confusion and the industry as 
well as individual states started to implement their own version of the Wireless Privacy 
Protection Act.
Japan
In Japan, a very clear legislation was put in place from the beginning and this legal framework 
is believed to have facilitated the development of location-based services. The “Guidelines 
on the Protection of Personal Data in Telecommunications Business” issued by the Japanese 
government in 1998 clearly states that location information cannot be disclosed by mobile 
operators to any other party without users’ consent. In 2003, the “Personal Data Protection 
Law” clarifies the requirements for implementing ’opt-in’ privacy policies mentioned in the 
1998 guidelines.
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The potential loss of privacy together with the fear of location data disclosure to unau­
thorized entities will undoubtedly slow down end-user adoption of LBS. Regulations have 
recently been put in place in order to restrict potential abuses related to location information 
gathering without, user consent. However, implementing those regulations may turn out to 
be problematic since they guarantee total end-user privacy although enabling them to use 
LBS seems contradictory.
1.5 Problem statem ent
Mobile communications technologies, together with positioning and wireless Internet access 
technologies create tremendous opportunities for mobile operators to offer new value-added 
services to their users while generating revenues. Prototypes of such location-based ap­
plications have already been developed and some of them have already been deployed in 
Europe [152, 24, 61]. However, concerns have arisen regarding potential privacy threats 
that personal location information disclosure could entail [128, 31]. These concerns have 
been partially addressed by the development of sound regulatory frameworks in Europe, the 
U.S.A and Japan, see Section 1.4.2. In fact, the real issue lies in how these frameworks 
will be implemented. While mobile network operators may implement these location-based 
applications within their infrastructure, it is very likely that they will only act as location 
information providers to third party LBS, as explained earlier on. In the latter case, LBS 
end-users may be faced with a dilemma. On one hand, they must be willing to disclose 
a minimum of their personal location information in order to avail of LBS’ services. On 
the other hand, revealing too much information may expose them to privacy and security 
threats.
The challenge here is therefore to be able to provide third party LBS with location 
information as accurate as possible, while maintaining a high level of privacy for their users.
1.6 Thesis Objectives
The goal of the research carried out and described within this thesis is to enable a secure 
and privacy preserving usage of third party location-based services by mobile phone users. 
More precisely, we wish to help Targets preserving their privacy by guaranteeing a fine­
grained access control to their location information as well as the Confidentiality and the 
Integrity of their location data. We wish to supply LBS providers with reliable location 
information and enable Subjects to access the services they provide securely. Section 4.3
1.4.3 Conclusion
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outlines some approaches that deal with Subjects' location information privacy. From this 
review, we identify three main problems related to location privacy:
- The location inference problem, by which a LBS can infer the exact location of a par­
ticular Target given some less precise location data retrieved from the Mobile Operator.
- The location path problem, by which a LBS can infer the location of a particular 
Target given some historical data.
- The location transfer problem, by which a LBS can redistribute to unauthorized enti­
ties the Target's location data it retrieved from the Mobile Operator.
The research work presented in this thesis aims at addressing the location inference problem 
and, to a certain extend, the location transfer problem. In particular, while we do not 
address fully the location transfer problem, we provide a solution that may discourage such 
a practice. By offering a tailored quality of service in terms of location accuracy, our solution 
provides location information that may not be suitable for any other unauthorized LBS than 
for the one it was generated for.
We also intend to facilitate the development of LBS by providing an environment in which 
dealing with location information and security is made transparent to software developers. 
In this section, we briefly describe the outcomes of the research carried out.
1 .6 .1  T h e s is  C o n tr ib u t io n s
The expected contributions of this thesis are summarized in this Section as follows:
- We propose a design for a secure infrastructure that enables mobile phone users to 
avail of third party location-based services while preserving their privacy.
- We introduce the need and describe the functionalities of a software platform and a 
protocol that handle both user privacy, communication security and location informa­
tion provision to LBS.
- We design a privacy engine that enables mobile phone users to provision their privacy 
preferences.
- We present a secure algorithm capable of degrading the quality of mobile users’ location 
information so that it guarantees their privacy while remaining meaningful to LBS.
- We use elliptic curve-based server-aided cryptography in order to provide a Public 
Key Infrastructure that handles the security services needed within the architecture 
considered.
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The infrastructure proposed is designed to operate within the wireless mobile phone net­
works described in Section 2.4. Wireless networks such as WLAN and its related positioning 
techniques are not considered in this thesis. Also, the security of mobile phones or mobile 
terminals in general will not be covered and remain beyond the scope of the research carried 
out. Concerning location privacy, analytical attacks that involve the use of environment 
characteristics such as the presence of buildings, roads, direction of traffic flow, etc. to infer 
somebody’s location, will not be considered in the design of our location privacy algorithm. 
However, research avenues describing potential approaches to prevent such attacks will be 
given in Section 8.5. Finally, we will not consider security services provided by the knowl­
edge of location, namely location-based security services [186, 218] but instead focus on the 
security of location information.
1.7 Thesis Outline
The structure of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews the background necessary to understand the environment in which 
location-based services operate. In particular, we focus on computer security and 
mobile phone telecommunications.
Chapter 3 introduces the different players in the provision of LBS as well as their 
requirements in terms of security and privacy.
Chapter 4 presents the related research carried out in the field of location privacy, 
location privacy policies as well as location information access control. We also describe 
infrastructures that aim to achieve similar goals to ours.
Chapter 5 details the design of the architecture proposed. It describes in depth the 
software platform functionalities and the protocol used by LBS to access them.
Chapter 6 describes an algorithm used to modify the granularity of mobile users’ 
location in order to guarantee their location privacy.
Chapter 7 outlines the design and implementation of the Public Key Infrastructure 
used in order to provide confidentiality in mobile users’ communication with Location- 
Based Services.
Chapter 8 draws the conclusions of the work carried out and outlines the possible 
future research directions.





In this section, we intend to provide the background necessary to understand the research 
work undertaken. The design of an architecture allowing for the provision of location- 
based web services necessitates a deep understanding of three research domains: internet 
computing, mobile telecommunications and computer security. Instead of covering these 
three research fields in depth, we will focus only on the last two and describe their overlap 
in the context of the Internet. We first give an overview of the building blocks of computer 
security and highlight some of their issues. We then present the mobile phone systems 
currently used and emphasize the security services they provide. Finally, we describe the 
standardized location positioning technologies that will enable the widespread of location- 
based services.
2.2 Building Blocks
Research in the field of cryptography became very active during the second world war where 
cryptography was used separately by Allies and Germans as a way to protect their vital 
information. Even though its usage proved successful in some cases, scientists also studied 
techniques to attack the cryptographic designs used, laying the grounds of cryptanalysis. 
Advances in the late 70s as well as the deployment of the Internet a decade ago enabled and 
fostered the need for personal secure communications. Nowadays, cryptography is considered 
as a non exhaustive set of techniques used to protect electronic data transfers, providing 
security services such as confidentiality. In this section, a brief overview of cryptography is 
given as well as some interesting cryptographic schemes relevant in the context of this thesis.
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2 .2 .1  S y m m e tr ic  C r y p to g r a p h y
Symmetric cryptography is also referred to as secret key cryptography. It enables the trans­
formation of a meaningfnl message (plaintext) into an unintelligible one (ciphertext). This 
transformation is achieved using a secret piece of information called the cryptographic key 
and is called encryption while its inverse is named decryption. Both of these operations are 
indexed on the cryptographic key and define a bijection between the two sets of plaintexts 
and ciphertexts. The encryption and decryption processes combined together are usually 
referred to as a cryptographic algorithm.
Two entities sharing a cryptographic key can therefore securely communicate by enci­
phering their messages, provided that the algorithm and the key are considered secure. In 
1883, Auguste Kerckhoffs stated six cipher design principles also known as the Kerckhoffs’ 
laws [121]. Two of them are worth mentioning since security designs that do not take them 
into account are usually easily broken (see Section 2.4.2 for an example). The first principle 
deals with openness as opposed to security by obscurity. The design of cryptosystems should 
be made publicly available to researchers so that it can be studied and declared secure after 
enough scientific review. The only element that should be kept secret is the secret key. The 
second principle states that the key space should be large enough to prevent a brute force 
attack (exhaustive search of the key) but that it should not be considered as a sufficient 
condition to guarantee the security of a cryptosystem. Currently, the lower bound estimate 
for symmetric cryptographic key size is 128 bits of key material [130]. In theory, any se­
quence of bits that is long enough can be considered as a symmetric key. Therefore, the key 
generation process can remain as simple as a random number generation.
Nowadays, the most popidar block cipher is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
[156], It was chosen by the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) in 2000 
to be the successor of DES, which was later withdrawn from the FIPS standards for not 
being adequate enough to protect federal government information [157].
2 .2 .2  A s y m m e tr ic  C r y p to g r a p h y
Asymmetric cryptography was discovered in the 1960s by an engineer and mathematician 
from GCHQ, James Ellis, who provided the proof of the possibility of non secret encryption. 
In 1976, this concept was officially discovered and published for the first time by Whitfield 
Diffie and Martin Heilman, who described a protocol enabling key exchange over an insecure 
communication channel [67]. More widely known as public key cryptography, it proposes an 
alternative to secret key cryptography. It solves the key exchange problem by allowing the 
use of a publicly available encryption key as well as a private decryption key, both of them
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bound to any individual willing to conduct secure communications.
The key pair cannot be chosen at random as for a symmetric cryptographic key: the 
asymmetry property of a public key encryption scheme requires them to be mathematically 
related but not deducible from each other. The difficulty of recovering the private key from 
the public key relies on the widely believed difficulty of solving a hard problem. Examples 
of well known hard problems are as follows :
- Integer factorization for large enough integers is considered to be computationally 
difficult: if the prime factors of a large number n are known, it is easy to compute n. 
However, factoring n can be computationally infeasible for a large enough n.
- The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is defined as follows:
Given an element g in a finite group G of order n and another element 
h £ G, find an integer x where x is in the range of [0,n — 1] such that 
gx = h, provided that such an integer exists.
While computing discrete exponentiation is easy, solving the discrete logarithm prob­
lem is considered as difficult ill some well chosen groups.
In other words, the security of public key cryptographic algorithms relies on a trap door 
function : a pseudo one-way function only invertible with a secret. This function enables 
the key generation process but makes it computationally infeasible to recover the private 
key from the public key. The size of the cryptographic keys used to guarantee a good level 
of security does not depend anymore on the ability of an attacker to perform an exhaustive 
search in the private key space. Indeed, since the key pair is mathematically generated, it is 
more relevant to attack its mathematical structure. As a result, depending on the algorithm 
considered and the hard mathematical problem involved, the acceptable key size will be 
different from one public key cryptosystem to another. Two main public key cryptosystems 
standards are currently used and have been studied for more than 20 years. We give a brief 
description of each of them as follows.
R SA . The RSA cryptosystem [177], named after its inventors Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir 
and Len Adleman, relies on the difficulty of computing the integer factorization for large 
integers. An interesting property of the RSA cryptosystem appears when swapping the 
public and the private key parameters in its algorithm. The RSA encryption algorithm turns 
into a new cryptographic primitive known as a digital signature scheme that can provide 
services like message integrity and non-repudiation. Encrypting a token such as the hash 
of a message using one’s private key enables anybody having access to the corresponding
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public key not only to check for the authenticity of the sender but also for the integrity of the 
associated message. The recommended minimum RSA key size is 1024 bits. This provides 
a comfortable level of security provided factorization is the only way to break RSA. For 
almost twenty years, the RSA cryptosystem has been subject to a certain number of attacks 
[145]. In his survey [41], Dan Boneh categorizes them in four different categories: attacks on 
low private exponents, low public exponents, on the implementation, and on misuse of the 
system. He concludes that most of them exploit flaws in the padding schemes used prior to 
the encryption process and can be avoided by following good practices.
E lliptic Curve Cryptography-based cryptosystem s. Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC) -based cryptosystems constitute the second standard of public key cryptosystems 
that have undergone a thorough academic scrutiny. Independently discovered by Victor 
Miller and Neil Koblitz [122, 149], they rely on the difficulty of a special class of the discrete 
logarithm problem: the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Traditionally, 
the discrete logarithm problem can be stated as in Section 2.2.2. This definition is applicable 
to any group. However, the DLP problem in some groups may be harder to solve than in 
others. Furthermore, computations on the group elements can be made easier depending 
once again on the group considered. Therefore, finding a group of mathematical objects 
making the DLP problem the hardest as possible while making sure operations on the 
elements of this group can be made quick enough is a key to design a cryptosystem based 
on such a problem.
In the case of ECC, the group in question is defined as an abelian group G of n elements, 
known as points on an elliptic curve. An elliptic curve is a two-dimensional mathematical 
structure defined over any finite field F. Thus, a point of an elliptic curve is defined by the 
two coordinates x and y taken from a finite field, for example a Galois field with a size of 
a power of 2. GF(2k) fields make it easy for computers to perform arithmetic since field 
elements can be represented as polynomials of a degree less than k, with coefficients in F2 
[103], In other words, x and y are bit strings, which is an efficient data representation for 
computer processing. The analogue problem of the DLP in ECC can now be defined. The 
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) states that:
Given an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field Fp and two points P  and
Q, where P  has order n, find an integer k where k is in the range of [0, n — 1]
satisfying Q = k.P, provided that such an integer exists.
In ECC, finding a suitable group where the DLP is hard while arithmetic operations 
on elements remains efficient is therefore a matter of finding the right elliptic curve. To
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guarantee the hardness of the ECDLP, one requirement is that the number of elements 
of the curve is divisible by a large prime number in order to avoid the Pohlig-Hellman 
attack that reduces the ECDLP to instances of the same problem in subgroups of prime 
order [170]. For the same group size however, ECC cryptosystems are generally slower 
than the RSA cryptosystem. This is mainly due to the execution of the time consuming 
scalar multiplication used in the underlying field computations. Yet, ECDLP is believed to 
be significantly harder than DLP or the factorization problem. Therefore, cryptosystems 
based on ECDLP can achieve the same level of security as others by using a group with a 
smaller size. This means that the cryptographic keys used by ECC cryptosystems can be 
significantly shortened while providing equivalent security in terms of the time to break the 
cryptosystem. Therefore, the recommended minimum ECC key size is 163 bits. Attacks on 
ECC-based cryptosystems focus on their theory rather than on their actual implementation, 
mostly because ECC cryptosystems have not been used as much as RSA in the industry. 
More details about these attacks can be found in [104, 47, 194, 143, 90].
2.3 Public Key Infrastructure
In the real world, individuals are usually identified by their names even though the date 
and place of birth are sometimes needed to resolve any hypothetic collision. An identity 
card or a driving license certifying one’s identity can be used to authenticate one to toll 
stations when crossing borders. These documents are usually issued by trusted government 
administrations and usually bind someone’s name with a picture of herself. In the digital 
world, checking the identity of an individual is not an easy task since physical verification 
is not possible. Instead, individuals are given a cryptographic key pair that makes them 
identifiable when conducting online communications, at least in theory. While it is easy 
to remember someone’s identity in the real world, it is much more difficult to associate 
somebody you know with a string of bits. Rather than trying to use directly a public key 
to identify somebody, a mapping binding a user’s identity with her public key, signed by a 
trusted third party’s private key is used: this is called a digital certificate. Issuing, managing 
or revoking certificates necessitate a lot of work and organization. As in the real world, a 
trusted entity following a set of policies is needed. In this section, three different Public 
Key Infrastructures (PKI) are presented. These are frameworks that include protocols and 
services used to manage identities and their associated key pairs. The PGP, SPKI/SDSI and 
X.509 approaches are highlighted as well as their pitfalls and an overview of recent advances 
and possible solutions is also given.
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2 .3 .1  P G P
The Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) system [89] was created in 1991 by Phil Zimmermami and 
developed in various versions through out the years by many developers both from the cor­
porate and open source world. PGP is mainly used to secure email exchanges, guaranteeing 
confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation. It implements a hybrid cryptosystem where 
RSA or ElGamal is used for key agreement and IDEA, TripleDES and of course AES can 
be used as the symmetric block cipher. The principles of the PGP PKI lie in a concept 
called the “web of trust” . There is no central authority in charge of managing trust: this 
is up to the users of the system to validate each others public keys. Every user generates 
her key pair and publishes the public key on a key server, on a web page or even includes 
it in an email. However such a key has no value since anybody could have impersonated an 
individual by creating and publishing the key under her name. To establish trust, a user’s 
public key needs to be signed by a person that can state that the key actually belongs to 
this user. The public key, together with a name, an email address, a creation date and a list 
of digital signatures forms a PGP certificate. Every user is free to sign any certificate and to 
share it with anybody. When it comes to trust a particular public key, users have therefore 
the choice to follow one path on the “web of trust” in order to validate the ownership of the 
public key. Public key revocation is handled by end-users as well: a revocation certificate 
is sent by a user to his/her correspondents and to key servers. PGP is therefore well suited 
for informal and personal networks but not really for large organizations or the world wide 
web.
2 .3 .2  S P K I /S D S I  
SD SI
The Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure [179] (SDSI) was designed in 1996 and, as 
with PGP, no central authority is required to issue certificates: everybody is free to do so. 
However, it improves on PGP by introducing the notion of a local name space. Each user of 
the system has its own name space and uses local names to refer to other entities. A local 
name is a public key together with an identifier, which is typically a common name or a 
nickname. The local name is only meaningful to its issuer and is bound to other public keys 
in the subject of a name certificate. Name certificates can be represented by a four-tuple 
structure and linked between each other through local names.
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At around the same time, the SPKI [215] project was developed following a predefined 
set of requirements. Its aim was to design an easy way to perform authorization rather 
than authentication through certificates. Like for PGP, users would be free to generate 
certificates and delegate access rights to other usersfor a predefined time interval clearly 
specified in the certificate. In order to avoid using complex naming mechanisms, the SPKI 
approach would give public keys a central role: access rights would be granted to a key rather 
than to an individual. The system would therefore be used completely without names. SPKI 
certificates would bind the issuer’s public key with a subject and mention any relevant detail 
about authorizations and their delegation.
S P K I/S D S I
In 1997, the two research efforts merged to form the SPKI/SDSI public key infrastructure 
[75, 54], The SPKI/SDSI approach took the best ideas from both worlds to provide a 
powerful PKI. The system implements the two types of certificates:
- Name certificates similar to SDSIs that bind local names to public keys. The SDSI 
naming convention is used to provide SPKI with a mechanism for getting public keys 
according to local names. Any certificate chain containing a certificate can be searched 
and if one path is not trusted, another one can be chosen.
- Authorization certificates like in SPKI. The system implements the SPKI delegation 
of rights mechanism. By issuing a certificate, a user grants another entity some or all 
her rights on a resource and these rights can be transferred depending on the issuer’s 
requirements. Delegation of rights can therefore be seen as a way to share private key 
usage without disclosing the actual private key to anybody.
R evocation
The SPKI/SDSI philosophy states that there is no certificate revocation problem since 
SPKI/SDSI certificates are not meant to be revoked. As stated in [178], “This certifi­
cate is good until the expiration date. Period”. As a consequence, SPKI/SDSI advocates 
that signers present separate evidence that the key pair used has not been compromised. In 
order to enable such a process, a separate infrastructure is proposed: a network of servers 
called “suicide bureaus” (SB) is set up on a high speed network. When users generate their 
key pair, they digitally sign a document known as a “suicide note” and keep it secret. They 
also register their public key with the SB network. If users are required to produce a proof
S P K I
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of validity for their key pair, they can request a “certificate of health” from a SB. This is a 
dated document stating there is no evidence that a private key has been lost or compromised. 
If their key ever gets compromised, they issue the suicide note to a SB that will broadcast 
it to the SB network which will stop issuing “certificates of health” for this public key.
2.3.3 X.509
The X.509 PKI is the most popular PKI used to carry out secure transactions over the 
Web. The X.509 original approach defines identity-based certificates binding a public key 
to a name. Unlike the previous approaches, these certificates are generated by a central 
authority and are distributed through online directories.
D escription  o f th e  PK I
The early design of the X.509 PKI used the X.500 directory structure [219] to provide 
naming services to its end-users. However, the X.500 standard itself was never adopted by 
the Internet community because it was seen as far too complex to use. The X.509 PKI 
consists of the following entities:
- Certification Authorities (CA). The main role of CAs is to issue signed X.509 certifi­
cates. They are generally organized in a hierarchical structure whose root is called a 
root CA. This top level certification authority is a trusted entity that is in charge of 
propagating trust through other CAs using digital signatures. As opposed to normal 
CAs, the root CA can be off-line so that a high level of security is maintained. Every 
CA holds a public key with its associated certificate. The root CA certifies the public 
key of the CA that is directly below it in the CA hierarchy and so on until the end 
user’s certificate is reached. Its certificate is self-signed, which means that it can only 
be used to check for the integrity of its content.
- Registration Authorities (RA). This is a component used as an interface between the 
certificate authority and the end-users. It is in charge of identifying and authenticating 
certificate requestors before the corresponding CA issues them a digital certificate. De­
pending on the nature of the certificate requested (self-signed, user, server or business 
certificates), RAs use different practices and procedures to establish the identity of cer­
tificate requestors [52]. Identity verification can be performed online without providing 
any credential or using a more secure “out-of-band” channel, comparing registration 
details with real identity papers such as passports of the requestors [22].
- One or more directories that store X.509 certificates.
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Eveu though the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure primarily adopted the X.500 hierar­
chical structure, it also evolved in a networked structure enabling more flexible bilateral 
relationships. Cross-certificates are therefore used in order to bypass a hierarchy structure 
that would be too awkward to follow.
C ertificate V alidation
Every time a digital signature needs to be checked or an encrypted communication needs to 
be set up, the certificate validation process takes or at least should take place in order to 
be sure that a valid certificate is being used. Certificate validation can be described as a 3 
step process.
- The certificate path discovery: this involves building a path of certificates from the 
certificate to be checked to a CA certificate that is considered trustworthy. This is 
usually carried out on the end-user side. Most of the time, the end-user already trusts 
the CA that issued the certificate and in this case, the certificate path is already 
built. However, when the PKI topology becomes complex, the burden of discovering 
the certificate path is usually left to the end-user in charge of validating the digital 
signature. [135] explores more in depth the issues that arise when certificate path 
discovery is performed in environments where cross certification between heterogeneous 
PKIs is involved.
- The certificate path verification: this involves checking the integrity of each certificates 
by validating the digital signatures of each of them in the path.
- The certificate status checking: this involves making sure that each certificate in the 
path is valid. To be considered as valid, a certificate should be used within its validity 
period (i.e should not have expired) and should not be revoked. Certificate revocation 
is a process by which an entity can decide to prematurely end the lifetime of a certificate 
and therefore invalidate the binding between the public key and the identity it contains. 
As stated in [80, 84], several reasons can lead to the revocation of a certificate, in 
particular:
- Private key compromise or its suspicion: if a user’s or CA’s private key has been 
compromised, the binding between its identity and public key should no longer be 
trusted and the corresponding certificate should be revoked as soon as possible.
- Change of affiliation: It occurs when any information mentioned in the certificate 
is no longer valid.
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- Cessation of operation: A CA may cease to operate or a user may no longer need 
the certificate issued.
The most common and standardized method to perform certificate revocation is to use 
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) [114]. A CRL is a document digitally signed by 
every CA that implements the standard: it contains the list of all the serial numbers 
of revoked but not yet expired certificates issued by the CA. CRLs are periodically 
published by CAs and stored in the directory with the certificates issued by the same 
CA. They can be located using an extension field called CRL Distribution Point (CDP) 
[114] in the X.509 certificate. It contains a X.500 or LDAP directory entry or even a 
URL indicating the location of the CRL.
Problem s
In [76], Ellison and Schneier conduct a critical analysis on PKIs and highlight their major 
flaws. In particular, they emphasize the fact that PKIs involve many components controlled 
by different entities for which different levels of trust are applied. Thus, they question 
the relative authority of CAs and RAs that may issue certificates to people that are not 
trustworthy but whose identity will not be verified. They also point out that the end 
user has not been taken into account when PKIs were designed: most PKIs assume that a 
private key holder is the end-user, forgetting that a private key is primarily manipulated by 
a computer program on a platform that may not be considered secure [188]. Ellison and 
Schneier’s analysis also critics the naming conventions used and highlights the fact that name 
collisions are likely to happen, which of course defeats the purpose of such an infrastructure. 
In [134], the authors point out some more practical problems related to the X.509 PKI 
such as the certificate processing complexity, certificate costs as well as cross domain trust 
management involving translation of security policies.
However, the PKI issue that has received the most attention from the academic commu­
nity is with no doubt the certificate revocation problem. The widely used CRL revocation 
system suffers from several major flaws [178], such as its size, the variable periodicity of its 
update and its lack of actual use by applications. Indeed, locating a CRL for a particular 
certificate involves checking the value of the X.509 extension field CRL Distribution Point 
present in the certificate. Most applications do not perform this check by default and need to 
be configured to do so. Moreover, even though [114] recommends support for this extension 
by CAs and applications, most certificate issuers do not bother filling the field (see [211] for 
an example). In order to try to overcome the problems listed above, several approaches have 
been studied [216, 217], In [222], these methods are sorted into four different categories. We
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briefly describe the most important here.
List-based Schem es. Delta CRLs were a first attempt to solve the size problem of CRLs 
by supplying users with a base CRL and some more lightweight delta CRLs that include 
only the serial numbers of the certificates that have been revoked since the base CRL was 
issued. Segmented CRLs and over-issued CRLs are also discussed in [216] but do not quite 
provide a realistic solution to CRLs problems.
C ertificate R evocation  status-based  schem es. The first real innovation came from 
Micali in 1994 with his Certificate Revocation Status system (CRS), later refined and re­
named Novomodo [147, 148]. It aims at getting rid of the burden of CRL checking as well 
as getting a more complete answer regarding the status of the certificate. It is based on 
hash chains and allows for a single certificate status checking at a time. The verifier is only 
left with the verification of this hash function-based lightweight signature and obtains a 
complete and satisfactory answer.
Tree-based Schem es. This approach was suggested by Kocher [124] and is based on 
Merkle hash trees [146]. It aims at saving time bandwidth and processing power by avoiding 
the downloading of a full CRL. The serial numbers of revoked certificates are stored in the 
leaves of the Certificate Revocation Tree (CRT) and its root is signed by the CA. When a 
certificate status is requested, a short proof of validity is sent to the verifier by the CRT 
issuer, which is the entity in charge of running the system on several CAs. The main 
drawback of this approach lies in the computational effort to carry out an update on the 
tree: a complete re-computation of the whole tree may be necessary.
Verifier transparent schem es. The strategy here is to off load time and resource con­
suming operations to a third party that carries out some operations on behalf of the end-user 
and/or CAs.
The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [154] is a protocol used to request the 
status of a certificate online and therefore provides potentially more up-to-date information 
than CRLs. However, end-user clients encounter the same problem as in the CRL system: 
they must be able to locate the right OCSP server and even if its location can be found in 
some certificates, it is likely that it is not mentioned in most of them. Verifying a certificate 
chain can also become problematic, especially when each certificate has been generated by 
different CAs depending on different OCSP servers. In order to overcome this problem, an 
architecture has been designed in [74] to enable OCSP servers to work as part of a network
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and provide OCSP clients with relevant responses even though the OCSP server contacted 
does not hold the information locally.
Other alternative certificate validation schemes are analyzed in [44], Their main idea is 
to delegate as many operations as possible to a third party online server. The Delegated 
Path Discovery (DPD) [169] approach delegates the task of discovering the certificate chain 
to a server given a target certificate specified by the client. The DPD server does not need to 
be trusted since it only collects CA generated information and forwards it to the client. The 
Delegated Path Validation (DPV) [169] approach extends the idea of the delegation of tasks 
even further by delegating all the burden of certificate path validation as well as certificate 
path discovery to an online server. As opposed to DPD, DPV does not provide the client 
with CA-signed proofs that the information requested is trustworthy. Therefore the online 
DPV server used must be fully trusted and the connection between the server and the client 
must be secure. The authors of [44] provide also a detailed description of SCVP [140] and 
XKMS [83], two protocols implementing the concept of DPV.
2 .3 .4  I d e n t ity -B a s e d  E n c r y p t io n  an d  A p p lic a t io n s
In 1984, Shamir first came up with the concept of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), a 
public key cryptosystem that would not require users to exchange any public key or public 
key certificate [191]. Instead, users would use any string and in particular their identity as 
a public key in order to solve key authenticity problems without using PKIs. The approach 
required however a trusted key generation center to derive the private key corresponding to 
their identity. The private key then had to be retrieved through a secure channel by the end- 
user. Identity-Based Encryption remained a concept until Boneh and Franklin showed in 
2001 that bilinear pairings on elliptic curves could be efficiently used to implement the first 
fully functional and secure IBE scheme [43], Their design suffers however from two major 
problems. Identity revocation is awkward to perform since revoking one’s email address, foi- 
instance, prevents anybody else from using it to communicate with that person. A solution 
to this problem was proposed by the same authors, and consisted in including a preset 
expiration date in the identity in order to produce ephemeral public keys. For example, 
“receiver-public-key || expiration-date” where “expiration-date” represents the current day, 
month or year depending on how long the key pair should be valid for, could be used as the 
recipient’s public key. This solution is however not very flexible as it forces the recipient 
of the message to obtain a new private key within the timeframe of the “expiration-date”. 
Another problem inherent to their design is key escrow, where one’s private key is generated 
by the trusted key generation center. Nevertheless, their IBE system remains a breakthrough
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in the field of pairing-based cryptography and fostered with no doubt research efforts in the 
area.
At the same time, Boneh et al. developed the concept of an on-line semi-trusted mediator 
(SEM) [42]. A SEM is a server that carries out cryptographic operations in conjunction with 
the end-user in order to provide a system that overcomes the certificate revocation problem. 
Based on threshold cryptosystems [91], this solution exploits a modified version of RSA 
called mediated RSA (mRSA) whose private key is split into two parts: one used by the 
end-user, the other one by the SEM. One of the main advantage of this approach is that 
it enables immediate revocation of security capabilities. In other words, the SEM checks 
whether the public key used has been revoked and if so, prevents immediately any entity 
from using the corresponding private key for decryption and/or digital signature generation 
by not completing the threshold cryptographic operations required. Therefore certificate 
validation no longer needs to be carried out by the end-user .
Soon after, Ding and Tsudik proposed a variant of the SEM-based security architec­
ture that uses a modified version of mRSA based on IBE concepts: IBE-mRSA [68], The 
approach eliminates the need for certificates but relies on the strong assumption that no 
user will ever be able to compromise the SEM, which would result in the total break of 
the system. Furthermore, Libert and Quisquater uncovered a flaw in the security proof 
provided, showing that the security of the system against inside attacks is no longer guar­
anteed [132], They also proposed a mediated ID-based encryption scheme based on bilinear 
pairings. However, even though it improves on Ding and Tsudik’s results, their system is 
still not secure against insiders that possess a user’s private key share and conduct chosen 
ciphertext attacks. Recently, Baek and Zheng solved this problem by designing a scheme 
that is secure against such attacks [29]. Their work finally provides IBE with fine grained 
revocation but still does not solve the key escrow problem.
2.4 M obile Phone System s and their Security
The first wireless telephone services were deployed in the late nineteen forties in Saint Louis, 
USA. A team of engineers from Bell Labs had designed and made available the first wireless 
network to thousands of users [28]. The system could only handle three subscribers at a 
time in the same city and was only half duplex. Since then, advances in the field of mobile 
telecommunications have led to the deployment of highly sophisticated third generation 
mobile phone architectures throughout Europe. In this section, we will explain the main 
principles of mobile telephony, detailing the current architectures in place. Then, we will 
study the mechanisms used to enable Internet access through mobile phone systems with a
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particular focus on their security.
2 .4 .1  G lo b a l S y s te m  for M o b ile  C o m m u n ic a tio n s  (G S M )
The GSM project [30, 99] started in 1982 at the European Post and Telecommunications 
conference (CEPT) where a proposal for a European cellular system was first discussed. The 
aim was to design a system that would replace the incompatible wireless mobile systems 
already in place in Europe. A study group called “Groupe Special Mobile” was formed with 
the objective to specify the GSM system. It would be cellular-based1, digital and would 
primarily be designed for voice transmission. The first tests were carried out in the early 
nineties and in 1992, the first GSM cellular network was introduced to the public by France 
Telecom [85], with its Itineris network. The system was then renamed the Global System for 
Mobile Communications and became the most popular mobile phone system in the world.
D escription
The GSM system is a revolution compared to previous systems. From the mobile operator 
point of view, the GSM network can handle even more mobile users due to a new technique 
called Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) [117] and that replaces the frequency-division 
multiple-access (FDMA) system used in 1G wireless networks. The frequency dedicated to 
each mobile user is now divided into time slots which increases the carrying capacity of the 
network by enabling multiple mobile users to access it at the same time [55], From the 
mobile users’ point of view, the digital design provides them with a lot of new features, such 
as a superior speech quality achieved by using digital audio encoding or extended battery 
lifetime due to reduced power consumption. New services are available, such as SMS [15] 
or call waiting/forwarding services and the security of communications is now guaranteed 
[185]. Finally, it provides its users with a new international roaming capability, regarded as 
one of the key strengths of the whole system.
A rchitecture
The architecture of the GSM system can be split into three different components; see Figure 
2.1.
- The Mobile Station (MS). This is the mobile handset used by a mobile user. It con­
tains the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM card) which identifies a mobile user uniquely
l T h o  w i r e l e s s  n e t w o r k  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  m u l t i p l e  g e o g r a p h i c a l  a r e a s  a l s o  c a l l e d  c e l l s  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n a b l e  
f r e q u e n c y  r e u s e  ( i n  n o n  a d j a c e n t  c e l l s ) .
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through the use of the International Mobile Subscriber Identity number (IMSI num­
ber). It is also composed of the Mobile Equipment (ME), in charge of the digital audio 
signal processing and radio transceiving. The ME is identified by the International 
Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI).
- The Base Station Subsystem (BSS), composed of two entities. The Base Station 
Transceiver (BST) is the radio transceiver relaying mobile users calls. Its radio cov­
erage area is called a cell, which measures typically from 250m wide for high density 
urban areas to 30km wide for rural areas. The Base Station Controller (BSC) is a small 
switch that handles a finite number of BST and links them to the switching system 
component. The area covered by the BSC is called Location Area and its identifier 
Location Area Identity (LAI). In some cases, a LA may be covered by multiple BSCs. 
The BSS is also called the radio access network.
- The Network Subsystem (NSS). This is the component used to set up and maintain 
calls made over the network. A Mobile Switching Center (MSC) usually parents a num­
ber of BSCs. The area controlled by the MSC is the sum of all the LAIs of its BSCs, 
as further described in Section 2.5.3. It uses a distributed database system to manage 
mobile users’ mobility. A Visitor Location Register (VLR) associated with each MSC 
stores information about mobile stations currently served by the MSC. The Home 
Location Register (HLR) carries IMSIs, service subscription information, location in­
formation (the identity of the currently serving Visitor Location Register (VLR) to 
enable the routing of mobile-terminated calls), service restrictions and supplementary 
services. It is generally associated with an Authentication Center (AuC) handling the 
authentication phase at the beginning of a connection. An Equipment Identity Reg­
ister maintains a list of IMEI as well as their rights on the network. The switching 
system also provides interfaces to PSTN networks as well as TCP/IP networks.
Security
First generation wireless networks suffered from eavesdropping attacks and mobile phone 
cloning since the identity of the phone as well as the communications were transmitted in 
plaintext over the radio link [65, 109]. Therefore, there was a need to secure the radio 
link of cellular mobile networks. The aim was basically to make GSM communications 
at least as secure as ordinary PSTN ones. Thus, several security mechanisms have been 
implemented in the GSM system to ensure the authenticated anonymity of mobile users 
and the confidentiality of their communications as well as the protection of mobile network 
operators from billing frauds.
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Figure 2.1: Architecture of GSM networks.
Anonym ity. Anonymity of mobile users is provided through the use of a temporary 
pseudonym [172], The MSC needs to identify the Mobile Station by its IMSI number in 
order to establish a connection between the Mobile Station and the Network Subsystem. 
However, sending this number as a plaintext over the network could reveal information 
about the Mobile Station. To ensure anonymity, the IMSI will be sent only once, when the 
Mobile Station is turned 011 for the first time. From then, a Temporary Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (TMSI) number is used instead and updated frequently depending on time and 
location of the subscriber [35]. The TMSI number is stored in non volatile memory so that 
it can be reused if the phone is switched off and switched back on.
A uthentication . It occurs between the Mobile Station and the Network Subsystem. The 
Mobile Station contains a SIM card. It is a tamper resistant device also known as a smart 
card [174]. The SIM card stores temporary personal data such as mobile phone numbers or 
SMS text messages. It also stores permanent security related information such as the IMSI 
number, two proprietary security algorithms (A3,A8), a 128 bits user Key K j  and a PIN (Per­
sonal Identification number). The authentication mechanism follows a challenge/response 
protocol initiated by the Network Subsystem. It is extensively described in [98].
Confidentiality. Once the authentication step is successfully achieved, both the Mobile 
Station and the Network Subsystem generate an enciphering key K c  aimed at encrypting 
communications on the fly. K c  is a 64 bit key, is generated by the A8 algorithm and is also 
an operator dependent one way function. A8 and A3 are usually implemented in a single one 
way function. An example of such a function is the GSM Association’s [99] COMP128, which
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is implemented both on the AuC and on the SIM card of each subscriber’s Mobile Station. 
The use of A3 and A8 as part of the authentication protocol constitutes an operator option. 
As a result, operators can specify and implement their own authentication algorithms. In 
practice, most operators do not wish to do so and usually use example implementations from 
either 3GPP [199] or the GSM Association [99], In the latter case though, the COMP128 
implementation is oidy made available to qualified industry parties. In order to allow for 
mobile phone users to roam without operators having to reveal authentication algorithms 
and K[ keys, triplets containing common parameters can be exchanged between different 
networks. Once K c  has been agreed between the two parties, communications between the 
Mobile Station and the Base Stations can be encrypted using a stream cipher A5. A5 is 
implemented on the Mobile Equipment part of the Mobile Statioii because it has to encrypt 
and decrypt data on the fly. It is also implemented on Base Stations Transceivers.
D iscussion. The GSM security is however limited by a number of factors [181]. First 
and foremost, the security design only provides access security in the sense that information 
is only protected between the Mobile Station and its related Base Station. Signaling and 
communications can therefore be intercepted in clear within the fixed network as well as 
tokens like triplets potentially exchanged between network operators that can be reused to 
perform replay attacks. The authentication design lets Mobile Stations be authenticated 
by the network but does not allow them to authenticate it. An active attack can therefore 
be conducted by impersonating network elements. An example of such Man-In-the-Middle 
attack is presented in [35], Algorithms used for both authentication and confidentiality rep­
resent another source of security weaknesses. Indeed, their design were not made available 
to public scrutiny and proved to be insecure after further investigations. Their implementa­
tion suffered from security flaws as well. Indeed, since 1998, a series of attacks has seriously 
hampered the credibility of the GSM security, see [214, 123]. The stream cipher A5 has also 
been subject to various attacks. Due to import/export restrictions on encryption technolo­
gies, several versions of A5 are available. A5/0 is a version of A5 used by countries under 
UN sanctions. A5/1 is used in Europe while A5/2 is used in Asia. Even though its design 
was never published, it leaked to two computer security researchers [214] and led in 1999 to 
two successful attacks on A5/2 and A5/1 [167, 40, 214].
In order to address these security issues, 3GPP [199] and the GSM Association Security 
Group [99] developed fully open security algorithms based on international standards. In 
2003, they published the specifications of A5/3 and GSM Milenage [12] in order to replace 
the flawed algorithms initially used. Some attacks have already been performed on A5/3, but 
without noticeable success [198, 39, 193]. For the time being however, only a few networks
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and Mobile Stations support these new algorithms.
2 .4 .2  G en er a l P a c k e t R a d io  S e r v ic e  (G P R S )
The GSM system was primarily designed for voice communications. While data transmission 
is possible over such a type of network, it remains limited because of its circuit switched 
design. In order to provide a more flexible and faster data transmission over wireless net­
works, ETSI [1] defined a new standard in 1997, based on a packet switched design. This 
approach enables GPRS to provide a bandwidth theoretically 18 times higher than GSM, 
which is more suitable for data transmission.
A GPRS network is usually built on top of a GSM network architecture and is viewed 
as an upgrade of the 2G network [150]. Such a network is referred to as a 2.5G network. 
Both networks work in parallel; the GSM network still provides voice services while the 
GPRS network handles data transmissions. In order to sort the incoming data, the Base 
Station Controllers (BSC) are upgraded with a new piece of hardware called Packet Con­
trol Unit (PCU), a unit that routes the data to the appropriate GSM or GPRS network. 
Voice communications are handled by the GSM network while data communications are 
forwarded to two new functional units: the Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) and the 
Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN). The former is in charge of delivering data packets 
and handling handovers when mobile users move from one cell to another. The latter is a 
gateway between the mobile network and the Internet and may be in charge of assigning IP 
addresses. To avail of GPRS new services, Mobile Stations need to be upgraded as well.
Security
Security at the radio link remains the same as for the GSM system [45], However, the 
Mobile Station (MS) performs the authentication step directly with the SGSN. The same 
algorithms are used but their implementation follows the standards published by 3GPP [12]. 
Encryption is performed at a higher layer in the protocol stack (Logical Link Layer (LLC)) 
and uses a new stream cipher with different input/output parameters: the GPRS Encryption 
Algorithm (GEA3) [79, 11], similar to A5/3. The secure link is extended further back in 
the network to the SGSN, as opposed to the Base Station Transceiver in the GSM system. 
The fact that GPRS was designed to enable mobile users to access Internet services means 
that some components of the GPRS system are potentially subjects to the same threats as 
online systems [175, 48]. Like GSM, the system still does not provide end-to-end security 
and must use some other technologies (see Section 2.4.4) to provide this security service.
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2 .4 .3  U n iv e r sa l M o b ile  T e le c o m m u n ic a t io n s  S y s te m  (U M T S )
In Japan, third generation (3G) wireless networks were commercially made available to 
mobile users in late 2001 [2], Like GPRS networks, 3G networks are primarily designed 
for data communications and adopted a packet switched design. By providing a higher 
bandwidth than GPRS networks, they enable mobile network operators to support enhanced 
mobile services such as faster internet access or video services.
The Euro-Japanese version of 3G is called Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
(UMTS) [16]. Like GPRS, it was designed to be an upgrade of the GSM networks already 
in use. In order to provide a higher bandwidth, UMTS defines a new way to handle mobile 
communications by using a new multiplexing technique: W-CDMA [6], which allows multiple 
devices to transmit on the same frequencies at the same time using sequence numbers.
Mobile Access Network Network Subsystem
Figure 2.2: Architecture of 3G networks.
However, while UMTS still uses the same GSM/GPRS core network (mainly switches and 
registers), the radio access network cannot be recycled and needs to be upgraded in order to 
support W-CDMA [10] (see Figure 2.2 for a more detailed description of the architecture). 
This 3G radio access network, also known as UTRAN (UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access 
Network) [16], requires more Base Station Transceivers (BST) than before. Furthermore, 
due to the new multiplexing technique, BST sites that were considered optimum prior may 
not be optimum sites for 3G Base Stations. All this resulted in a relatively slow and costly 3G 
network implementation by mobile network operators. In order to provide similar services 
but at a lower quality of service, GPRS was implemented as an interim measure.
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Third generation network security is an evolution of GSM security [14]. The new security 
design aims at correcting the GSM security weaknesses as well as adding new security fea­
tures required by new 3G services and new architectural network design. While anonymity 
is ensured by the same mechanisms, authentication and confidentiality have been slightly 
redesigned in order to meet new security requirements.
A uthentication . One of the main problem with GSM authentication is that it is only 
one way. The Mobile Station authenticates to the Network Subsystem but has no proof it 
is dealing with a valid network . To address this issue, several upgrades have been made 
to the GSM authentication scheme to provide mutual authentication of the two parties. 
Two new sets of functions have been introduced in order to replace the A3/A8 and A5 
algorithms. 3G authentication steps are similar to GSM authentication ones [172] but involve 
different parameters. In order to prevent replay attacks, the freshness of the authentication 
parameters is also verified by the USIM using a sequence number.
Confidentiality. The 3G security takes advantage of the lessons learnt from the GSM 
security flaws and uses open design and published algorithms. Confidentiality is now ensured 
from the Mobile Station to the switching center and uses longer keys to avoid potential brute 
force attacks. The new ciphering algorithm F8 [17] replaces the A5 algorithm from the GSM 
system and is used to encrypt both signaling and data messages. F9 [17] also guarantees 
the integrity of the signaling messages. Both F8 and F9 are protected against reuse of 
their output by using parameters such as time, identity direction of the communication and 
random numbers.
N etw ork  security. A significant effort has been carried out in order to secure the Network 
Subsystem [35]. Indeed, while confidentiality was only available between the Mobile Station 
and the Base Station Transceiver in the GSM system, it has been extended further to the 
switch (MSC). Mechanisms were also included to support security between different network 
operators: a Public Key Infrastructure enables networks to securely exchange shared session 
keys used to protect information shared as part of the roaming agreements.
2 .4 .4  In te r n e t  A c c e s s  o v er  M o b ile  P h o n e  N e tw o r k s
This section aims to present the evolution of mobile phone Internet access. In particular, 
it introduces the WAP technology along with a description of its security as a first attempt 
to provide Internet services to 2G mobile stations. It then discusses an Internet Access
Security
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protocol known as I-mode, a NTT DoCoMo’s proprietary technology, that provided first the 
possibility to browse the Internet from a phone over a packet-switched network.
W ireless A pplication  P rotocol (W AP)
The need for mobile phone Internet access arose by the end of the nineteen nineties, pushed 
by the promising success of m-commerce as well as its wired equivalent e-commerce. In order 
to tackle the daunting challenge of enabling wireless internet access on 2G Mobile Stations, 
industry partners gathered in a joint effort and founded a democratic consortium known 
as the WAP forum [5], The group merged later in 2002 with the Open Mobile Architec­
ture Initiative to form the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) [161], In 2001, they released the 
specifications of the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP), which defines an open standard 
architecture as well as a set of protocols for the implementation of wireless Internet access.
D escription. The WAP architecture is designed to enable communication between mobile 
terminals and network servers and can operate over any wireless network. It defines a new 
protocol stack [5] based on the TCP/IP architecture. However, in order to suit mobile 
devices needs, WAP comes with some optimizations and enhancements:
- Its transport layer combined with its transaction support provides enhanced packet 
handling compared to TCP and UDP.
- Content is provided to mobile clients through a new binary encoded markup language 
(WML) based on XML. Smaller than HTML with only 35 tags, it provides mobile 
devices with display limitations with simple and lightweight content.
- A gateway in charge of translating Web-based protocols to/from WAP-based ones. It 
is also in charge of DNS lookup and caching. Some gateways can act as transcoding 
proxies [38] by translating HTML into WML, on the fly.
- New services are provided to mobile users such as Push services and Wireless Telephony 
Application (WTA).
While a HTTP client receives the HTML code upon HTTP request, a WAP client receives 
a compiled byte stream instead of a WML page. Indeed, when a WAP client requests a WML 
page through the WAP protocol, the gateway fetches the WML page from the corresponding 
remote server on her behalf and converts it into WML bytecode before sending it back to 
her. The size of the compiled stream received is smaller than the normal WML content and 
it requires less than half of the packets needed to transport information in the equivalent 
TCP/IP communication.
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Security P rotocol. WAP security is based on the specifications of TLS 1.0 [66], but 
is adapted to the wireless environment. Known as the Wireless Transport Layer Security 
(WTLS) [9], the protocol supports both client and server authentication, key exchange, con­
fidentiality and integrity. It differentiates itself from TLS by supporting datagrams, since 
WDP or UDP can be used as the transport layer. It provides a key refresh for long lived 
connections obtained through an optimized handshake that provides certificate information 
used to easily retrieve the corresponding certificate. Finally, WTLS uses a more compact 
certificate known as the WTLS Certificate that supports RSA as well as ECC cryptosystems 
[144], However, all the changes made to TLS in order to simplify it resulted in introducing 
some new security flaws. A detailed description of the known attacks on WTLS that include 
exploits on both symmetric and asymmetric weak keys and Man-In-The-Middle attacks, is 
given in [183]. On top of all these security vulnerabilities, no end-to-end secure connection 
between the mobile client and the content provider can be established since the WAP Gate­
way sits in between the two entities [53]. Translating WTLS into TLS requires the WAP 
Gateway to decrypt and encrypt information to be forwarded to the content provider. This 
“WAP gap” (see Figure 2.3) makes the WAP Gateway the weakest link in the data path.
Mobile Stations WAP Gateway Web Server
Figure 2.3: The WAP Architecture.
W ireless P ublic K ey Infrastructure. In order to meet the security requirements of m- 
commerce and provide end-to-end security between a mobile client and a content provider, 
a wireless PKI (WPKI) [208] tailored to mobile devices was designed. This PKI is not 
entirely “wireless” and in fact the fundamental ideas behind this PKI are the same as for
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a traditional PKI. However some enhancements and optimizations have been implemented 
to take into account the low processing power of mobile devices. The architecture of WPKI 
[220] is very similar to the IETF PKIX [114]. It requires the same components and the main 
difference between the two architectures is the Registration Authority that interoperates 
between mobile devices and traditional CAs. It is implemented as a network server and is 
referred to as the PKI portal. Mobile devices now carry a new tamper resistant computer 
chip [173], the WAP Identity Module (WIM) [206], along with the SIM card. Like a SIM card, 
it performs cryptographic operations at the transport layer (WTLS) but the WIM module 
supports public key technologies, and provides enhanced authentication and key agreement 
mechanisms. Furthermore, WIM modules provide application layer security by allowing 
mobile terminals to digitally sign WAP transactions using a set of cryptographic libraries 
known as WMLScript [207]. Users’ private keys as well as a set of PKI root certificates are 
also stored on the WIM module.
Enhancem ents. WPKI introduces optimizations in PKI protocols, in cryptographic 
algorithms and keys as well as in certificate formats [182]. In particular, a public key 
cryptographic algorithm based on Elliptic curves [63] can be used in order to perform digital 
signature operations as well as the TLS handshake [66]. Also, a new server certificate 
format known as the WTLS certificate has emerged in order to minimize the amount of 
work required for transfer, processing and storage of public keys on mobile devices. It is 
used only for server authentication and may be sent over the air via the WAP protocol. 
Client certificates remain X.509v3 certificates [114] but these are not meant to be sent over 
the radio network. Instead mobile clients provide the server with the URL of their X.509v3 
certificate so that the latter can retrieve it.
L im itations. The WPKI approach tends to reduce the amount of computation on the 
mobile device as well as the quantity of memory and bandwidth used. However, it does 
not introduce any new solution to solve the traditional PKI problem: certificate revocation. 
Indeed, CRLs or OCSP approaches have not been specified yet in the WPKI standard 
[63, 102]. To overcome the problem, short-lived server-side certificates are issued by CAs 
and can be used during typically 48 hours by mobile clients. To revoke a server’s public 
key, a CA stops issuing a certificate for his key. Clients need only to perform a simple time 
check, provided they have access to a precise and reliable clock.
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In 1999, NTTD0C0M0 [3], a Japanese network operator, released I-Mode [159], a propri­
etary technology aimed at delivering mobile services to mobile phone users. Similar to WAP 
implementations, this protocol runs on Personal Digital Cellular Packet (PDC-P) networks, 
comparable to GPRS networks but proprietary, to establish wireless communications be­
tween mobile phones and transceivers. It then uses standard TCP/IP [196] to communicate 
with mobile service providers on the wired part of the network. The architecture remains 
quite simple [27]: a Mobile Message Packet Gateway (MMPG), part of the PDC-P network, 
is in charge of converting messages between the two protocols and a portal web server known 
as the I-mode server, hosts the different iMode sites. Software content is provided via Java 
applets [113], while static content is distributed using a subset of HTML 3.0, known as 
Compact HTML (cHTML [70]). No content translation is needed since mobile users can 
still view HTML but cHTML has been tailored to constrained mobile displays and therefore 
looks better.
I-Mode uses a packet switched network which makes it more suitable to transfer data 
and very attractive in terms of performance compared to WAP implementations [34]. The 
bandwidth available is higher and allows richer content to be downloaded. The “always on” 
connection does not require a long dial up (sometimes up to 40 seconds using WAP) and 
allows mobile subscribers to be charged for the content downloaded rather than for the time 
spent online.
However, I-mode was designed behind closed doors and none of its components’ design 
specifications were ever made publicly available. Even though NTT DoCoMo adopted the 
Internet TCP/IP protocol from the beginning and therefore uses well known and studied 
technologies, no standard security was provided before 2001. All this means that security 
relied on the lower layers of the I-Mode protocol stack, such as the PDC-P radio link which 
was never published and was potentially subject to attacks. In 2001, NTT DoCoMo adopted 
the SSL/TLS [66] standard security layer which provides end-to-end security between mobile 
phones and the I-Mode server [4]. However, only server side certificates are handled by 
mobile clients which does not provide non-repudiation services, digital signature cannot be 
used by mobile users and the I-Mode server cannot authenticate mobile users, at least at 
that protocol layer.
C onclusion
Higher bandwidth availability due to network upgrade as well as technical advances in mobile 
device design will soon make the use of the IP stack in the wireless environment possible.
I-Mode
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Version 2.0 [7] of the WAP specifications adds support for TCP/TLS/HTTP and provides 
IP support to mobile devices when it is available on the radio network [220]. WAP2.0 now 
encompasses both the TCP/IP stack and the old WAP protocol stack and provides enhanced 
security by guaranteeing end-to-end security between the mobile device and the content 
provider through the use of TLS [8], As a result, the “WAP gap” problem disappears and 
the utility of the WAP Gateway is reduced to providing enhanced telephony functionalities 
as well as WAP push services.
2.5 Location M anagem ent in M obile Networks
Location Management is the process by which a mobile network keeps track of its sub­
scribers in order to allow the latter to initiate and/or maintain a wireless communication. 
With the advent of location-based applications, the positioning technologies previously used 
have become obsolete and some more accurate techniques are required to comply with the 
E112/E911 regulations recently adopted (see Section 1.2.2). In this section, an overview 
of the newly standardized positioning technologies is given along with some considerations 
about accuracy and ease of deployment. Finally, the network upgrades needed to handle 
location information requests and positioning are detailed together with the main location 
management operations.
2 .5 .1  L o c a t io n  P o s it io n in g  T e c h n o lo g ie s
In order to comply with the new regulations aiming to render mobile phones locatable within 
wireless phone networks, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) as well as the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) have recently standardized the 
following location positioning systems [18],
N etw ork-based M obile Position ing Technologies
E nhanced Cell-ID . The Cell-ID technique is the most simple but also one of the least 
accurate positioning methods. As described in Section 2.4.1, since mobile phone networks 
are cell-based, they constantly need to know in which cell a mobile user is located in order 
to provide him/her with mobile network services. Therefore, the positioning technology is 
already built-in and a simple software upgrade can make it available for LBS use. However, 
this method suffers from a very low and variable accuracy due to differences in cell size. 
Another problem lies in the fact that the cell serving the mobile phone might not be the 
closest to the handset. Precision can therefore vary from a few hundred meters in cities up
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to several kilometers in the countryside where cell concentration is much lower.
Enhanced Cell-ID takes advantage of the Cell-ID positioning technique associated with 
some features of the GSM system usually used for network management. Timing Advance 
(TA) is an internal parameter used for synchronization on the radio channel in TDMA 
systems (see Section 2.4.1). It basically holds the time it takes for the radio signal to travel 
from the mobile phone to the Base Station. However, its accuracy is very low (around 500 
meters) and using it to locate a mobile phone would require the device to communicate with 
three Base Stations. Timing Advance is therefore only used in conjunction with Cell-ID to 
achieve higher accuracy by determining with precision the cell serving the mobile phone, 
when the cell radius is greater than 500 meters. In 3G networks (see Section 2.4.3), Timing 
Advance is replaced by the Round Trip Time (RTT) parameter.
T im e of Arrival. Time of Arrival (TOA) is a technique based on Base Station (BS) 
triangulation and assumes that BS positions are accurately known. It also exploits the time 
difference between radio signals propagation for the same signal to reach two distinct BS. 
The location of a mobile phone is determined by the intersection of the three hyperbolas 
corresponding to its estimated location measured by three BS. This approach provides only 
a little better accuracy than Cell-based location techniques and is subject to quality of 
service problems due to potential multipath signal propagation and/or lack of Base Station 
coverage. Also, some Base Station upgrades known as Location Measurements Units (LMU) 
(see Section 2.5.2) are necessary in order to measure and triangulate users’ position. These 
units need to be implemented in every Base Station and need to be synchronized. TOA 
enables the network to locate a mobile user with a precision of about 100 meters.
H andset-based M obile Positioning Technology
Enhanced Observed T im e Difference (E -O T D ). Observed Time Reference refers to 
the time interval observed by a mobile phone between the reception of signals emitted by two 
different Base Stations. This positioning technique locates a mobile phone by triangulation, 
knowing the Base Stations’ location, the arrival times of the signals emitted by each Base 
Stations as well as their the timing differences. It requires some software modifications in 
order to enhance existing measurements processes as well as some Location Measurements 
Units (LMU) (see Section 2.5.2). Its accuracy ranges from 50 meters to 150 meters.
Hybrid
A ssisted G PS. The Global Positioning System (GPS) [111] is the oldest as well as the 
most widely used satellite-based positioning system. It relies on 24 satellites in orbit around
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the earth. A receiver calculates the distances between itself and four satellites and is able to 
work out its location with a precision of up to ten meters. The system is however subject to 
coverage problems inside buildings and in very dense urban areas, and mobile phones need 
to be upgraded with these satellite receivers in order to avail of the system. A European 
version of this positioning technique called Galileo will be available in 2008. The system will 
be under civilian control and will be an alternative to the GPS system, controlled by the 
United States Department of Defense.
Assisted GPS, or A-GPS is a network-assisted GPS. It combines the GPS system with 
network-based positioning technologies to achieve better response time. Assisted GPS uses 
network resources to get relevant information such as the position of the appropriate satellites 
to contact and forwards it to mobile stations. The GPS receiver included in mobile phones 
can then:
- Process its location quicker and more precisely thanks to the additional correction data 
received. This approach is known as Mobile Station-based A-GPS
- Acquire the raw GPS signal and forward it to the mobile network. The mobile network 
can perform the necessary calculations on behalf of the mobile station and process its 
location. This approach is known as Mobile Station-assisted A-GPS
This hybrid approach achieves an accuracy of a few meters in open environments but remains 
limited in dense urban areas due to GPS lack of availability.
A v a i l a b i l i t y
Figure 2.4: Accuracy of positioning techniques.
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Some of the positioning techniques presented in this section are applicable whatever the 
geographical context but may not provide an optimal accuracy for some location-based 
services. Others are very accurate but are not available in every location. Almost all of 
them need some software and/or hardware upgrades, as described in Section 2.5.2. Therefore, 
because of all these parameters, network operators may implement only a subset of these 
standardized techniques, depending on the level of service they want to offer as well as the 
investments they are willing to engage in network upgrades. Figure 2.4 summarizes the 
accuracy of each method given the context environment in which they operate.
2 .5 .2  N e tw o r k  U p g r a d e s  to  S u p p o r t  L o c a t io n  In fo rm a tio n
The integration of these new positioning technologies implies both a hardware and software 
upgrade on the existing wireless networks. The authors of [71] describe three newly required 
hardware units as well as some existing hardware upgrades to be performed in order to 
correctly implement the new location positioning requirements.
The first hardware component needed is called the Gateway Mobile Location Center 
(GMLC). It is in charge of interfacing the network with location positioning requesters and 
its main tasks are requester authentication as well as access control. The Serving Mobile 
Location Center (SMLC) is a component located at the edge of the access network and is 
in charge, of determining the position of mobile terminals. Finally, Location Measurement 
Units (LMU) assist SMLCs in determining mobile terminals’ positions by carrying out Base 
Station synchronizations measurements when necessary.
As stated before, existing network components also need to be upgraded. Mobile Switch­
ing Centers (MSC) need to be able to work in conjunction with GMLCs in order to perform 
access control according to users’ preferences. It also needs to be able to trigger mobile 
terminals for their location when handset-based mobile positioning technologies are used. 
Base Stations also need to be upgraded with the necessary LMUs.
2 .5 .3  O p e ra tio n s
Understanding the concept of network areas is essential to capture the location management 
mechanisms used to route voice and data phone calls. In this section, we briefly describe 
the different levels of location areas used within a wireless phone network and show how the 
latter manages to maintain an up-to-date location information for every registered mobile 
phone.
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Wireless mobile phone networks cover a geographical area called the Public Land Mobile 
Network Area (PLMN). This is the area in which a network subscriber expects to be both 
reachable and able to initiate voice or data phone calls. Because of the very nature of 
cell-based wireless networks, the PLMN area is made up of multiple other subdivisions 
corresponding to the different network layers. Figure 2.5 presents the different levels of 
network areas.
Network Areas
PLMN Service Area m s c /  j +
,/ VLR
/I ------------► b A serves one and only one b area
A + : There exists one or more instance o f A in the current area
Figure 2.5: Network Areas in Wireless Networks
As explained earlier, routing voice/data phone calls involves the knowledge of the location 
of the receiver. In other words, the mobile network and more precisely the MSC must have 
up-to-date Mobile Stations’ location information in order to establish the communication. 
Two processes enable the MSC/VLR to be aware of the Mobile Stations’ position:
- Location Update. Every time a Mobile Station enters a new Location Area, it sends 
an update message to the corresponding MSC. This automated process does not occur 
as often as moving from one Base Station to another. It is not very precise since the 
Location Area returned may potentially be very large, but it reduces however the search 
space when the MSC needs to locate a Mobile Station. Location Update also occurs
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when a Mobile Station is either switched on or off. In practice, Base Stations regularly 
broadcast the LAI of the Location Area they are part of. Mobile Stations compare 
this value with the previous one received and send an update to the corresponding 
VLR via the MSC if it has entered a new Location Area. The MSC provides Mobile 
Stations with a new TMSI and updates the different components of the Network Sub 
System.
- Location Paging. When the MSC needs to locate a particular Mobile Station in order 
to route a phone call for example, it pages the Mobile Station or polls the Base Stations 
located in the Location Area associated with this Mobile Station. The Mobile Station 
can then send a location update.
More information on the research efforts to optimize both Location Update and Location 
Paging can be found in [139].
2.6 Refinem ent of the Thesis O bjectives
In the light of this section, we wish to refine here the research objectives previously stated. 
The research undertaken aims at designing a secure infrastructure to enable mobile phone 
users to avail of location-based web services over the Internet.
Mobile phones are here Internet enabled devices. They can connect to a 2G or 3G 
network and do not necessary embed any positioning technologies. However they need to be 
locatable in the sense that an entity, such as the mobile phone network for example, is able 
to position them and transfer their location safely to the mobile operator databases.
The location-based web services are web services run by third party entities. These third 
parties access mobile operator’s network resources through the infrastructure to provide LBS 
over the Internet to both mobile and static clients.
The infrastructure design will make sure to take into account all the security issues arising 
from the nature of the radio network. An appropriate PKI suitable for mobile phones will 
be used as a way to authenticate mobile users and secure communications. Finally, the 
infrastructure will help mobile operators to comply with the EU directives stated in Section 





This section aims to provide the requirements for the design of an architecture that guaran­
tees privacy for mobile phone users when considered as Targets for location-based services 
applications. Our analysis first describes the mobile environment in which the architecture 
will operate by introducing the different actors involved in the provision of location-based 
applications. By stressing each entities’ security requirements, we introduce the need for 
a middleware together with its open protocol and PKI in order to interface and mediate 
the transactions between the different actors. We finally state the requirements for the new 
components considered.
3.2 Environm ent
We present here the basic requirements of the main actors in the context of the provision 
of location-based services in wireless phone networks. First and foremost, we give a general 
description of the entities involved and detail their respective requirements. We then study 
the threat model of the environment in which they operate and identify the main problems 
that the research work carried out aims at solving. Finally, we introduce the need for a 
middleware in order to implement the various requirements of each entity.
3 .2 .1  F u n c tio n a l D e s c r ip t io n  a n d  R e q u ir e m e n ts
The architecture considered in order to enable LBS provision is composed of 4 different 
entities as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Recalling the terminology defined in Section 1.3.1, we 
identify the requirements for the following entities:
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- The Subject. The Subject is the entity querying a LBS through the Internet. She may 
or may not be registered with a LBS or with the Mobile Operator. The Subject can 
access a LBS using a fixed or mobile device through a fixed or wireless Internet access 
and may or may not be registered with the corresponding LBS depending on the type 
of service offered. We also refer to mobile Subject as a Subject connecting to a LBS 
through a mobile device.
- The Target. The Target is the entity to be located by the Mobile Operator and whose 
position will be used by LBS to offer a value-added service. She carries a mobile device 
connected to a wireless mobile phone network, as defined in Section 2.4 and that is 
locatable by either network or handset-based positioning techniques (see Section 2.5.1 
for further information). The Target has to be registered with the Mobile Operator and 
may or may not be known to the LBS. Her identity and location should be protected 
in order to restrict their access by authorized LBS. Finally, the Target should have 
the possibility to set up and modify her privacy preferences regarding to the degree of 
intimacy she wishes to maintain between her and any LBS or Subject that may want 
to locate her. As mentioned in Section 1.3.1, the Target and the Subject entities may 
represent the same entity in some situations such as when a mobile Subject uses a LBS 
that requires her location to deliver its service.
- The LBS. This is the location-based service provided over the Internet. It can be 
accessed either anonymously or using pseudonyms by Subjects. The external third 
party that provides a LBS is refered to as a LBS provider.
- The Mobile Operator. This entity operates a wireless network and may be responsible 
for locating Targets and managing their location information, when network-based 
positioning techniques are used. The Mobile Operator is also in charge of delivering 
Targets' location information to LBS, according to their privacy preferences.
3 .2 .2  T h r e a t  M o d e l
The Mobile Operator is the only completely trusted entity in this architecture. She knows 
the identity as well as the personal details of all of her mobile subscribers. She also already 
knows their location to a certain extend as this is a requirement for implementing a cellular 
network; see Section 2.4.1 for more information. Soon, when the new positioning techniques 
mentioned in Section 2.5.1 will be implemented, she will have access to rather more accurate 
location information. The Mobile Operator needs to be trusted not to misuse the data she 
already has or will have access to. Targets trust her not to disclose their location information
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L o c a t i o n  d e t e r m i n a t i o n
Figure 3.1: General Architecture Topology.
without considering their privacy preferences while LBS  expect her to provide them with 
reliable location information upon authorized request.
The LBS may not be trusted by any other entity, with respect to location information 
handling. LBS providers do maintain a commercial relationship with the Mobile Operator 
and for this reason, we believe that they are not likely to give away the location information 
they have collected. However, we are aware that some information leaks may occur in some 
cases. E-commerce web sites that store credit card details in their database are usually 
much less trusted than web sites that outsource the billing transaction to a trusted banking 
institution, by implementing protocols such as SET [120] for example. Similarly, we believe 
that LBS that store location information represent a threat for Targets since this information 
could be stolen and misused by some other malicious entities, like credit card numbers could 
be. Therefore, we believe that Targets should be able to judge and decide whether the LBS 
requesting their location should be given full or limited access to it. This way, we avoid 
considering LBS as a “global hostile observer” and create several levels of confidence. Yet, 
LBS are expected not too cheat in order to help malicious Subjects gain more information 
than what they should receive. Indeed, LBS may query Mobile Operators for some Target's 
location information on behalf of a particular Subject. By replacing the identity of the 
malicious Subject with the identity of a more trusted one, a LBS could retrieve more precise 
and sensitive information and forward it to the malicious Subject.
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Subjects authorized to access a particular Target's location information are generally 
believed by the latter not to misbehave with the location data they receive since there exist 
a trust relationship, external to the architecture described, that has been established prior 
to connecting to a particular LBS. An example of such a relationship lies in the identity 
management of Instant messaging services such as MSN Messenger, where someone needs 
to know her correspondent’s email address before being able to establish a communication 
with this person. Malicious Subjects that collude with some malicious LBS can however 
become a threat to the architecture considered, as describe above.
The Target can potentially become an active entity with respect to location information 
provision when handset-based positioning techniques are used by the Mobile Operator to 
retrieve her location details. In this precise context, the entity is trusted to provide reliable 
location data. In other words, the Target is not considered as an attacker willing to modify 
her location information.
3 .2 .3  C o n c lu s io n
The requirements stated in this section outline the role of an intermediary that would make 
decisions regarding to who could access location information and when. The Mobile Operator 
is clearly in the best position, both from a technical and commercial point of view, to be 
given this responsibility. We therefore propose the design of an interoperable middleware, 
operated by a trusted third party, that will implement the technologies necessary to fulfill 
the requirements detailed in this section. The proposed middleware may be administrated 
and run by the Mobile Operator and will communicate with LBS using a specific protocol.
3.3 M iddleware and Protocol
A middleware is generally defined as a software layer or “glue” that is used to interface two 
applications in order to facilitate their communication. In the context of this thesis, the 
middleware considered will interface location-based web services with low level positioning 
technologies. It will act both as a location information provider and as a security mediator 
between the different requestors and providers of location information. In this section, we 
outline the requirements for the design of such a middleware as well as the ones for the 
protocol used by LBS to access its functionalities.
47
Security and privacy of Targets being the main reason why such a middleware is needed, we 
first describe the functional requirements it should fulfil. We then investigate the security 
features that it provides to Targets, Subjects, Mobile Operators and LBS.
Functional Requirem ents
The middleware proposed is designed to be implemented within a trusted third party’s 
infrastructure. We consider the Mobile Operator as the candidate that provides the ideal 
environment to facilitate the implementation of such middleware. It will easily allow the 
latter to remain transparent for Subjects, Targets and LBS and will provide an easy access to 
Targets’ location information. As a result, we will use it as the trusted third party entity in 
our description even though the architecture design will allow the middleware to be located 
in some other trusted third parties’s infrastructures. The main functional requirements for 
the design of such a middleware are listed as follows:
- Requirement 1. It should be easily accessible to Web Service developers in terms of 
programming interfaces. Web Service designers and developers, as opposed to Telecom 
developers, are more familiar with high level programming languages. The middleware 
will therefore be implemented at the application level of the OSI model.
- Requirement 2. Its design should follow a network and mobile device independent 
approach. In other words, the middleware will abstract the location positioning tech­
nologies used to retrieve location information. It will also be independent of the wireless 
network used, provided the latter can provide a full Internet access to Subjects. Fi­
nally, the middleware is intended to be mobile device independent, which means that 
Subjects may use whatever type of devices they wish as long as the latter are connected 
to a suitable wireless network and, of course, locatable as defined in Section 2.5.1.
- Requirement 3. It should provide an interface capable of accessing some of the Mobile 
Operator’s resources. In particular, it should be able to retrieve Targets’ location 
information from the Gateway Mobile Location Center (GMLC) when necessary.
- Requirement 4• It should provide an open interface in order to interoperate with similar 
infrastructures, run by other Mobile Operators, that facilitate the provision of location 
information. In particular, the middleware should handle roaming Targets in terms of 
positioning and charging.
3 .3 .1  M id d le w a re
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- Requirement 5. It should provide an open interface so that any entity willing to im­
plement a location-based service over the Internet using Targets’ location information 
can access the necessary resources upon agreement with the Mobile Operator.
- Requirement 6. It should provide some charging mechanisms implementing the revenue 
sharing model by which a LBS provider and the Mobile Operator share the technical 
resources and the profits made from every LBS usage by Subjects.
- Requirement 7. It should provide different formats for location information. Indeed, 
while the world geodetic coordinate system [210], which describes location as a pair 
of coordinates (longitude,latitude) together with its altitude, would constitute a raw 
representation of location information, it is likely that other formats such as northing 
and easting coordinates or even civil location description such as ’’Dublin train station” 
will prove to be more meaningful to LBS. Therefore, the middleware should be able 
to perform translations between the different location formats.
Security R equirem ents
Identity management constitutes without any doubt a crucial characteristic of the security 
mechanisms designed as part of the middleware. Targets’ identity must be known precisely 
to the middleware so that it can locate them upon request. However, LBS may or may not 
be given the exact identity of a particular individual either Target and/or Subject, depending 
on how trustworthy the former is or on what the latter is prepared to disclose in terms of 
privacy details. As a result, the middleware should implement pseudonymous access to LBS, 
where an alias known as a pseudonym is used to refer to a particular individual. Preferably, 
the pseudonyms used should represent long term identifiers such as the ones used in web 
services like instant messaging or webmail. The middleware should also be able to provide 
an anonymous usage of LBS by which the identity of either Subjects or Targets may not be 
a necessary parameter to avail of a particular location-based service. Authenticated access 
should also be considered, as a matter of completeness.
Location information management will also be a key requirement for the design of such 
a middleware. Delivering location information to a LBS could constitute a threat for a 
Target's privacy if it discloses too many details about her location. Therefore, we believe 
that intentionally degrading the quality of location information in order to render it less 
meaningful but still relevant to LBS constitutes a key feature of the middleware as well as 
a powerful privacy enhancing technique. This process will be from now on refereed to as 
Location Blurring and is further investigated in Section 4.3 as well as Section 6 of this thesis.
Access control to location information will also be handled by the middleware. The access
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control mechanism should allow LBS to access a particular Target's location information on 
behalf of a particular Subject. Access control decisions should be made as quick as possible so 
that they do not affect the process of location information provision to LBS. The provision of 
privacy preferences by Targets regarding to access control should be handled by a component 
of the middleware. The main requirements for this privacy preferences provision tool are:
- It should allow Targets to precisely tell which LBS on behalf of which Subject is 
authorized to access her location information, depending on parameters such as the 
time.
- It should be accessible through the Internet, from both fixed and mobile devices.
- It should allow Targets to quickly and easily override their privacy preferences for a 
given period of time in order to face a particular and potentially unpredicted context. 
This process would avoid requiring them to enter once again all their privacy details.
3 .3 .2  P r o to c o l
As already stated in Section 1.3.1, LBS providers are third parties interested in accessing 
Mobile Operators' network resources in order to provide location-based web services to their 
Subjects. In order to exchange the necessary credentials with the middleware and query for 
some Targets’s location information, LBS need the specification of an open protocol that 
will allow them to communicate securely with Mobile Operators and access their resources. 
In this section, we detail the functional and security requirements for such a protocol.
Functional Requirem ents
The protocol will mainly enable LBS to connect to the middleware over the Internet using 
standard technologies. It will also in theory enable Targets to access their personal details 
and preferences but it is likely that a web interface will be provided for convenience. The 
main services that the protocol should offer are summarized below.
-  A c c e s s  t o  l o c a t i o n  i n f o r m a t i o n  u p o n  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r i g h t  c r e d e n t i a l s .
- Management of personal profiles for both LBS and Targets.
- Communications between different instances of the middleware.
The protocol should also allow for LBS providers to bill their Subjects through the middle­
ware following a revenue sharing model. The Mobile Operator would charge a LBS provider 
for the provision of a particular Target’s location information. The LBS provider would add
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value to the data and charge in turn the Subject requesting the LBS through the Mobile 
Operator. Both the Mobile Operator and the LBS provider would make profits out of the 
transaction, as further explained in Section 5.3.2.
Security R equirem ents
The two party protocol should be able to let the LBS and the middleware authenticate each 
other. The authentication protocol used should be negotiable prior to the invocation of one 
of the services listed in the previous section. If the authentication phase succeeds, a session 
is established and the entity initiating the protocol should be able to request one or more 
services from the other entity. The session should terminate upon request from the initiating 
party.
The protocol should allow for the confidentiality of the exchanged messages. The sym­
metric algorithm, as well as the symmetric key size should be agreed during a negotiation 
phase that may occur during the authentication protocol negotiation or as part of the pro­
tocol itself during a handshake phase as in SSL [66], The middleware should only negotiate 
algorithms that have received a fair amount of study and preferably standardized. The 
negotiated key length should also follow the up-to-date recommendations established by 
experts in the field of cryptography. A key agreement phase may then take place as part 
of the authentication protocol. When the session is established between two entities, the 
shared symmetric key should be used to encrypt each message exchanged until the session 
terminates. The two entities should then discard the secret key.
Integrity and non repudiation of the messages should also be supported through the 
use of Digital Signatures. The algorithms choice should follow the same logic as for the 
symmetric algorithm used for confidentiality.
3 .3 .3  C o n c lu s io n
The security requirements of the protocol used by LBS to access the middleware can be 
fulfilled using a conventional X509 PKI. The same does not apply however to the commu­
nications that occur between Subjects and LBS, where the formers may use wireless mobile 
devices to connect to the latter. As for conventional web sites, these communications may 
or may not be protected depending on the sensitivity of the information transmitted. When 
secure connections are required between these two entities, a PKI that suits better the needs 
of such a mobile environment should therefore be employed.
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3.4 Public K ey Infrastructure
Mobile phones become more and more sophisticated but still remain less powerful than 
desktop computers. In Section 2.3.3, we pointed out the shortcomings of existing “wired” 
PKIs. The main motivation behind the proposal for an alternate PKI for mobile devices 
is, on one hand, to overcome these issues and on the other hand, to simplify client-side 
security-related operations. In particular, we wish to remove the need for key distribution 
and provide a fast and efficient key revocation mechanism. Furthermore, mobile phones are 
devices that are easily stolen, lost and that are more fragile than conventional computers. 
Therefore, the devised PKI must remain flexible enough to adapt to the mobile environment 
described and secure communications involving mobile Subjects and Targets. The PKI will 
also be used to secure communications between the “non mobile” entities. In particular, the 
communications between LBS providers and the middleware will be protected as well as the 
ones between the middleware and the Mobile Operator, when the former is not implemented 
as part of the latter’s infrastructure for example.
3.5 Conclusion
The architecture described in this section comprises a secure location management middle­
ware, a secure and open protocol used by LBS to access the Mobile Operator’s resources 
through the middleware, and a PKI to provide security services to Subjects. The require­
ments stated for each entity emphasize the need for a strong support of security and privacy 
techniques. In order to fulfil these requirements, our architecture design will benefit from 
the latest advances carried out in the field of cryptography and will implement innovative 





One of the big challenges in location aware computing lies in the end-to-end control of loca­
tion information [166], This involves securing the communications used to convey location 
information as well as guaranteeing located entities an appropiate level of privacy. Some 
research has been carried out in the field of location privacy at the network layer, with, 
in particular, the Mist routing project [25] and the MIXes approach used in mobile com­
munication systems [81]. In this section, we concentrate our study on location privacy at 
the application layer. In particular, we analyze recent advances in privacy techniques that 
modify the location granularity of mobile users in order to provide privacy services. Two 
different philosophies co-exist:
- Techniques that offer anonymity by withholding a mobile user’s identity from a third 
party LBS.
- Techniques that blur the location information supplied to LBS.
We describe both techniques which we will respectively refer to as Identity Blurring and 
Location Blurring. We also review some more general algorithms and tools and describe ap­
proaches in building secure infrastructures similar to ours. Finally, we give a brief description 
of related standards that are currently being defined.
4.2 Identity Blurring
Identity Blurring is a technique that aims at rendering mobile users unidentifiable so that 
linking location information with a particular individual is made impossible. It is commonly
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admitted that identifying users with their real identity opens up too many privacy breaches, 
especially when location information is transmitted to non-trusted third parties. Therefore, 
most research work carried out in the field of context aware computing advocate either 
anonymous or pseudonymous usage for location-based services. In this section, we review 
the two main approaches that implement Identity Blurring. The first one uses transaction 
pseudonyms [168] as well as a technique to prevent linking location requests while the second 
one describes a new anonymization technique.
4 .2 .1  M ix  Z on es
Beresford and Stajano recently introduced the concept of mix zones as a way to provide 
location privacy in pervasive computing [36]. Their main idea is to provide a certain degree 
of anonymity between non trusted LBS and their end-users by proposing a secure framework 
capable of frequently changing pseudonyms in order to achieve anonymization of location 
information. End-users are located through a portable device by either some embedded 
hardware or by some external network resources. A shared event-based middleware is used 
as a trusted proxy in order to provide pseudonym management services to them. LBS 
register with the middleware specifying an application zone. As a result, users that have 
registered with this LBS through the middleware and that enter its application zone will 
have their location details transmitted pseudonymously to it.
Beresford and Stajano introduce the concept of mix zones based on David Chaum’s mix 
networks [49] ideas in order to implement their approach. A mix zone is defined for a certain 
number of users and constitutes an area where none of the LBS currently serving them have 
registered an application zone. Users that enter a mix zone become invisible from LBS 
and can change their pseudonyms to later become untraceable by LBS when they leave it. 
The results they obtain when assessing their technique are not however quite satisfactory. 
In their laboratory environment, many factors such as the number of users as well as the 
geometry of mix zones force the middleware to wait a considerable amount of time before 
forwarding services requests. In [37], the authors refine the concept of mix zones as well as 
its evaluation and extend their work by providing feedback to end users on their level of 
privacy.
Beresford and Stajano propose a method to prevent user tracking using historical location 
data. The framework they provide targets LBS that accept pseudonyms but that neither 
need to keep any session information nor perform user authentication. Using this framework 
to enable commercial wide-area LBS is however questionable. A lot of LBS such as the ones 
based on the well known ” friend finder” principles require identification and authentication
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mechanisms. Also, the size of their application zone could potentially greatly exceed the size 
of a country leaving no room for mix zones. Point-Of-Interest LBS such as location-based 
advertising services can however benefit from such an approach.
4 .2 .2  L o c a tio n  k -a n o n y m ity
In [96], Grutezer and Grunwald propose a new technique called location k-anonymity to 
allow anonymous usage of LBS. Their idea extends the concept of k-anonymity developed by 
Samarati and Sweeney in the context of database privacy [197]. With the concept of location 
k-anonymity, Grutezer and Grunwald want to “de-identify” LBS queries by making a user 
indistinguishable from any k-1 other. Their approach allows for anonymous connection to 
LBS and prevents any re-identification attempts or location prediction when they are given 
some location history data.
End-users communicate with non trusted LBS through a trusted location server acting 
as a proxy. They typically use handset-based location systems such as GPS receivers to 
locate themselves and periodically send their precise location over a cellular network to the 
location server. The middleware then applies the location k-anonymity algorithm on the 
data received. The basic idea behind it is to provide anonymity by decreasing the location 
accuracy of the LBS end-user position. Instead of precise privacy sensitive user location 
coordinates, LBS receive two points delimiting an area in which k other individuals are 
located. The algorithm starts dividing the area A, keeps the sub-area that includes the 
location L and repeats the process until the sub-area obtained only contains k-1 individuals. 
The coordinates of the sub-area S obtained at the second last iteration (i.e. containing at 
least k individuals) is then sent to LBS. Here again, users are shielded behind the middleware 
which is the only entity conducting anonymous communications with LBS.
While this first approach consists in varying the size of the area sent to LBS in order to 
meet the privacy requirements, a variant of the algorithm described by the authors aims at 
providing anonymity by delaying LBS responses. The parameter k now denotes the number 
of entities that have visited the area S  that will be revealed to LBS. The area S is now 
passed as a parameter to the new location k-anonymity algorithm. When it receives a LBS 
request, the middleware starts monitoring the area S and counts the number of entities 
visiting it. When this number becomes greater than k, the privacy requirements are met 
and the middleware sends an LBS response containing the area S as well as the time it 
took for k entities to go through S. As a result, this approach achieves better accuracy but 
includes a delay in location responses.
The main problem that arises with Grutezer and Grunwald’s approach is that it only
55
specifies privacy as the size of a crowd in which the end-user can hide. This may not be 
relevant for some services other than location tracking LBS. Furthermore, when user density 
is low in a specified area, the area containing k other entities can become extremely large 
and useless when returned to a LBS. Also, knowing some external information such as 
where a user lives can enable attackers to identify her. In [95], Grutezer et al. investigate 
privacy issues that arise when attackers collect location and time information of a particular 
user, referred to as a path. Since their initial approach relies on a high number of users and 
therefore on simultaneous paths potentially tracked, they propose two ideas as a complement 
to their work to try overcome the issue. Path Segmentation aims at truncating paths to make 
user tracking more difficult to perform. Minutiae Suppression introduces black-out periods 
in their path during which users are not locatable, for example when their location gives 
away too much privacy.
4.3 Location Blurring
Location Blurring is a technique that aims at rendering location information less accurate by 
intentionally decreasing its granularity. It can be seen as a data perturbation technique, like 
adding noise to accurate data in order to make it less meaningful. The Global Positioning 
System (GPS) [111] constitutes a good example as it used to employ such a technique before 
to 2000 [209] as part of its Selective Availability (SA) system whose aim was to deny access 
to accurate location information to unauthorized users. Location Blurring can be used by 
mobile users in order to avail of LBS while preserving a certain level of privacy. The idea has 
been mentioned in multiple research projects but its implementation has only been carried 
out using “civil locations” ( “Train station”,“Dublin”, “Ireland”) and not in the context 
of raw location data. In his thesis [131], Leonhardt pushes the idea further and exploits 
the hierarchical nature of location domains to provide a way to vary the granularity of the 
location information disclosed. For example instead of revealing that a user is at a Dublin 
train station, the system only discloses the name of the city. Also, Hengartner and Steenkiste 
consider the same technique and use it as part of their access control to location information 
environment [106], In this section, we analyse an extension of the algorithm mentioned in 
Section 4.2 that was used to implement Identity Blurring. Here it perturbs location data in 
order to achieve a specified degree of privacy.
In [97], Grutezer and Liu investigate a technique based on their previous work on location 
k-anonymity and referred to as Minutiae Suppression', see Section 4.2.2. In their paper, 
the authors state that some areas are more sensitive than others and therefore should be 
protected from location tracking. However they point out that disabling location information
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determination in those areas is not sufficient. Indeed, attackers may easily infer where the 
user has gone using simple linear interpolation. To address this issue, they propose to 
withhold any location information that could disclose the sensitive areas the user has visited 
in order to protect her path information.
The architecture considered is very similar to the one used to implement location k- 
anonymity. The authors propose three different algorithms in order to withhold location 
information when mobile users enter sensitive areas. The Base Algorithm discloses location 
information only when mobile users are located in non sensitive areas. The Bounded-Rate 
Algorithm does the same but adds more privacy by lowering the frequency of location updates 
when mobile users are located in non sensitive areas. Finally, the k-area algorithm follows the 
Base Algorithm philosophy but only releases location information when it does not disclose 
which of at least k sensitive areas a mobile user has visited.
Grutezer and Liu proposed a technique whose aim is to solve the location inference 
problem. In their security evaluation, they run the three algorithms they have designed on a 
mobility simulator and find that the k-area algorithm is very convenient as it discloses more 
than 85% of location updates in non sensitive areas while guaranteeing an acceptable level 
of privacy. However, the assumptions under which the evaluation was conducted may be 
considered as weak. Indeed, the sensitive areas described in their experiments are buildings 
situated in the city center of Manhattan while streets are considered as non sensitive regions. 
If the density of sensitive areas decreases, one can expect a change in their results.
4.4 M achine Readable Location Privacy Policies
Machine readable privacy policies are privacy policies represented in a machine-readable 
syntax so that the process of checking a particular action against such privacy policies 
can be automated. The P3P initiative developed by the W3C [60] proposes an automated 
mechanism that helps users gain more control over the use of personal information collected 
by the web sites they visit. In this section, we review research that builds on the P3P project 
and analyze how they manage to provide a more efficient control over location information 
usage. It is worth mentioning that P3P and P3P-derived approaches rely on the assumption 
that the different entities involved will follow some predefined rules. Indeed, no mechanism 
has been defined in order to check whether privacy policies are enforced or not. However, P3P 
provides indications on how to resolve disputes if any, and can be, for instance, implemented 
as part of a larger legal framework.
In [116], Indulska et al. present a location management system that aims at aggregating, 
processing and managing location information obtained from various sources. The authors
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use P3P and APPEL [59] as part of their location access control mechanism. In their 
system, each location query made to the location server is sent together with a P3P policy 
file indicating the purpose of the location information collection. Using APPEL rule-sets 
representing target user’s context-aware preferences, the location system is able to block, 
partially release or fully release the location information requested. The authors however 
recognize the necessity of a more fine grained control 011 location information release and 
state they will address this issue in future work. Another potential weakness of this approach 
is that location requestors need to be trusted, especially when generating their P3P policy 
file, since they could lie on the intended use of the information requested.
The pawS system [127] also uses P3P to encode data collection and location information 
usage practice. The system aims at letting users have control on the data collected as well 
as providing data collectors with tools to help them enforce the security policies correctly. 
In the architecture proposed, a user accesses services’ resources through privacy proxies that 
handle the interactions between the two parties. A privacy beacon regularly announces 
potential data collections by services for a particular context aware environment. When a 
user wishes to avail of a particular service, she contacts her proxy which first retrieves the 
available privacy policies from the service proxy and selects the one that complies most with 
the user’s preferences. The personal privacy proxy forwards the relevant and potentially 
context-aware data to the service proxy. The latter then issues an authentication token 
known as agreement id to the user for future reference, should she wish to update the 
information submitted. Collected data is finally stored in the pawSDB back-end database 
together with the corresponding privacy policies. From an implementation point of view, 
privacy policies are encoded in XML using the P3P namespace and users’ preferences are 
described using the APPEL language. The authors recognize that such a system is only 
a privacy enabler and that a legal framework should be put in place in order to prevent 
fraudulent usage of personal data. They also plan to extend the P3P language to be able to 
formulate privacy policies that capture the location of the data collection as a parameter.
Myles et al. designed the LocServ middleware service [155] in order to support LBS 
usage and provide their users with a fine-grained control on the release of their location 
information. Users specify their privacy preferences as part of a Validator, which is a system 
component capable of making decisions regarding to location information release by checking 
users’ privacy preferences against LBS’s privacy polices. The authors used here again the 
P3P syntax to specify privacy policies. However, they also slightly extended its vocabulary in 
order to capture the concepts of user and third party-initiated location query. For example, 
they introduce the solicited and unsolicited classes of interactions between LBS and LocServ 
in order to differentiate between sporadic user-driven location queries and location tracking
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in terms of privacy policies to apply. The authors also discuss the nature of validators and 
state that any kind of such component should be accepted by the system. As a result, 
they do not advocate the use of the APPEL language in particular and leave the choice 
of specifying and checking users’ preferences to validators designers. Their implementation 
actually consists of a simple and relatively flexible language using basic attributes.
In [195], Snekkenes introduces relevant concepts for formulating location-related privacy 
policies. While allowing users to specify their own privacy preferences like in P3P, the au­
thor’s approach differs however from the former on one significant point. Policy enforcement 
is not left to service providers but instead, is split between them and users. Not only users 
can refuse to use a service if it does not comply with their requirements, but they can also 
decide on the level of accuracy at which they will release their location information in order 
to preserve their privacy. Snekkenes also points out that P3P is tailored to web usage and 
that it does not suit particularly context-aware environments, where the collection of sensi­
tive data is performed all the time as opposed to only once when connecting to a web site. 
As a result, the author specifies fragments of a language aiming at encoding personal privacy 
policies. The language captures concepts such as the accuracy of location information, the 
identity of the requestor, the time when the request was made, as well as the speed of the 
target user. As a conclusion, Snekkenes recognizes however that users may find the use of 
the language somewhat awkward and that further research needs to be done in this context. 
He is also concerned that entities could just ignore policies since no mechanism is used to 
check policy enforcement. The author mentions that cryptographic techniques could be used 
to address this issue but does not however study the possible solutions.
4.5 A ccess Control to Location Information
Two different categories of access control models co-exist. Mandatory access control (MAC) 
mechanisms such as the Bell-LaPadula model [94] implemented on a system let the latter 
define and enforce the access control policies for all users. On the contrary, Discretionary 
access control (DAC) mechanisms such as the Lampson’s access matrix [126] let users define 
the access control policies. In general, MAC access control mechanisms are more secure than 
DAC ones. However, DAC mechanisms are considered more efficient in terms of performance 
and convenience to users.
This section shows that these models are not applicable as far as location information 
is concerned, due to the complexity of dealing with location and time. It then presents an 
alternative called the multi-target access control mechanism based on three sets of policies. 
Certificate-based access control mechanisms are then reviewed and the concept of role-based
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access control is introduced as well as some applications. Finally, we discuss a rule-based 
access control framework used to provide mobile phone users with control on their privacy.
4 .5 .1  M u lt i- ta r g e t  a c c e ss  c o n tr o l for lo c a t io n  in fo r m a tio n
In his thesis [131], Leonhardt proposes a generalised access control matrix in the form of 
multi-target access control policies in order to provide access control to location information. 
First, he recalls that standard models for access control do not work when applied to location 
information. Indeed, he states that neither location information nor the located object can 
be considered as a valid target since the two entities are inter-dependent. He then shows how 
to generalize the classic access control models in order to provide a solution to the access 
control to location information. In the context of the Lampson’s access matrix, Leonhardt 
proposes to refine the security policy derived from the matrix. The standard policy can be 
stated as follows:
<subject> {<list of actions>} <target>
Leonhardt modifies it such that location information and located object can be addressed 
as targets:
<subject> {<action>} <target 1> ... <target n>
Using this definition, an authorization policy enabling a subject Joe to find out about 
the location of a subject named Fred when the latter is at school can be expressed as:
Joe { testForCollocation } Fred, Building—School
In the context of label-based access control, the author shows that the Bell-LaPaluda 
security model can also be applied to multiple subjects or targets such as location information 
and located objects. To conclude, he states that neither of the two approaches satisfies 
all environments and advocates a ”mix-and-match” approach depending on the security 
requirements needed. Within the scope of his thesis, he designs a security mechanism that 
comprises three different layers, where only one or two are used at a time, depending 011 the 
requirements of the situation. He defines the following policies:
- Access policies. They are standard access policies that regulate authorized access to a 
particular resource or target.
- Visibility policies. They are policies regulating the level of location detail released. For 
example, instead of releasing the street name where a target is currently located, only 
the name of the town will be disclosed. This philosophy follows the author’s tree-based 
hierarchical model for location information developed as part of his thesis.
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- Anonymity policies. They regulate the level of detail released about the identity of 
a target at a particular location. This is the same idea as for visibility policies: a 
hierarchical model for identity is built and, depending on the level of security required, 
the identity of the target ranging from anonymous to his real first name and last name 
combination can be disclosed.
By combining those three levels of access control policies, the author is able to define more 
flexible policies, higher-level policies, applicable in a wider range of contexts.
4 .5 .2  C e r t if ic a te -b a s e d  s o lu t io n s
In this section, we review two approaches that use authorization certificates as a way to 
implement Discretionary Access Control (DAC).
In [107], Hengartner and St.eenkiste propose a design of an access control mechanism
for a people location system. The architecture considered consists of a hierarchical struc­
ture of location services. Location services are entities that gather and/or process location 
information. Requests go through the location services chain and the response follows the 
inverse path. Location services can either be trusted or not, and the access control mech­
anism proposed relies on the use of location policies. In order to implement their location 
access control mechanism, the authors enclose trust information as well as location policies 
in SPKI/SDSI digital certificates, as described in Section 2.3.2. Users that want to use the 
system sign their location requests together with a timestamp and forward it to a location 
service. Location services can then use the certificates received as proofs when they require 
access to location information on behalf of somebody. The certificates, together with loca­
tion requests are accessed through a virtual database called the Aura Contextual Service 
Interface designed in [119], In their evaluation, the authors discuss the influence of delegation 
of access rights and admit that the cost of access control certificates generation and checking 
is quite high and that it only pays off when long certificate chains have to be checked. They 
finally conclude that their system provides good security but with a significant delay.
Hauser and Kabatnik also developed an access control system based on authorization 
certificates. In [105], they study the requirements for an access control mechanism suitable 
for location services. The authors describe an access control solution applicable within the 
NEXUS architecture for spatially aware applications [112]. They outline two ways in order 
to help users preserve their privacy while disclosing location information. The first solution 
lies in the frequency at which location updates are performed. The lower it is, the less
accurate location information is. Users should be given control of the location sensors so
that they can regulate or tune the accuracy of the information that is sent to the location
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services. The other solution aims at reducing the information concerning users’ identities by 
using pseudonyms. The solution for the access control is based on the use of authorization 
certificates binding the permissions of key holder directly to their public key. In their 
approach, targets share a unique pseudonym with the LBS with the particularity that the 
pseudonym in question is in fact the target's public key. LBS also possess a cryptographic 
key pair. When a target wishes to let a subject locate her, the former issues an authorization 
certificate to the latter, as well as a LBS public key encrypted Token T  containing her 
pseudonym together with a nonce to prevent replay attacks. Upon receipt of the query 
made by a subject, the LBS first checks its signature. It then decrypts the token T, revealing 
the target's public key. Using it, the LBS attempts to validate the authorization certificate. 
Finally, if the authorization certificate’s subject is the public key of the subject then this 
means that the target has granted the subject with the permissions stated in the authorization 
certificate. The LBS can then query its database to retrieve the target’s location information.
In a mobile environment, the main drawback of this approach would certainly be the 
target’s certificate generation and transmission over limited bandwidth. Furthermore, the 
authors point out that the revocation of permissions is quite problematic and can only be 
resolved by using short lived certificates. This however further increases the number of 
certificates to be generated by targets.
4 .5 .3  R o le -b a se d  A c c e s s  C o n tr o l M e c h a n ism s
The Role-based Access Control (RBAC) model [184] offers an alternative to MAC and DAC. 
As a non-discretionary access control, the model advocates the use of a subject's function 
or role, instead of her identity. In this model, subjects are assigned roles, and each role is 
assigned a set of permissions. Most of the time, permissions granted to roles will not change 
while the association subject-role might vary more often. This results in a more flexible 
access control scheme regarding permissions assignments.
Zhang and Parashar propose the use of RBAC to build a flexible dynamic context- 
aware access control mechanism [221]. It aims at assigning dynamically roles to subjects as 
their context changes. However, the context and more precisely the location of the object 
considered is not taken into account when access control decisions are made.
In [58], Covington et al. extend RBAC by introducing environment roles as well as 
object roles. Environment roles capture the state of the environment at the time an access 
control request is performed. In particular, the time and location dimensions are used as 
environmental information in order to define environment roles of access control queries. 
Object roles capture properties of the object of the access control query. The Generalized
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RBAC (GRBAC) approach is however very general and would need to be more tailored in 
order to provide access control to location information. In particular, the number of roles 
required to express an access control policy could potentially grow very large.
4 .5 .4  R u le  e n g in e -b a se d  A c c e s s  C o n tr o l M e ch a n ism s
One of the main problems with traditional and RBAC mechanisms is that permissions and 
roles must be generated in advance. Access control decisions cannot usually be made on 
the fly depending on constantly changing parameters. Defining fine-grained access policies 
is therefore problematic, especially in context-aware environments where time and location 
are parameters that can potentially influence access control decisions.
In [115], Hull et al. describe the design of the Houdini framework which proposes a 
discretionary rule-based access control mechanism that enables mobile phone users to specify 
their privacy preferences regarding to their context information. In their paper, the authors 
focus on two key components of the Houdini framework:
- The framework used to support self-provisioning of preferences. Users can express 
their view on who should access their location information and when, by specifying a 
time and location dependent profile. Because the access control system is rule-based, 
users need not specify their privacy policies in details using a complicated language. 
Instead, they specify their preferences through web forms and let the underlying rule 
engine make access control decisions based on their settings as well other context data 
such as time and location.
- The Privacy Conscious Personalization engine. This is the component that makes 
access control decisions based 011 users’ preferences and context information.
The authors discuss the choices made for the Houdini language used to encode rules and 
assess the performance of their design on the time it takes to render access control decisions. 
By achieving a 3 milliseconds response time per query, the system proposed is clearly efficient 
enough to handle multiple requests at the same time.
4.6 Secure A rchitectures for context aware com puting
This section first presents a brief survey of the mechanisms that can be used to protect mobile 
users’ privacy. Then, it reviews some architectures that implement part of the requirements 
formulated in Section 3 and analyses their strengths and weaknesses.
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4 .6 .1  L o c a tio n -a w a re  co m p u tin g  w ith  no lo c a tio n  d isc lo su re .
Priyantha et al. designed and implemented the Cricket system to enable indoor mobile 
location-dependent applications [171]. It is based on a network of fixed devices also known 
as beacons that advertise the geographical area they are located in. Each mobile device uses 
a combination of ultrasonic and RF sensors called listeners in order to receive signals from 
beacons and decide which one is the closest. Cricket is a location support system as opposed 
to a location tracking system, since location information is not centrally stored on a server. 
Instead, the system enables mobile clients to learn their location by listening to the beacons 
without disclosing any personal information. They can then decide whether they want to 
use it locally with an application that utilizes cached location-based information or transmit 
it to external entities.
In [187], Schilit et al. introduce the concept of intermittent connectivity. Like the Cricket 
system, their approach aims at using location information directly on the mobile device 
rather than connecting to a remote server. The mobile device computes its own location 
and uses cached location-based information. However, downloading and caching location 
information through multiple queries can potentially disclose someone’s location. Intermit­
tent connectivity advocates downloading geographically coded records in one go to avoid 
revealing precise location information when querying for location-based information. This 
approach is of course limited to LBS that can be run on a mobile device and for which 
location-based information is not subject to frequent updates.
4 .6 .2  P r o x y - b a s e d  lo c a tio n  in fo rm a tio n  d isc lo su re
In [78], Escudero and Maguire propose the use of a proxy server to hide the network location 
of a mobile user as well as her identity. The proxy operates in an environment where the 
positioning technology used to locate a user is fully under her control and where LBS are 
accessed anonymously. When a mobile user wants to avail of a LBS, she retrieves her 
location, creates a SOAP request and forwards it to the proxy. The proxy hides her network 
address and acts as an intermediary between her and the LBS. To ensure confidentiality, 
they assume the presence of a shared secret key between mobile users and LBS in order to 
encrypt part of the SOAP request containing location information using XML Encryption. 
The encrypted location record submitted can then, either be forwarded to the corresponding 
LBS or published in a DNS LOC directory that can carry location information. Finally, 
Escudero and Maguire discuss the use of the proxy as a mix node [49] and show how the 
approach can anonymise communications.
A similar approach has been proposed by Konidala et al. in [69] in the context of wireless
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networks. However, it strictly differs from Escudero et al.’s by its trust model. Indeed, the 
authors explicitly mention that the proxy used is trusted and should be implemented within 
the mobile operator’s infrastructure. In order to secure the communication link between the 
mobile user and the proxy, the authors propose the use of a short lived shared secret key 
between the two entities. The communication link between the proxy and LBS is secured 
using a traditional X509 PKI.
4 .6 .3  T o k e n -b a se d  lo c a tio n  in fo rm a tio n  d isc lo su re
The security architecture described in this section gives mobile end-users a total control on 
the disclosure of their location information. Mobile end-users are given a token that they 
can release in order to provide third parties with their location.
In [180], Rodden et al. design a secure protocol based on the principle that mobile users 
should have control on the disclosure of their own location information. They propose a 
protocol that aims at retaining the mobile user’s identity as long as no agreement is passed 
between her and a LBS. The location is then released to the LBS for a given time interval. 
The user generates a sufficiently large random number in order to avoid collisions and sends 
it to a location server in order to be used as a transaction pseudonym [168], The location 
server then records the user’s location as a triplet (location,time,pseudonym). When a user 
wants to disclose her location to a LBS, she gives it her pseudonym. The LBS can then use it 
to retrieve her location information from the location server. By modifying the value of her 
pseudonym, she revokes the LBS’ privilege to use her location information. This lightweight 
mechanism supposes of course that LBS do not collude with each other and that LBS do 
not need to identify users in order to keep session information.
Gajparia et al. [87] introduce a mechanism that enables end-users to control the use, 
storage and dissemination of their location information in the context of location-based 
services. The technique relies on the use of constraints [86], which are rules that dictate 
how location information should be handled. Constraints are statements bound to location 
information and are enforced by a trusted third party known as the Location Information 
Preference Authority (LIPA), acting on behalf of the end-user. The authors then describe 
the protocol used to provide users with control on their privacy. Once the user has been 
located, her location information together with the related constraints form a token that is 
signed and encrypted using the LIPA's public key. The token is then given to a LBS. The 
latter can identify whose location information the token contains but neither the location 
information itself nor the associated constraints. When necessary, the LBS sends the token 
to the LIPA, which can then verity the signature and decide to grant access to the location
65
information depending on the constraints imposed by the user. A message is then sent to the 
LBS, encrypted using her public key and signed by the LIPA. It contains either the location 
information together with some security parameters or a message stating the failure of the 
location request.
4 .6 .4  S e c u re  p la t fo rm s  fo r lo c a tio n -b a se d  s e rv ic e s  p ro v is io n
Little research has been carried out in order to offer access to location-based services over 
the Internet with a particular focus on end-users privacy. In this section, we describe three 
different initiatives whose objectives are relatively close to the Orient Platform overall project
Kurashima et al. designed a platform allowing LBS mobile users to control their privacy 
[125]. In particular, they developed a privacy control gateway to be run by mobile operators, 
whose aim is to match mobile users’ privacy policies with location-based services’. The 
gateway uses the errors inherent to positioning systems in order to “blur” the location 
information, which does not provide a very high level of privacy. It also uses a policy-based 
privacy control mechanism. This mechanism is used to match LBS’ policy with mobile users’ 
preferences in terms of location granularity. It is implemented as a platform and run by the 
mobile operator. The authors have implemented their prototype and studied its integration 
within the existing 3G infrastructure. They do not, however, address the identification issues 
arising from the externalization of location information. It is also unclear whether they have 
designed and implemented an algorithm to adjust the granularity of location information. 
Finally, their platform does not provide location-based web services to its mobile users since 
it is implemented as a gateway where services are published. As a result, LBS deployment 
is not as flexible and transactions handling is left to the mobile operator.
Lee et al. propose a secure web services infrastructure to enable the use of location-based 
services through wireless networks [129]. However, it does not implement a comprehensive 
fine grained access control to location information since the profiles used as parameters to 
the policy creation do not even take time or location into consideration. Also, the approach 
implements the WAP 1.1 architecture known to have encountered some security flaws (see 
Section 2.4.4 for more details).
Zuidweg et al. have designed a privacy control architecture in the context of the WASP 
project [224], The WASP project aims to develop a context-aware service platform that 
enables 3G mobile phone users to access Location-Based web services [57], The privacy 
control architecture is based on the P3P initiative and aims at implementing the notice 
and consent paradigms 1 in the context of location information. In his thesis [223], Zuidweg
1 T h e  “ n o t i c e ”  c o n c e p t  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  i n f o r m i n g  u s e r s  w h e n  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e m  i s  c o l l e c t e d  
w h i l e  “ c o n s e n t ”  p r o v i d e s  u s e r s  w i t h  t h e  c h o i c e  b e t w e e n  d i s c l o s i n g  o r  r e t a i n i n g  t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r
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details how P3P can be extended to make it suitable for both web services usage and location 
information handling. In particular, he studies how to transport and reference P3P policies 
in the context of web services. He also advocates to update the P3P basic data types in 
order to include references to contextual information. Concerning user privacy preferences, 
the author proposes an extension of APPEL, known as the Context-Dependent Preferences 
Language, that takes location, time, date, day of the week and user activity as parameters. 
The WASP context aware privacy architecture provides a way to compare users’ privacy 
preferences with service providers’ privacy policies in the context of web services. However, 
the proposed architecture is entirely based on trust. Indeed, there is no mechanism defined in 
order to ensure that service providers will behave according to what is stated in their privacy 
policies. Furthermore, the platform’s Privacy Control Layer’s decisions are not granular in 
terms of context information. For example, if a service’s privacy policies do not comply with 
a user’s privacy preferences or her context dependent preferences, the service request will be 
discarded: it’s all or nothing. Finally, this approach does not support anonymous or even 
pseudonymous access to context aware services and does not therefore provide a high level 
of privacy for end-users.
4.7 Standards
fn this section, we present the different standard bodies that influence the development of 
mobile telecommunications. We focus on the working groups that intend to specify security 
mechanisms to ensure a secure and private provision of location-based services over the 
Internet.
4 .7 . 1  O p en  M o b ile  A llia n c e
The Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) [161] is an industry forum that was formed in 2002 in 
order to consolidate the multiple interoperability forums already existing in the area of 
mobile services. It brings together around 300 companies and aims at developing open 
technical specifications to guarantee interoperability between mobile services. In particular, 
the OMA Location Working Group continues the work carried out by both the Location 
Interoperability Forum (LIF) and the WAP forum in order to ensure interoperability of 
mobile location services on an end-to-end basis. The OMA currently develops two protocols 
that are relevant in the context of our research. These two protocols are being specified in 
order to comply with 3GPP Release 6 LCS Specification; see Section 4.7.5 for more details,
i n f o r m a t i o n .
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The Mobile Location Protocol (MLP) [163] is an XML-based application-level protocol 
th a t can be used by third parties to communicate with mobile operators in order to access 
mobile users’ location information. It is independent of the underlying location technologies 
and supports different transport mechanisms such as HTTP or SOAP. The Mobile Location 
Protocol offers five different services to its users. The first two services are initiated by the 
third party LBS and define a standard mobile user location request/response mechanism as 
well as an emergency one. The same services initiated by mobile users are also supported. 
Finally, a triggered location status update service can be requested by a third party LBS in 
order to continuously monitor the location of a particular mobile user. This protocol does 
not support any security or privacy techniques and provides location information “as is” , 
upon request 0 1 1  MSISDN numbers.
The Location Privacy Checking Protocol (PCP) [162] is also an application-level protocol 
and it can be used by mobile operators to check mobile users’ privacy policies. The privacy 
policies are stored in a server called Privacy Checking Entity (PCE) and the service offered 
by the protocol enables the mobile operator to query for the assertion of a mobile user’s 
privacy settings prior to disclosing her location information to a third party. The mobile 
operator can then notify the mobile user and ask for her verification if necessary. The PCP 
assumes the existence of a PCE whose specifications are not available yet.
4.7.2 Parlay/O SA
The Parlay Group [202] is a non profit consortium of 65 companies from the IT  and Telecom 
industries. They have designed the Parlay/OSA architecture [136] as well as a set of APIs 
to enable third parties to create telecommunication services using mobile network operators’ 
resources. Parlay/OSA APIs give access to fixed, mobile and next generation IP-based net­
work resources in a secure, controlled and accountable way. They are open APIs and can 
therefore be adopted by a large proportion of developers. However, IT  developers are used to 
working with higher level programming interfaces and the Parlay/OSA APIs are primarily 
aimed at telecommunication developers. To address this problem, a sub group of the Parlay 
Group called Parlay X, designed the Parlay X web services API [203], This API aims at 
simplifying the development of next generation network applications by IT  developers who 
are not necessarily experts in telephony and telecommunications. The Parlay/OSA architec­
tu re’s main component is a gateway whose role is to ensure that the resources made available 
by network operators through the Parlay/OSA APIs are not accessed by unauthorized users 
or applications. Applications request location information by providing the gateway with 
the MSISDN number of the end user, which means that applications need to be aware of
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the real identity of the end users. While providing a very basic service, the Parlay/OSA 
initiative represents a significant first step towards the externalizat.ion of telecommunications 
services to third parties.
4.7.3 Geopriv
Geopriv is an IETF working group that focuses on privacy issues related to location infor­
mation gathering and transfer [92], In [151], they provide the requirements for the design of 
an architecture and protocol deployed over the Internet that aims at providing mobile users 
control on the delivery and accuracy of their location information. Their work focuses also 
on the definition of a lo ca tio n  o b jec t that encapsulates location information as well as its as­
sociated privacy requirements. In [64], they carry out a security analysis where they explore 
the different threats the architecture and the protocol may encounter. Among other things, 
they advocate the use of short lived identities for target users and unlinked pseudonyms for 
location recipients to prevent location tracking. Finally, they discuss in [101] the design and 
the storage of policies rules produced by a component called the Rule-maker. In particular, 
they detail the two location data filtering strategies used to reduce location accuracy. The 
first one defines six different levels of precision, or “civil locations” , ranging from building 
to country visibility levels, and taking into account the two extreme cases of full filtering 
and null filtering. The second strategy aims at decreasing geospatial location information 
by altering its raw representation. For example, this could consist of rounding up longitude 
or latitude coordinates to offer less accurate information.
4.7.4 The GSM Association
The GSM Association (GSMA) [99] was founded in 1987 in order to develop and foster the 
interests of GSM mobile operators throughout the world. In 2004, the association counts 
almost 660 members and still remains very active in terms of standardization activities. In 
particular, one of its subgroups known as the Service Group (SerG) has produced a reference 
document about location-based services [100]. In this document, the authors identify and 
outline the basic requirements for providing privacy services regarding to the collection and 
use of location information. They advocate the use of anonymous location information where 
applicable or, if necessary, the use of an O p a q u e  ID , which they define as the encrypted 
identity of the mobile user used as a t r a n s a c t io n  p se u d o n y m . They also emphasize that 
users should have a fine-grained control on who is entitled to use their location information. 
The authors also believe that the level of accuracy of location information can be used to 
enhance users’ privacy. However they do not propose any specific algorithm and just evoke a
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hierarchical model of location information where an upper layer is chosen in order to reduce 
the accuracy of location data. The low level architecture proposed is identical to the one 
presented in Section 4.7.5.
4.7.5 3G PP
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) [199] is a collaboration agreement estab­
lished in 1998 between some telecommunications standards bodies. Its aim was initially 
to propose technical specifications as well as technical reports in order to contribute to the 
design of a 3G mobile system. Its scope was later refined to include the maintenance of GSM 
and GPRS technical specifications. In the context of location information, [13] outlines the 
architecture used to retrieve and make mobile users’ location information available for use 
(see also Sections 2.4.3 and 2.5.2 for more information). In particular, 3GPP introduces the 
low level architecture used within mobile operators’ current architecture to provide location 
information to both internal and external clients. The document also details the interactions 
between the different entities involved.
The 3GPP research effort introduces 2 new low level components regarding to security 
and privacy of location information.
- The P r iv a c y  P ro file  R e g is te r  (PPR). This component stores privacy profiles for target 
mobile users. The P PR  also performs privacy checks upon GMLC requests. The 
privacy options available are organized in privacy classes depending on LBS requesters 
identities, LBS types, the serving network and allow for the positioning of a target 
mobile user automatically or upon user notification and potentially verification.
- The P s e u d o n y m  M e d ia t io n  S e rv ic e  (PMS). This component is in charge of manag­
ing users’ pseudonyms used when accessing certain LBS. 3GPP defines two types of 
identities for mobile end users: v e r in y m s  and pseudonyms. V e r in y m s  correspond to 
identifiers used to refer unambiguously to mobile users. 3GPP advocates the use of 
MSISDN numbers or IMSI identifiers (see Section 2.4.1) as v e r in y m s .  An IP address 
can also be used in some cases as a v e r in y m .  The solution defined concerning the 
nature of pseudonyms is the one proposed by the GSM Association (see Section 4.7.4). 
A mobile user’s v e r in y m  is encrypted with the mobile operator’s public key and is used 
together with the corresponding PMS and GMLC addresses as a pseudonym when ac­
cessing certain LBS. The main role of the Pseudonym Mediation Service is therefore to 
perform identity translation between v e r in y m s  and pseudonyms upon GMLC requests.
Please refer to Sections 2.4.3 and 2.5.2 for further information regarding to the 3G architec­
ture developed by 3GPP.
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C h a p t e r  5
Architecture, Infrastructure and 
Protocol
5.1 Introduction
This section introduces the architecture designed to enable mobile phone users to securely 
avail of location-based services through the Internet. It intends to satisfy some of the require­
ments presented in Section 3. In particular, we present a design for a middleware called the 
O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  together with its protocol, namely the O r ie n t  P ro to co l, and describe their 
implementation. However, we do not cover the security aspects of this architecture as they 
are further detailed in Sections 6 and 7 of this thesis. Most results outlined in this section 
constitute joint work carried out with my colleague Cameron Ross Dunne [73]. While they 
do not represent the core of the research summarized in this thesis, they remain essential 
for the better understanding of the reader. The overall design presented reflects the secu­
rity priorities outlined in Section 3, and lays a basis to implement comprehensive security 
mechanisms in order to enable mobile phone users to maintain a high level of privacy.
5.2 Architecture
The overall architecture design is presented in Figure 5.1. It differs from the architecture 
presented in Section 3.2.1 by the presence of a trusted third party implementing the mid­
dleware called the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .  In this architecture, a mobile S u b je c t requests a L B S  
connecting through the O r ie n t  P la fo r m  while a fixed S u b je c t  connects directly to the L B S  
like a normal web user. Then, if the need arises, the L B S  may in turn  connect to the O r ie n t  
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Figure 5.1: Revised General Architecture Topology
5.3 Middleware
T h e  O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  has been designed as a proxy server to fulfill the requirements stated in 
Section 3. We outline here the main reasons of such a choice, discuss its different components 
and present a prototype implementation.
5.3.1 Proxy-based approach
T h e  O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  is a middleware interfacing mobile phone users with L B S .  One of its 
main roles is to guarantee mobile S u b je c ts ' privacy as well as the security of their commu­
nications. This involves authenticating them in order to:
- Protect their identity by shielding it using pseudonyms.
- Manage and maintain secure communications between them and L B S .
- Enable a reliable charging scheme involving them as well as both the L B S  and the
M o b ile  O p e ra to r  they are registered with.
These operations should remain as transparent as possible to S u b je c ts , especially to mobile 
S u b je c ts  for which the user interface of the mobile devices used are generally quite limited. 
As a result, T h e  O r ie n t  P la t fo r m 's  logical integration within the client/server architecture is 
performed by implementing it as a proxy server; see Figure 5.1. While S u b je c ts  connecting 
from a desktop computer do not directly connect to the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m , the latter is used 
later on to provide access control mechanisms to location information.
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This approach has already been successfully applied to tailor web content to lightweight 
mobile devices capabilities [38]. In their context, the proxy server used is referred to as 
an “active proxy” or “transcoding proxy” , as it intercepts and modifies the content of the 
HTTP responses to adapt to mobile devices’ weak capabilities. This approach has also been 
used to provide location-based content to mobile users, as described in Section 4.6.2. In our 
context, the proxy helps provide much more transparency for S u b je c ts  when connecting to 
the Internet as it does not necessitate additional software to be installed on the client side. 
Furthermore, it allows the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  to  monitor and control location-based content 
transmission in order to bill the appropriate entities for each transaction.
5.3.2 Components
The internal architecture of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  can be described as a set of components 
implementing different functionalities. In this section, we describe the various units in which 
those components are organized.
I d e n t i ty  M a n a g e m e n t U n it
The Identity Management Unit (IMU) manages all forms of identity for any S u b je c t, T arg e t 
and L B S .  There exist several kinds of L B S  with different needs in terms of identity. For 
example, an P o in t - o f - I n te r e s t  L B S  as defined in Section 1.3.2 does not need to be aware of the 
exact identity of a requestor. On the contrary, a L B S  in charge of locating someone’s child 
needs to be able to authenticate its S u b je c ts  in order to supply them  with T a r g e ts ’ sensitive 
location-based information. As a result, the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  implements the following 
identification schemes:
- Anonymous access to L B S .  This allows a S u b je c t  to access a L B S  without providing 
her identity. In practice, this is achieved using t r a n s a c t io n  p s e u d o n y m s  as defined in 
Section 4.2.
- Pseudonymous access to L B S .  Most webmail services allow for the use of pseudonyms as 
usernames when setting up email accounts. Internet Messaging software such as Yahoo 
or MSN Messenger also provide this feature and enable people to create communities 
without using their real names. Since the L B S  considered in our research are web- 
based, we believe that such long-term pseudonyms will also be used to identify both 
the S u b je c ts  and T a rg e ts  of a particular L B S .  For convenience however, we will limit 
S u b je c ts  and T a rg e ts  to a maximum of one pseudonym per L B S .
- Fully-identified access to L B S .  Banking web sites are the typical example of web sites
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that necessitate to authenticate their users with their real identities. As for pseudony­
mous accesses, only one authenticated identity will be allowed per S u b je c t  and T arget.
The Identity Management Unit’ s main role is to translate the S u b je c t s ’ real identity to 
the corresponding pseudonym to be used with a particular L B S .  Also, the IMU must be 
capable of translating a T a r g e t’s pseudonym into her real identity since the latter may be 
used by the M o b ile  O p e ra to r  to locate the T a rg et.
L o ca tio n  M an ag em en t U n it
The Location Management Unit (LMU) is the component in charge of all the processes 
involving location information. In particular, it looks after the task of retrieving location 
information for a particular T a rg e t. It is also in charge of translating location information 
from raw coordinates to more relevant and meaningful information, easily exploitable by 
L B S .  Finally, the LMU is able to downgrade the accuracy of this location information to 
improve T a r g e ts ’ privacy using a process called L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  defined in Section 4.3 and 
further analyzed in Section 6.
L o ca tio n  R e triev a l. The O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  provides L B S  with secure location informa­
tion. While h a n d se t-b a sed , or h y b r id  positioning technologies (see Section 2.5.1) may be used 
to locate a particular T a rg et, it is likely tha t most location processes will involve n e tw o r k -  
based  p o s i t io n in g  techniques since not every device will be location aware. In any case, the 
O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  has to  have access to some of the M o b ile  O p e r a to r ’s  network resources for 
both location and identity information. As reviewed in Section 4.7.1, the Open Mobile Al­
liance (OMA) consortium has designed the Mobile Location Protocol (MLP) that enables 
third parties to query M o b ile  O p e r a to r s ’ resources for T a r g e ts ’ location information. The 
Parlay initiative also aims at opening M o b ile  O p e ra to rs ' resources to authorized third par­
ties. Althought the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  is more likely to be implemented within the M o b ile  
O p e r a to r ’s  infrastructure, the middleware provides interfaces to both standards in order to 
enable remote access to M o b ile  O p e r a to r s ’ resources if necessary.
L o ca tio n  T ran sla tio n . M o b ile  O p e ra to r s  currently hold T a rg e ts ' location information in 
terms of L o c a tio n  A r e a s  Id e n tit ie s - , see Section 2.5.3 for further details. However, other 
positioning technologies (see Section 2.5.1) may return a location information as a point, an 
area or even a volume. As a consequence, depending on the positioning technology used, 
the L B S  requesting location details may end up with some information in a format she 
does not understand. Furthermore, different L B S  may require different location formats, 
more relevant to the service they wish to offer. In order to cater for all the potential
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L B S '' needs, the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  provides an open interface so that location translation 
tables can be implemented by the L B S  themselves and made available when retrieving 
location information. Of course, the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  provides already some default tables 
that enable, for example, to convert lo n g itu d e  and la ti tu d e  coordinates into N o r th in g  and 
E a s t in g  coordinates.
L o ca tio n  B lu rrin g . This functionality is part of the services provided by the O r ie n t  
P la t fo r m  tha t add value to a T a r g e t’s location information. Here, the value added lies in the 
transformation of the T a r g e t 's  location information in order to become more private while 
still remaining useful to L B S .  L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  is the process defined in Section 4.3, that 
intentionally downgrades the quality of location information in order to provide L B S  with 
the minimum acceptable accuracy in terms of T a r g e ts ' position. T a rg e ts  do not have to 
disclose their precise location if they believe the L B S  is not trustworthy or if they wish to 
maintain a certain level of privacy. L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  is designed as an algorithm tha t takes 
various parameters such as, for example, the accuracy of the desired location positioning. 
The O r ie n t  P la i fo r m  is designed to implement different types of b lu rr in g  algorithms, each 
T a r g e t being able to choose the one that corresponds most to the type of protection she 
requires. However, only one algorithm has been implemented and tested. Its design is 
further discussed in Section 6.
P ro file  M an a g em en t U n it
The Profile Management Unit (PMU) provides T a rg e ts  with the possibility to enter and 
modify their personal details as well as their privacy requirements into the system. They 
can either log on to the system from a desktop PC and set up their privacy preferences or 
directly do so from their mobile devices.
We present here a description of the privacy preferences provisioning component of the 
PMU. After having outlined the main motivations behind its conception and introduced its 
design, we will provide a description of its implementation and show how it relates to the 
other components within the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .
M o tiv a tio n s . The field of context-aware security is relatively new. While the meaning 
of context as well as context aware applications have received extensive interest from the 
research community, very little work has focused on analyzing privacy issues and require­
ments in the context of mobile services. In Section 4.5.4, we describe the approach taken by 
Hull e t  al. [115] in order to design and implement a flexible rule engine-based access control 
mechanism th a t lets T a rg e t provision their privacy preferences. While a similar research
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effort has also considered this idea in [88], we argue that given the conclusions of the studies 
mentioned earlier on, such systems can be efficiently replaced by simple server side software 
with database access.
D e sig n . Our privacy engine was designed to remain as simple as possible, both from the 
programming and the user point of view. The design takes into account the results of three 
studies [32, 128, 56] tha t investigated the privacy requirements in context aware computing. 
The main ideas guiding our choices can be outlined as follows.
- In order to protect T a r g e ts ’ privacy, we consider tha t a T a rg e t wishes to remain non- 
locatable as long as she does not explicitly specify the contrary using the privacy engine. 
This avoids having T a rg e ts  being potentially tracked by default when connecting to a 
L B S  for the first time. We note that it also complies with the EU directives described 
in Section 1.4.2, that advocate opt-in user consent with regards to location information 
collection.
- The parameters enabling a T a rg e t to decide to what degree she wishes to disclose her 
location information include the identity of the L B S  used, the identity of the S u b je c t,  
the reason why the information is collected and her current situation. We however 
restrict the meaning of the last two parameters as follows. The reason for the location 
information collection does not reflect why a single location request is performed but 
more what the usage of the information collected by the corresponding L B S  will be. As 
a result, upon registration with a L B S  using the privacy engine, a T a rg e t is prompted 
with a detailed description of location information handling. As with P3P, there is no 
way of actually enforcing the policy. The other parameter, i.e . the T a r g e t’s  situation 
when the request is performed, would usually encompass both T a r g e t’s location and 
time of the request. However, we chose to only retain the time of the request as a 
relevant parameter since we believed that the two are most of the time interlinked. 
This statement is supported by the fact that a T a r g e t usually knows where she is or 
will be at a particular time. Therefore, when setting up her privacy preferences, she 
will be able to accurately define when and where she wishes not to be tracked by only 
considering the time of a potential request.
- Instead of allowing a T a rg e t to set her privacy preferences by specifying an exact date, 
we restricted her choice to a weekly schedule. As reported in [56], some weekly T a rg e t  
mobility patterns exist, essentially due to working hours and daily office life. We 
exploit these patterns to provide T a rg e ts  with a flexible way to set up their privacy 
preferences while minimizing their interaction.
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- The authors of [160] point out the importance of “clusters” of S u b je c ts  to simplify 
privacy management. “Clusters” are defined as groups of entities that are treated 
similarly. In our context, this means that a T a rg e t will likely impose the same level 
of privacy to groups of people rather than a different one per person. As a result, the 
privacy engine provides pre-defined profiles (Public, Work, Family, e tc .)  that a T a rg et  
can choose when allowing a S u b je c t  to indirectly look up her location.
- Finally, it is assumed that the profiles provided will be suitable in most situations. 
The design of the privacy engine allows however T a rg e ts  to perform simple and quick 
changes on a particular profile, or, if the need arises, to create re-usable profiles from 
scratch, fn particular, it is possible for them to create temporary profiles by specifying 
only the accuracy they wish to be located by. These temporary profiles can be used to 
override existing ones when, for example, an unexpected event occurs, which requires 
a T a rg e t to temporary obfuscate her location for example.
The use of pre-defined profiles and user interfaces used to create new profiles prevents T a rg e ts  
from declaring conflicting privacy preferences. Every time a location request is performed by 
a L B S  on behalf of a S u b je c t , the PMU queries the data stored by the T a rg e t for this S u b je c t  
and L B S  given the time of the query. The PMU then outputs the accuracy at which the 
T a r g e t should be located and forwards it to the L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm of the Location 
Management Unit (LMU).
Im p lem en ta tio n . The Java language was used in order to implement our privacy engine. 
More precisely, we used JSP to implement the backend of the web-based forms made available 
to  T a rg e ts . The database of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  was used to store the privacy preferences 
of each T a rg e t for each S u b je c t. The user interface basically consists of multiple forms to fill 
in, four of them are shown in Appendix B. Upon request from a L B S  through the LMU, 
the privacy engine can determine very efficiently what accuracy the L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algo­
rithm  implemented as part of the LMU needs to use in order to protect the corresponding 
T a r g e t 's  privacy while complying with her privacy requirements. When connecting to the 
web interface of the PMU, T a rg e ts  need to identify and authenticate themselves. This can 
be done either by using the facilities provided by the Public Key Infrastructure described 
in Section 7 to enable client side authentication or the traditional login/password mechanism.
Of course, we realize that our privacy engine is less flexible than the ones presented in 
[115] or [88]. However, we believe our approach reflects the needs of T a r g e ts  since it is based 
on the results of recent studies that point out what privacy parameters really matter with
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regards to location information disclosure. Furthermore, the response time of the privacy 
engine discussed in this section is reduced compared to the other approaches since privacy 
preferences are hard-coded in a database when provisioned by T a rg e ts . The authors of [115] 
recognize that hard coded privacy preferences may be preferable in some situations. We 
illustrated here how this approach could be efficient in our context.
C h arg in g  U n it
Following the recommendations established in the reference document [100], the charging 
mechanism used is based on the revenue sharing model, not only between the different players 
involved, but also with their peers. Indeed, a S u b je c t  may connect either to the network 
operator it is registered with or to a foreign one, while roaming for example. This means that 
the two network operators need to be able to share the cost of a location positioning request. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates a typical revenue sharing model involving a roaming S u b je c t  The 
O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  is considered here as not being part, of the network operator’s infrastructure 
but is very likely to be integrated by the latter.
«
.. ► LBS





T a rg e t
9 p.
1 Orient Platform \ 6 Home
Mobile Operator
Subject
► B A  re q u e s ts  a  s e iv ic e  fro n t B
-►  B A  ch a rg e s  B
B A  c h a rg e s  B m o re  lik e ly  in te rn a lly
►  8  A  lo c a te s  8
P robab le  In te g ra t io n
Figure 5.2: Charging Mechanism
The charge for providing location information is believed to be set up by every M o b ile  
O p e r a to r  individually. This charge will also depend on the positioning technology used to 
determine the T a r g e t 's  location as well as on whether the T a r g e t is roaming or not. Thus, 
a possible charging scenario can be described as follows1:
1. A S u b je c t  requests a service from a L B S  provider.
1This example does not consider the case where a Subject queries a LB S  from her desktop computer.
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2. The L B S  contacts the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m ,  which forwards the request to the correspond­
ing M o b ile  O p e ra to r2.
3. The home M o b ile  O p e ra to r  checks whether the T a rg e t is locatable within its own 
PLMN network and queries the relevant target M o b ile  O p e ra to r  for the T a r g e t’s loca­
tion if the need arises.
4. The target M o b ile  O p e ra to r  retrieves the location of the T a rg et.
5. The target M o b ile  O p e ra to r  forwards the location of the T a r g e t to the home M o b ile  
O p e ra to r  and charges him the amount p t  for the location request.
6. The home M o b ile  O p e ra to r  then forwards the location information to the O r ie n t  P la t ­
f o r m  and charges her p h + p t .
7. The O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  adds value to the location information and forwards it to the 
L B S ,  charging him p o + p h + p t .
8. The L B S  adds value to the location information by providing his service to the S u b jec t,  
and charges the latter through the O r ie n t  P la tfo rm , p l+ p o + p h + p t.
9. The O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  forwards the charging details to the home M o b ile  O p era to r.
10. The home M o b ile  O p e ra to r  then bills the S u b je c t, pays the target M o b ile  O p e ra to r  p t  
as well as the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  p l+ p o , which in turns pays the L B S  pi.
We now present some comments and observations on this charging scheme. First, both 
L B S  and S u b je c ts  should be aware of the maximum price of the total transaction. Thus, 
we advocate, like the GSM Association in [100], that L B S  fix a maximum price and the 
accuracy for a particular location request prior to sending it to the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m . An 
estimation of the different prices p x  is given in Table 5.134.
p i p o p h p t
Cost 20 cents 15 cents 10 cents 5 cents
Table 5.1: Estimation of the Shared Costs of a L B S  Request.
Furthermore, if, for some reason, the location request fails, this should not be charged to 
either the L B S  or the S u b je c t . This charging scheme involves a lot of transactions between 
parties th a t may not fully trust each other. In order to ensure that any charging related
2 In this section we voluntary simplify the Orient Platform’s actions for clarity purpose.
3 On the basis of a LBS  request costing 50p.
4As mentioned in [77] for 2003. Average price for a location request (ph.) (02, Vodafone, T-Mobile, 
Orange) in the UK.
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conflict will be resolved, strong security mechanisms guaranteeing confidentiality, integrity 
and non-repudiation must be used in every transaction.
5.3.3 Implem entation
A prototype implementation of the O r ie n t  P la tfo rm , has been carried out using the Java lan­
guage, mainly for robustness reasons. As a middleware platform, it interfaces directly with 
the two entities mobile S u b je c t  and L B S  as a proxy. It also communicates with the M o b ile  
O p e ra to r  when a location request is received from the L B S .  Finally, its PMS component 
is accessible to  S u b je c ts  and T a rg e ts  via a web interface. As a result, the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  
prototype comprises the following components, as presented in Figure 5.3:
- A proxy server. A S u b je c t  may need to set up his browser preferences such that 
it connects transparently to the proxy when conducting any HTTP connection; see 
Section 5.5. The proxy server then forwards any HTTP request to the relevant web 
host when the request is not location-based related. On the contrary, when it involves 
location information retrieval, the request is filtered, modified and tunneled through a 
protocol called the O r ie n t  P ro to co l, further discussed in Section 5.4.
- A web server. It provides an interface for L B S ,  S u b je c ts  and T a rg e ts . Indeed, when a 
L B S  is queried by a S u b je c t using a desktop PC, as would any internet user do with a 
conventional web site, the former queries the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  for location information 
through the web interface using the O r ie n t  P ro to co l. When a S u b je c t  wishes to modify 
her personal details such as her pseudonyms used for L B S  access for example, she 
contacts the PMU through the web interface. Finally, a T a rg e t can manage her privacy 
preferences by accessing the same unit through the same interface.
- A database. The database contains all the records of the identities of the different 
parties involved, mapping pseudonyms with real user identities. It also stores S u b ­
j e c t s ’, T a r g e t s ' , and L B S '  general preferences and privacy details where applicable.
- A set of protocols. The MLP or the Parlay protocol (see Section 4.7.1) is used in order 
to query the M o b ile  O p e ra to r  for T a r g e ts ' location information. The communications 
between L B S  and the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  are established using the O r ie n t  P r o to c o l; see 
Section 5.4 for further information. The protocols mentioned are implemented as Java 
APIs and distributed to the parties involved in their use.
In order to evaluate the different components of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m , we ran a location 
simulator [176] whose task was to generate a set of sample T a rg e ts  and simulate their move­
ments. The simulator was acting as a server, just as a M o b ile  O p e r a to r ’s GMLC, and was
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able to respond to queries upon T a r g e ts ’ pseudonym provision. This simulator, combined 
with prototypes of L B S  developed as part of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m ’s  project (see [73]), enabled 
us to implement a useful test bed for the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .
5.3.4 Evaluation
The design of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  presented in this section has taken into consideration the 
analysis presented in Section 3.3.1. In particular, the following design requirements have 
been fulfilled:
- R e q u ir e m e n t  1. The middleware is implemented as a combination of a proxy server 
and a web application server. This high level design makes it easy for both S u b je c ts  
and L B S  to interact with the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .
- R e q u ir e m e n t  2. The middleware is mobile device independent, both in terms of S u b ­
j e c t s ’ and T a r g e ts ’ equipment. The former needs only to be able to browse the Internet 
from her mobile device while the latter has no particular constraint imposed but to  be
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- R e q u ir e m e n t  3. The middleware accesses directly the GMLC through the MLP or the 
Parlay X protocol, whether the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  is implemented inside or outside the 
M o b ile  O p e r a to r 's  infrastructure.
- R e q u ir e m e n t  6 . A charging mechanism has been presented in this section and imple­
mented as part of the O r ie n t  P r o to c o l; see Section 5.3.2.
- R e q u ir e m e n t  7. A location translation module enables the translation of the location 
information received from the GMLC into formats that are more suitable for processing 
by L B S .  The translation table used are updatable and upgradable by L B S .
The R e q u ir e m e n ts  4 & 5  will be further discussed in Section 5.4. Part of the security require­
ments also mentioned in the analysis have been met. In particular, the identity management 
implements an anonymous, pseudonymous and fully-identified access to L B S .  Furthermore, 
a module implementing L o c a t io n  B lu r r in g  has been presented, but the algorithm itself will 
be further discussed in Section 6.
At this stage, the overall approach used to provide L B S  access to S u b je c ts  does not 
represent significant architectural advances compared to what has been recently published 
in the related literature. The proxy approach has already been used as mentioned in Section 
4.6.2. Our design differs however by the fact that the proxy is trusted, that it enables a 
web access to L B S  and th a t it can handle multiple types of identities. It differs furthermore 
from the closely related research work described in Section 4.6.4 by the fact that it is not 
specifically meant to be used over a WAP connection and because it provides some other 
functionalities such as L o c a t io n  T r a n s la t io n  and a charging mechanism. The security features 
of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  present however some novelty that make this middleware a fairly 
unique tool to enable a secure L B S  provision to mobile users over the Internet. This will be 
further discussed in Sections 6 and 7 of this thesis.
5.3.5 Conclusion
In this section, we introduced the design of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  as a middleware that 
provides T a rg e ts  with a high level of privacy and guarantees L B S  a reliable provision of 
relevant location information when delivering a location-based service to S u b je c ts . We then 
presented a prototype implementation and we refer to [73] for a critical evaluation of the 
overall design. We also briefly introduced the O r ie n t  P ro to c o l used by both L B S  and the 
O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  to communicate with each other. The protocol will be discussed more in 
depth in the next section of this chapter.
locatab le  by tlie  M obile Operator.
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5.4 Protocol
The O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  and L B S  need to be able to communicate using a protocol. Using 
an existing protocol such as HTTP is manageable but does not provide much flexibility 
in terms of session management and message handling. Indeed, the two parties need to 
exchange messages containing information about identities and location and thus keeping 
track of the message sequence may become problematic and demanding. Therefore, we have 
devised an application level protocol that can run on top of HTTP but also on UDP or TCP. 
We present here the resulting design and implementation of the O r ie n t  P ro toco l.
5.4.1 Design
As shown in Figure 5.3, the O r ie n t  P ro to c o l  is designed to allow communications between 
a L B S  and the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m ,  but also between the latter and S u b je c ts  and different 
instances of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .  Both L B S  and the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  can initiate the 
communication and start a s e s s io n  during which one or more s e r v ic e s  can be invoked. A 
s e rv ic e  is a sequence of at least two messages based on the request/response paradigm. 
The O r ie n t  P ro to c o l defines four different se rv ic e s , two that can be invoked by the O r ie n t  
P la tfo rm , and two by the L B S :
- The C lie n t  I n i t ia te d  S e r v ic e  (CIS). This service is initiated by the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  
when a S u b je c t  requests a L B S  through the proxy. The O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  encapsulates 
the S u b je c t 's  request into a request message and forwards it to the L B S . The L B S  can 
request further information from the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  before responding finally to the 
request.
- The L B S  I n i t ia te d  S e r v ic e  (LIS). This service is initiated by a L B S  and consists ba­
sically in a simple request-response message exchange in order to retrieve a S u b je c t ’s 
location details.
- The P ro file  M a n a g e m e n t  S e r v ic e  (PMS). It can be used by S u b je c ts ,  T a rg e ts  and L B S  
to update their personal details and preferences. In practice, this service invocation 
will be made transparently through a web interface.
- The I n te r - p la t fo r m  C o m m u n ic a t io n s  S e r v ic e  (ICS). This is the service that ensures 
that several instances of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  can communicate with each other
Each se rv ic e  is made of two or more different messages. Each message shares the same 
basic structure composed of a header and a body. The header contains some session infor­
mation, including the time the message was emitted as well as the identities of the sender
83
and the receiver. The body contains the actual content of a message including location re­
quests/responses, charging details e tc .. A complete description of the services and messages 
can be found in [46] and [73]. A complete protocol stack is also given in Appendix A of this 
thesis.
The O r ie n t  P ro to c o l  guarantees message confidentiality, authentication, integrity and 
non-repudiation. This is achieved through the use of encryption and digital signatures at 
the application level. Any entity involved in a message exchange authenticates herself to the 
other party at the beginning of a session, and agrees on a cryptographic session key. The 
choice of the authentication protocol used is left to the protocol initiator and is decided after 
a protocol negotiation. This mechanism is similar to SSL, but designed at the application 
level so that each party has control on the session key used and on the encrypted and signed 
message parts.
XML was preferred to ASN1 to specify the protocol messages, mainly because the tech­
nology is widely known and adopted in the Internet environment. A namespace called 
OrientML was created in order to describe each of the components of the messages. XML 
Schemas were used to validate the XML messages as opposed to DTDs because of their high 
level of reusability. Finally, the XML Encryption and Digital Signature namespaces were 
adopted to specify the security layer of the O r ie n t  P ro to co l.
5.4.2 Implem entation
The O r ie n t  P ro to c o l was implemented as a Java API. Built as a finite state machine, it 
generates the relevant XML message according to the state of the service and the session 
parameters. It handles the digital signatures and encryption processes over a specified part 
of the message using XML Signature and XML Encryption cryptographic libraries. The 
messages can then be sent over H TTP or any other transport protocol to the other party. 
An alternative to this approach would have been to use an existing standard, the Simple 
Object Application Protocol (SOAP), that provides a XML messaging framework that also 
supports XML Encryption and Signature. SOAP operates in a web service environment and 
is useful as far as RPC requests are concerned. However, it adds overheads by encapsulating 
messages in a SOAP envelope when the protocol only consists of sending and receiving a 
series of XML messages. We finally opted for an application specific XML protocol in order 




The requirements for the design of a protocol capable of accessing the middleware func­
tionalities were stated in Section 3.3.2. We recall them here briefly and show how they are 
fulfilled by the design and implementation of the O r ie n t  P ro to co l.
A ccess to  lo c a tio n  in fo rm a tio n  u p o n  p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  th e  r ig h t  c re d e n tia ls . The
CIS and LIS services of the Orient Protocol offer the possibility to a L B S  to  request location 
information of a particular T a rg et. Whether the access to tha t information will be granted 
or not is left to the access control module of the Profile Management Unit of the O r ie n t  
P la t fo r m . Thus, R e q u ir e m e n t  5  for the design of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  is fulfilled.
M a n a g e m e n t o f  p e r s o n a l  p ro file s  fo r b o th  L B S  a n d  T a r g e t s .  The PMS service 
allows both entities as well as S u b je c ts  to enter, update and modify their personal profile 
stored in the Profile Management Unit. For convenience however, a web interface is used as 
a front-end and may request the PMS service transparently for its users.
C o m m u n ic a tio n s  b e tw e e n  d iffe re n t in s ta n c e s  o f  th e  m id d le w a re . The ICS service 
ensures that multiple instances of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  can communicate and forward re­
quests and responses when the need arises, implementing the R e q u ir e m e n t  4  for the design 
of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .
The security requirements stated in Section 3.3.2 have also been fulfilled by using XML 
Encryption and XML Signature to provide confidentiality, integrity and non repudiation. 
Authentication is carried out at the beginning of every session and establishes a temporary 
session key as specified in Section 5.4.1
5.4.4 Conclusion
The O r ie n t  P ro to c o l Java API has been evaluated by a group of undergraduate students, 
see conclusions in [73]. While the general services provided were used without any partic­
ular problem to implement L B S , it appears that there would be a need for a service that 
implements a location request based on an area as opposed to an identity. Indeed, querying 
an area to find out who is present at a certain place has been prevented by our design.
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In this section, we show how the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  and the O r ie n t  P ro to c o l fit in with the 
current M o b ile  O p e r a to r 's  infrastructure. As stated previously, the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  can 
either be integrated within the M o b ile  O p e r a to r ’s network or remain as a stand alone proxy 

































Figure 5.4: Protocol stacks of the different entities involved in location-based content pro­
vision.
The Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN) of the 2.5G network interfaces between the 
wireless and the wired networks converting the GPRS packet flow into Ethernet frames. The 
O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  is implemented behind this gateway. It encapsulates L B S - related HTTP 
requests into Orient Protocol messages and forwards them to L B S . The latter receive the 
embedded HTTP requests, process them and respond by embedding the HTTP response 
into an O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  message that is processed by the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  which sends the 
HTML content back to S u b je c ts .
C o n fig u ra tio n  1 : W i th in  th e  M o b i l e  O p e r a t o r ’s  in f r a s t r u c tu r e
The O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  is located within the M o b ile  O p e r a to r ’s infrastructure, coupled with one 
of its GGSN. When a S u b je c t  wishes to use a location-based privacy-enhanced connection 
when browsing the Internet, she must configure the Access Point Name (APN) prior to 
establish her connection. This is an alias for the GGSN to be used. Upon receipt of the APN, 
the SGSN resolves the name into the IP address of the corresponding GGSN and connects 
to it. The latter now authenticates the S u b je c t and allocates her an IP address through a
86
DHCP server. Prom now on, the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  acts as a proxy server, transparently to 
the S u b je c t. It can communicate with the M o b ile  O p e ra to r 's  GMLC using a protocol such 
as Parlay or MLP.
C o n f ig u ra tio n  2 : O u ts id e  th e  M o b i l e  O p e r a t o r ’s  in f r a s t r u c tu r e
When the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  acts as a stand alone proxy server, the S u b je c t  specifies the APN 
of the GGSN connecting to the network the proxy is implemented in. The S u b je c t is then 
allocated an IP address either by the DHCP of the GGSN or the one from the network where 
resides the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .  Since the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  needs to identify and authenticate 
somehow its S u b je c ts  in order to be able to retrieve location information on behalf of both 
them and L B S , a mapping between a S u b je c t 's  IMSI and IP address needs to be maintained. 
This information resides already in the GGSN, as part of the PDP Context of the connection. 
In practice, infrastructures of the same nature as the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  (transcoding proxies 
like WAP Gateways for example) are supplied with this information through the use of the 
RADIUS protocol. This approach assumes of course that the entity running the O r ie n t  
P la t fo r m  has an agreement with the M o b ile  O p e ra to r  in order to configure the APN and the 
GGSN such that they enable a connection as described previously.
5.6 Conclusion
The O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  and the O r ie n t  P ro to c o l presented in this section have been designed 
to fulfill the requirements stated in Section 3. In particular, they allow for accountable 
location information provision to L B S  by implementing a revenue sharing model between 
the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m , M o b ile  O p e ra to rs , L B S  and S u b je c ts . They also constitute the building 
blocks to provide privacy enhancing mechanisms to mobile users connecting to location- 
based applications. Further information on the O r ie n t  P ro to c o l  can be found in [73], where 
a detailed specification of the protocol messages and a description of the implementation 
choices are provided.
87
The Location Blurring 
Algorithm
6.1 Introduction
The middleware presented in Section 5 provides the building blocks for the security design 
of an architecture that aims at delivering L B S  to S u b je c ts  while preserving T a rg e ts ' privacy. 
In particular, it implements identity hiding or id e n t i ty  b lu r r in g  by combining the use of a 
web proxy and pseudonyms for both S u b je c ts  and T a rg e ts . However, several issues remain 
unsolved. Whilst L B S  may not be fully aware of the real identity of a particular S u b je c t  o r  
T a rg e t, they can easily gain more personal information by tracking them  over time. T a rg ets  
are then left with a dilemma:
- They must disclose their location details to an entity susceptible to track them if they 
wish to avail of a particular L B S .
- They must retain some of their personal location details if they wish to preserve their 
privacy.
Refusing to disclose enough location details may make it impossible for a L B S  to provide a 
relevant service to her S u b je c ts . Preserving T a r g e ts ’ privacy is therefore a m atter of finding 
the subtle balance between location information retention and disclosure.
This section addresses this problem by proposing a L o c a t io n  B lu r r in g  algorithm that 
intentionally downgrades the accuracy of the location information supplied to L B S .  Its role 
is to maintain a reasonable level of location privacy specified by T a r g e ts  in terms of the size 
of the area they wish to be located in, while providing L B S  with meaningful information.
C h a p t e r  6
6.2 Presentation
The L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm presented in this section is implemented as part of the 
Location Management Unit (LMU) (see Section 5.3.2) of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .  It is used to 
prevent a loss of privacy that may occur when T a r g e ts ' location information is disclosed to 
L B S .  For the better understanding of the reader, we first state some general definitions of 
terms that will be used through out this section. We then present the threat model of the 
environment in which the algorithm will operate and the requirements for its design. We 
point out how unique this location privacy feature is in the context mentioned and describe 
our approach after having outlined the main issues related to its design. We finally conclude 
on the relevance of our design.
6.3 Definitions
We understand that the terms quoted below may encompass notions and concepts that are 
somehow very similar. In our context however, we will clearly differentiate each of them by 
giving them a precise and subjective definition.
We first consider a three-dimensional Euclidian space S ,  where we define the following 
entities and concepts:
- A P o s i t io n  is a point P  G S ,  denoted by its three coordinates ( x , y , z )  where
i  £ I f l  (—180,180], y  £ M fl [—90, 90] and 2  G K+ . A P o s i t io n  represents the real 
location of a particular entity.
- A L o c a lity  is defined as a volume V  defined within S ,  and tha t contains P .  A volume 
is defined as the amount of 3-dimensional space contained in a polyhedron or in a 
union of polyhedra. A L o c a lity  may for example define the volume whose base is 
delimited by a cell when the Cell-ID location positioning technology is used. Another 
example of L o c a lity , denoted as P r e c is io n , can be defined as the quantification of 
location determination measurements errors. The P r e c is io n  of a particular T a rg e t  
can therefore be assimilated to the kind of location information a GPS system would 
provide in reality. However, we will from now on consider that a GPS system returns 
a precise T a r g e t 's  location and therefore, the P re c is io n  of this location system will be 
reduced to its P o s i t io n .
- A L o c a lity  L i  constitutes a b lu r r in g  of a L o c a lity  L 2 if the former contains the latter,
i .e .  V x  £  L 2 => x  E  L \ .  When context permits, we will use the term B lu r re d  L o c a lity  
to denote a L o c a lity  which is the result of applying the L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm.
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We note tha t a B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  contains the original L o c a lity  it is defined from in 
order to meet one of the requirements mentioned in Section 6.5, which states that a 
T a r g e t 's  B lu r re d  L o c a lity  should always contain her original P o s itio n .
- An I n s t a n t  is a number T  6 N defined as the absolute time measured with a certain 
accuracy from some epoch.
- A S ig h tin g  S  is defined as a L o c a lity  together with an In s ta n t .  When the O r ie n t  
P la t fo r m  queries a location server for a T a r g e t’s location, it receives a S ig h tin g  as 
an answer. We note here that the I n s t a n t  of a S ig h tin g  may not reflect the time of 
the query since some location servers may return the last location of a T a rg e t with a 
timestamp if they cannot currently locate her.
- A S ig h tin g  S i constitutes a b lu rr in g  of a S ig h tin g  S 2 if the L o c a lity  associated with S 1  
constitutes a b lu rr in g  of the L o c a lity  associated with ¿>2 and if the I n s t a n t  associated 
with S i  is equal to the I n s ta n t  associated with S 2 . When context permits, we will 
use the term B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  to denote a S ig h tin g  output by the B lu r r in g  A lg o r ith m .  
Typically, a L B S  querying the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  for a T a r g e t 's  location is provided with 
a B lu r re d  S ig h tin g .
We note here that, for a particular S ig h t in g , we only introduced the concept of S p a tia l  
B lu r r in g . The bigger the B lu r re d  L o c a lity  is, the more difficult it is to pin point exactly 
where a T a rg e t is located, i .e . a space range or volume is given rather than a clearly defined 
point in the space S .  The same concept could have been applied to the temporal dimension, 
as in providing a time range r ,  for which a T a rg e t is located in the associated L o c a lity  at 
some I n s ta n t  T e r .  However, we decided to focus on S p a t ia l  B lu r r in g  and leave T e m p o ra l  
B lu r r in g  for further research.
We now present some metrics used to quantify B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s .
- S p a tia l  G r a n u la r i ty  represents the level of detail with which the L o c a lity  of a S ig h tin g  
(and respectively B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  for a B lu r re d  S ig h t in g ) is described, i .e . is a measure 
directly proportional to the volume of the L o c a lity . The notion of T e m p o ra l G r a n u la r ity  
cannot be defined as such since we decided not to investigate T e m p o ra l B lu r r in g  when 
designing our algorithm. However, the concept of T e m p o r a l  F re sh n e s s  may be defined 
as the time during which a L o c a lity  or B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  will be presented as the most 
up-to-date geographical area where the corresponding T a rg e t is located. We note that 
the T e m p o ra l F r e s h n e s s  is maximal at the I n s t a n t  when the L o c a lity  is disclosed, and 
that it decreases over time.
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- Q u a li ty  refers to the degree of relevance of the location information supplied to a L B S .  
It strongly depends on her needs and is maximal when the L B S  is able to provide 
an optimal service to her S u b je c ts  using the location information received. It can be 
quantified using a scale ranging from P o o r  Q u a li ty  to P e r fe c t  Q u a lity . P o o r  Q u a l­
i ty  would be defined as the minimum acceptable S p a tia l  G r a n u la r ity  together with 
the minimum T e m p o r a l  F re sh n e s s  tolerated for any B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  received. P e r ­
fect. Q u a li ty  would represent the most precise location information achievable, as in a 
B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  reduced to its P o s i t io n  together with an I n s t a n t  corresponding to the 
time of the request.
- A c c u r a c y  illustrates a subjective notion used to describe the level of privacy of a partic­
ular T a rg et. It can be described in terms of S p a tia l  G r a n u la r ity , T e m p o ra l F re sh n e s s  or 
in terms of any parameter relevant to the T a rg et, such as a civil location (i.e. ’’home” , 
’’workplace”). Generally, a c c u ra c y  will be used as a synonym of S p a tia l  G r a n u la r ity  
through out this chapter.
Considering the fact th a t we will be studying T a r g e ts ’ mobility on the earth surface, it 
is legitimate to think of reducing 5  to a 2-dimensional space1. In this case, all the volumes 
defined become areas. In particular, a L o c a lity  in its simplest form may be a circle or a 
square. In this simple case, S p a t ia l  G r a n u la r ity  can be defined as the radius of the former 
or the square side of the latter.
6.4 Threat M odel
A complete threat model of the architecture, with a particular emphasis on the trustworthi­
ness of L B S  has already been proposed in Section 3.2.2. We propose here to refine it with 
respect to the L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm, and to describe it in more depth. The context 
of this section mainly involves two entities.
- The O r ie n t  P la t fo r m , which will apply the L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm on a S ig h tin g .
- The L B S  that receives the resulting B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g .
The O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  is considered as responsible for the “security” of the S ig h tin g  released 
to the L B S .  In other words, we assume that the location and timestamp provided to the L B S  
cannot help her gain a more a c c u r a te  knowledge on where and when a particular T a rg e t is 
in real-time.
1 While a Target may travel relatively freely on the ground, she may not, in most cases, be able to travel 
along the altitude axis.
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It is admitted that a L B S  can track a T a rg e t as accurately as the most privileged S u b je c t  
registered with this L B S  and authorized to do so. However, we do not assume that a L B S  
can request a T a r g e t 's  B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  on behalf of a particular S u b je c t  without her consent. 
It could indeed be detected as overcharging a S u b je c t  and could lead to legal complaints. 
Instead, we assume that L B S  can cache B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s  requested by their S u b je c ts  and 
perform location tracking. Therefore, this is the responsibility of the T a rg e t to restrict 
S u b je c ts  from obtaining very accurate location information if she does not wish to grant full 
visibility to a particular L B S  that she does not trust entirely.
Finally, we also assume tha t a L B S  will not cheat and use other resources to gain a smaller 
L o c a lity  of a T a rg et. Nevertheless, we believe that some of them may try to collaborate and 
collude with each other in order to gain more a c c u ra te  or fresher location information about 
the current P o s i t io n  of a T a rg et. We will therefore consider three categories of L B S  providing 
different degrees of location privacy:
- F u lly  T r u s te d  L B S .  They are L B S  that are fully authorized to track their users. Real 
user credentials can be used for identification and authentication and no L o c a tio n  
B lu r r in g  needs to be applied to the S ig h tin g . This category encompasses emergency 
L B S  and services that require trust and confidentiality such as child tracking services 
for example. In the World Wide Web environment, services such as online banking 
facilities share similar properties.
- S e m i  T Y u sted  L B S .  Most L B S  considered fall into this class of services. They are 
authorized to track a T a rg e t to the extent of her privacy preferences but are trusted 
not to share any identity or location information with any other entity. An analogy 
of S e m i  T r u s te d  L B S  in the WWW environment is the service provided by Yahoo! 
Inc2. Users are identified using pseudonyms and while they accept to be tracked using 
cookies or preference provisions, they trust the company not to disclose these personal 
details or behaviors to other entities.
- N o n  T r u s te d  L B S .  They are L B S  that may not only track but also share B lu r re d  S ig h t­
in g s  with other entities. Typically, anonymity is used when applicable. Any web site 
used in the WWW environment that does not require identification or authentication 
may fall under this category as no formal or informal contract has been passed between 
the entities with regards to the identity and location information collected.
As mentioned earlier, we assume that this is the responsibility of the T a rg e t to ensure she 
is fully aware of the type of L B S  that she authorizes to look up her location details.
2My Yahoo! http://my.yahoo.com.
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In this section, we first outline the requirements for the design of our L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  
algorithm and show that no approach has yet tackled such a challenge.
- First and foremost, the O r ie n t  P la tfo rm , may indirectly use different positioning tech­
nologies to locate a particular T a rg e t. For example, Assisted GPS (see Section 2.5.1) 
may locate a T a rg e t with negligible positioning errors. The result of such a positioning 
can therefore be assimilated as a point, or, as defined earlier on, as a P o s i tio n .  The 
Cell-ID positioning technique associated with the knowledge of the cell planning locates 
a T a r g e t  within the shape of a polygon. The L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm defined must 
therefore be able to cope with the different L o c a lit ie s  or geometrical location objects.
- The L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm should support anonymous, pseudonymous and fully 
identified T a rg ets .
- The B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  representing the location details of a T a rg e t should always re­
flect the reality, i .e . the corresponding B lu r re d  L o c a lity  should always contain her 
P o s i t io n .  The S p a t ia l  G r a n u la r ity  parameter of the B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  may vary in or­
der to maintain a reasonable level of privacy while providing accurate time and location 
information to L B S .
- The B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  returned to the L B S  should have the maximum accuracy re­
quested by this L B S  and allowed by the corresponding T a rg et. If this is not possible, 
the B lu r r in g  algorithm will return an error message.
- The B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  returned to  the L B S  should contain a L o c a lity  in which a T a rg et  
could potentially be anywhere with equal probability.
The requirements stated above emphasize the need for a location privacy algorithm that 
has no equivalent in the related research work summarized in Section 4. Indeed, the ap­
proaches based on I d e n t i t y  B lu r r in g  (see Section 4.2) are not applicable in our context since 
T a rg e ts  need to be identifiable in some ways by L B S .  The L o c a tio n  k -a rea  [97] approach 
presents a similar threat model as ours and represents the closest research effort to ours 
carried out to date, since it aims at hiding the location of a T a rg e t rather than her identity. 
Their approach is based on sensitive areas which are generated according to the fraction 
of the population considered that has visited the area: the less frequented areas are clas­
sified as s e n s i t iv e .  Their concept of location privacy is therefore based on the difficulty in 
distinguishing one person from another: the more difficult it is, the less sensitive the area 
is. While we respect this notion of location privacy, we believe that it should be based on
6.5 Requirem ents
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T a r g e ts ’ personal criteria rather than imposing the same model of privacy to all of them. A 
T a r g e t may not feel comfortable letting a L B S  know she is in a particular place, 1 1 0  m atter 
how many people surround her. Also, the L o c a t io n  k -a re a  approach stops disclosing location 
information when a T a rg e t enters a s e n s i t iv e  area , which goes against one of our require­
ments. Furthermore, the authors do not provide any precise description of the algorithm 
such as the list of parameters influencing the frequency of the location updates, and finally 
it is not clear whether the system would be efficient in a semi deserted area.
6.6 Geometrical considerations
This section points out the main issues regarding the development of a L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  
algorithm. In particular, it illustrates some of the geometrical constraints encountered when 
designing the algorithm so that it prevents location information leaks during a continuous 
location tracking. It demonstrates how we define the B lu r re d  L o c a lity  to be sent back to 
the L B S .  Throughout this section, we will consider two B lu rre d  L o c a lit ie s  that belong to 
the same T a rg et. As a m atter of simplicity and as mentioned previously, we will use a 2- 
dimensional Euclidian space S  and define the two B lu r r e d  L o c a litie s . I1 1  this context, we 
choose a simple B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  reduced to a circle of center P  (its P o s i t io n )  with a radius 
r  as an example. Another assumption requires the two S ig h tin g s  passed as parameters to 
the algorithm to be consecutive in order to simulate a continuous location tracking.
In te rse c tio n  issues. Intersection problems may arise when the T a r g e t’s  speed is negligible 
and when two B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s  of the same T a r g e t are requested consecutively by a L B S .  
If a different B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  is generated at each request, we then face such a problem. As 
shown in Figure 6.1, the L B S  gains more precise location details than what the L o c a tio n  
B lu r r in g  algorithm is supposed to reveal, since the area covered by the intersection of the 
two B lu r r e d  L o c a lit ie s  is smaller than either one of them.
B o rd e r  issues. Bearing in mind the same configuration as mentioned above but now 
considering the T a r g e t’s speed as non negligible, we define border problems as the higher 
probability for a T a rg e t to be located either in the intersection or near the intersection of 
the two B lu r r e d  L o c a litie s . The border problem is illustrated in Figure 6.1
Intersection problems can be avoided easily by imposing a constraint on all the B lu r re d  
L o c a lit ie s  returned to a particular L B S . As long as they remain the same or disjoints but do 
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Figure 6.1: Intersection and border problems.
B lu r r e d  L o c a lity .
Solving r e a l- t im e  border problems 3 involves working with the B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  itself 
rather than with the B lu r re d  L o c a lity  only. It basically amounts to guaranteeing that a 
particular T a r g e t  can be located anywhere in the B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  rather than at its borders. 
This can be achieved by giving the T a rg e t enough time to potentially move to any P o s i t io n  
within the B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  before the B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s  is released to the L B S .  Solving 
re tro sp e c tiv e  border problems 4 is more delicate since it involves releasing B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s  
that do not leak information about the past P o s i t io n s  of a T a rg et, but also tha t will not 
disclose sensitive information either when associated with more up-to-date B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s .
The shape of B lu r r e d  L o c a lit ie s  is also of importance. As stated in Section 6.5, the 
L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  must be able to reflect the reality, i .e . being able to release a B lu r re d  
S ig h tin g s  for every location in a predefined subset of a 2-D space, corresponding to the 
PLMN of a M o b ile  O p e ra to r  for example. This implies that the space considered is fully 
covered by predefined B lu r re d  L o c a litie s . Therefore, such a collection of B lu r r e d  L o c a lit ie s  
must form a tiling of the plane. This can be easily achieved using shapes like squares, 
equilateral triangles, and regular hexagons (wireless network cells constitute an example of 
such a tiling).
3 Border problems tha t may affect the Position of the Target a t the Instant of the Blurred Sighting 
received.
4Border problems th a t may affect the Position of a Target a t the Instant of a Blurred Sighting previously 
received.
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We introduce here the algorithm used as part of our approach to enable T a rg e ts  to maintain 
a specified level of privacy. The algorithm presented aims at solving intersection as well as 
r e a l- tim e  border problems. We first introduce its main principles and then provide a detailed 
description of its design.
6.7.1 Principles
The main principles of our L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm follow the recommendations stated 
above. The area covered by the algorithm is limited to the PLMN of the M o b ile  O p e ra to r  
in charge of locating a T a rg e t. A square tiling of the PLMN has been chosen as a m atter of 
simplicity. The side length of each tile represents the a c c u ra c y  by which a particular T a rg e t  
wishes to be located by a particular S u b je c t. For efficiency purposes, multiple overlapping 
grids of squares of different sizes are pre-computed. Each of these grids represents a level of 
privacy and each square in a grid is a potential B lu r r e d  L o c a lity , as shown in Figure 6.2.
6.7 Our Location B lurring  A lgorithm
L eve l 2
Figure 6.2: Overlapping grids.
The grid selection is performed by looking at the T a r g e t 's  entry for a S u b je c t  in her 
privacy preferences in terms of a ccu ra cy . In fact, this is the entry of a S u b je c t 's  pseudonym 
for the L B S  requesting a S ig h tin g  that is examined. Then, the B lu r re d  L o c a lity  in which 
the T a rg e t is located is determined from the actual L o c a lity  of the Target.
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While the control of S p a t ia l  G r a n u la r ity  of the B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  released to the L B S  
is left to the preference of the T arg et, the T e m p o ra l F re sh n e s s  of the B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  is 
managed by the L o c a t io n  B lu r r in g  algorithm itself in order to prevent intersection and rea l 
t im e  border problems. This parameter may depend on multiple factors such as:
- The T a r g e t 's  L o c a lity . A T a rg e t may wish to remain invisible to a particular S u b je c t  
for a given period of time, which could correspond, for example, to the duration of her 
stay in the L o c a lity .
- The T a r g e t’s speed. The algorithm must guarantee th a t the B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  returned 
to the L B S  contains a B lu r re d  L o c a lity  in which the T a r g e t can be uniformly located. 
We would like to draw the attention of the reader on the fact that this claim will be 
supported by results of experiments described in Section 6.9.2.
- The T a r g e t 's  accuracy preferences, which is of significant relevance for the same reasons 
as mentioned above.
The L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm has of course access to the latest T a r g e t 's  L o ca lity . The 
a c c u ra c y  preferences of the T a rg e t for a particular S u b je c t  and L B S  are made available via 
the Profile Management Unit (PMU) of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .  The T a r g e t 's  average speed 
needs however to be calculated from real data anytime it needs to be used.
6.7.2 Description
We consider a T a rg e t T  whose P o s i t io n  is denoted P .  A L B S  requests the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  
at the I n s t a n t  t  for her location on behalf of a S u b je c t. The O r ie n t  P la t fo r m 's  L o c a tio n  
M a n a g e m e n t  U n it  ( L M U )  then queries a location server such as a M o b ile  O p e ra to r 's  for a 
S ig h tin g  representing T ’s  location and passes it to the L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm. The 
B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  B S  produced by the algorithm is then forwarded to the L B S .
Within the algorithm, we consider a data structure tha t reflects the past location requests 
made for any T a rg et, specifying the L B S  that carried it out, the S u b je c t  that initiated it, 
the a c cu ra cy  requested by the T a rg e t as well as the latest B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  B S ia te s t  returned 
together with its re lea se  t im e  t rei (R ia te st =  (B S i atest- ,tr e i))■ We note here that the re lea se  
t im e  of a B lu r re d  S ig h t in g  corresponds to the date when it was released and may be different 
from its I n s t a n t  that denotes its original S ig h t in g 's date of creation. A B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  
repository (B S s t o r e ) is also kept in this data structure in order to store pre-computed 
B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  together with their future re lea se  d a te  until their release or destruction 
when their re lea se  d a te  has passed.
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The algorithm described in the next section relies on the following principle. The B lu r r in g  
engine will release a B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  if and only if it is considered as secure, i.e if the T a rg et 
can be located uniformly within its B lu r re d  L o c a lity . Our hypothesis for this to happen can 
be stated as follows : considering the instantaneous speed of a T a r g e t, the time it takes for her 
to travel the distance between the two extreme corners of the last B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  released 
and the one she is currently located in, constitutes the time delay necessary to ensure she 
can be located uniformly within its current B lu r re d  L o c a lity . This claim is justified by the 
algorithm performances in the simulation presented in Section 6.9.2 of this thesis.
In this section we note I now the current time, i. e. the time of a particular B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  
query.
I te ra tio n s . The first iteration of the algorithm computes the B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  B L c u r r e n t 5 
from the T a r g e t 's  P o s i t io n  P CUrren t received from the L o c a tio n  M a n a g e m e n t  U n it (L M U ). It 
then constructs the B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  B S c u r re n t  =  ( B L CUrre n tiL c u rre n t)  where Icurren t is the 
I n s t a n t  of the S ig h tin g  received from the LMU, and releases it. We note that I Cu rren t <  I n o w
Subsequent iterations of the algorithm will repeat the step described above and generate a 
new B S current =  (B L currejlt , /current)- The algorithm keeps two data  structures of relevance 
in memory: the latest B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  B S ia te s t 6 that has been released to the L B S ,  and a 
repository B S s t o r e  containing B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s  that were computed on previous iterations 
but not released. The B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  released by the algorithm to a L B S  will be one of 
the following candidates : B S c u rre n t, B S ia te s t , or 01le element of the B S s t o r e .
- B S ia te s t when the T a rg e t is still located in the B lu r r e d  L o c a l i ty  B L i atest associated 
with B S ia te s t , whatever her speed.
- B S curren t when the T a r g e t is not located in the B lu r r e d  L o c a l ity  B L i atest associated 
with B S ia te s t i but when her speed is equal to 0 7. Such a situation occurs when, for 
example, a T a rg e t has only moved by an insignificant distance during a large period of 
time since the last location poll carried out by the L B S .  We note that this is equivalent 
to restarting the algorithm.
- An element of B S s t o r e  for which the re lea se  t im e  has passed ( i .e . t rei <  I now). 
This element is chosen such that its original S ig h t in g ’s I n s t a n t  is the closest to I now in 
order to provide the most up-to-date location information. Such an element is released
5A  square defined within a predefined grid that contains the Target's Position.
6A t the second iteration, B S iatest is equal to B S CUrrent released at the first iteration.
7A speed lower or equal to lkm .h~ 1 is approximated to 0, as explained in Section 6.7.2.
At a Glance
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when the T a rg e t is not located in the B lu r re d  L o c a lity  B L i atest, but when her speed is 
different from 0. This corresponds to the general behavior of the algorithm, as in the 
general behavior of a moving T a rg e t.
B lu rred  S igh ting  R e p o s ito ry  M an ag em en t. The B S s t o r e  repository is fed with par­
ticular B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  generated from T a r g e ts ’ S ig h tin g s  received from the L o c a tio n  M a n ­
a g e m e n t  U n it  (L M U ) . These particular B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s  (denoted as B S current in the pre­
vious section) cannot be released directly to L B S  because they would give away too much 
information. This is the case when the T a rg e t is effectively located in the B lu r re d  L o c a lity  
of one of these B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g , but cannot be located with equal probability anywhere in it 
(see hypothesis mentioned in Section 6.7.2). Such a B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  is valid, but releasing it 
would help a L B S  exploit r e a l- t im e  border problems and compromise the T a r g e t’s location. 
Therefore, the algorithm stores it for future use together with a re lea se  t im e  calculated as 
follows. We note that each request performed on the B S s t o r e  repository updates its content 
by removing all the B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s  for which the original S ig h t in g ’s I n s ta n t  is lower or 
equal than  the one of the B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  returned in the corresponding response.
fcaSSS-Sl O&cumnt
I I Enclosing Rectangle
Figure 6.3: Maximal distance between any two points belonging to two B lu r re d  L o ca litie s .
The algorithm is run and selects one of the three B lu r re d  S ig h t in g s8 mentioned in Section
6.7.2 to be output. We will refer to  this B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  as B S output  =  ( B L out vut,  I output)-
sThe candidate selected will obviously be either BS/atest °r one of the element of B Sstore  for which the 
release time has passed.
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The original S ig h tin g  from which it was produced is denoted as S output — [P ou tpu t, I  output) 
and is available to the algorithm. Then, the algorithm computes:
- The maximal distance between B L output and B L currcnt as shown in Figure 6.3, dist.
- The distance between P outpu t and P CUrr e n t, d.
- The apparent speed of the T a rg e t between P 0UtVut and P CUrre n t, speed .
- The release time of B S current ,  as being the time by which the T a r g e t would have 
traveled the remainder of the distance given it has already traveled d  (See Equation 
6.1), d i s t reTnain de r .
dist
d
s p e e d
distremainder
r e l e a s e T i m e
—  max(distance(.Z?-Zj'cMT*f’eTi£ t B L o u tp u t) )
=  distance(Pcurrent, P output)
_______d______
le u r re n t Itoutput
=  d i s t  — d
I  current +
d i s t .rem ainder
s p e e d
(6.1)
At each iteration, the algorithm queries B S s t o r e  for the most up-to-date B lu r re d  S ig h t­
in g  available in the repository 9. This B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  qualifies as one of the three different 
candidates to be released, see Section 6.7.2. This process is performed by retrieving the 
B lu r r e d  S ig h t in g  whose release time is the closest to the time of the query.
Figure 6.4 depicts a typical scenario where a L B S  performs its first B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  query 
while the T a r g e t  is stationary. It illustrates also what happens when the T a rg e t starts moving 
by listing the content of the two variables R ia te s t and B S s t o r e  through out the process.
A lg o r i th m s
In this section, we will consider data structures X  whose inner components such as private 
members or methods y  are accessible using the operator X () will denote a constructor 
for such a data structure and finally <— will be used as the store operator. We first describe 
auxiliary methods to finish by a detailed description of the g e tB lu r r e d S ig h tin g ( )  function.
9 Except for the first iteration since B Sstore  is empty.
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LBS Blurring Algorithm Location Server
t, —
t v  —
t ,  —
«j = r —
time * r = i! + (dist - speed.(tyt,-))/speed 
»* r‘ - t, + (dist - speed. (t,-t,)) / speed
Figure 6.4: Location Tracking through the use of the Location Blurring algorithm.
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T h e  g e t M U T D B l u r r e d S i g h t i n g ( )  m e th o d . This method supposes the availability of 
the B S s t o r e ,  which is a repository where some B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  to be released at a latter 
date than the current one are stored. The most up-to-date B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  (MUTDBlurred- 
Sighting) B S UpToDa.te is retrieved from B S s t o r e  using a method described in Algorithm 1. 
It is chosen such that its re lea se  t im e  is the closest lower or equal to the current time, i .e .  
tre l ^  Inoxv •
A lg o r i th m  1 getMUTDBlurredSighting(/notu, R ia test)______________________________
R e q u ire : Access to B S s t o r e , I now and R ia te s t
E n su re : The most up to date (MUTD) B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  is returned. 
r e s u l t  <— R e t e s t - B S
w h ile  B S s t o r e .h a s M o r e B l u r r e d S i g h t i n g s Q  do
( S t e m p ,B S te m p , r e le a s e T i m e tem p) «- B S s t o r e .n e x t Q  
m o s tR e c e n tR e le a s a b l e  <— 0
if  (r e l e a s e T im e te m p  <  I now)&i & { r r io s tR e c e n tR e le a s a b le  < r e l e a s e T im e t em p) th e n  
m o s tR e c e n tR e le a s a b l e  <— r e le a s e T im e te m p  
r e s u l t  < B S te m p  
e n d  if  
e n d  w h ile
B  S  s t o r e .u p d a te ( r e s u l t )  
return r e s u l t
T h e  u p d a t e ( )  m e th o d . A call on the method u p d a te  (see Algorithm 2) can be performed 
at any time in order to sort and discard unnecessary or outdated B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s  in the 
B S s t o r e .  This is done by removing any entry whose initial S ig h tin g  was generated prior 
to the B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  to be released. Indeed, all these entries reflect the location of the 
T a r g e t before the released B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  was generated. They have thus become out of 
date.
A lg o r i th m  2 update(jB5'cur,.erit)
R e q u ire :  Access to B S s t o r e
E n su re : B S s t o r e  only contains records created after B S current 
w h ile  B S s t o r e .h a s M o r e B l u r r e d S i g h t i n g s Q  do 
(S tem p , B S te m p ,  r e l e a s e T im e te m p )  <— B S s t o r e .n e x t Q  
i f  ((B S curren t<I ^  B S te m p '^ )  th e n  
B S s t o r e . r e m o v e B l u r r e d S i g h t i n g ( S t e m p ,  B S te m p , r e le a s e T im e te m p )  
e n d  if 
e n d  w h ile
T h e  g e t L o n g e s t D i s t a n c e ( )  m e th o d . This method computes the distance between the 
farthest away points of two B lu r re d  L o c a litie s , here B S upT oD ate-L  and B S current .L  (d i s t ). 
We note that this method returns 0 when the two B lu r re d  L o c a lit ie s  passed as arguments
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denote the same area. Indeed, if a T a rg e t is said to be in a certain B lu r re d  L o c a lity , she can 
be anywhere in it and therefore, in any of its corners.
T h e  g e t S p e e d ( )  m e th o d . In the algorithms presented, the speed of the T a rg e t is used to 
predict whether she will be able to reach any location within a B lu r r e d  L o ca lity . However, 
the value calculated remains an approximation since it is evaluated from the P o s i t io n s  and 
I n s ta n t s  of the two S ig h tin g s  generated by the location server following two consecutive 
location queries from a L B S .  The traditional expression of the speed ( d i s ta n c e  =  s p e e d  x 
t i m e )  can therefore no longer be used when two consecutive queries are separated by a 
significant period of time while the P o s i t io n  o f  th e  T a r g e t only varies by a few meters 10. 
Indeed, this would result in the computation of a B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  whose release date grows 
significantly due to a very low estimation of its apparent speed. In order to overcome this 
problem, we propose to impose a threshold on the estimated speed of a T a rg et. If she is 
traveling at less than 1 k m . h - 1  (bearing in mind tha t the slowest average speed considered is 
the one of a walking T a rg et, which is approximately 5fcm./i_1), the speed is set to O k m .h ^ 1 
and this reinitializes the algorithm. One side effect of this strategy is that it cuts off the 
path of a T a rg e t that starts traveling along a loop at the time of a first query and that comes 
back to where she started at the same time as the second location query occurs. We note 
that this is also a general behavior of the algorithm and that it is beneficial since it hides 
part of a T a r g e t 's path while remaining truthful and efficient in terms of B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  
freshness.
T h e  g e t B l u r r e d S i g h t i n g ( )  m e th o d . The B lu r r in g  A lg o r i th m  is activated by a call on
the g e tB lu r r e d S ig h tin g  method (see Algorithm 3). This method first retrieves the current 
location of the T a rg e t T  and constructs the corresponding B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  from the P o s i t io n  
and the I n s t a n t  of the S ig h tin g  received. This B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  may or may not become the 
one released to the L B S ,  depending on its tracking history. If such history exists, and if the 
accuracy used is the same as the parameter a , then the algorithm retrieves it as the following 
tuple : ( B S s t o r e ,  R ia te st )■ If there is a tracking history but with no record using the accuracy
a, then only the last B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  is retrieved and B S s t o r e  is initialized to an empty 
array. Finally, when no tracking history exists, the algorithm initializes itself by constructing 
the relevant data structures according to the side length a  of the B lu r re d  L o c a litie s  to 
be used and provided as part of the T a r g e t 's  privacy preferences taken from the privacy 
engine, see Section 5.3.2. B S upToD ate is then retrieved using the g e tM U T D B lu r r e d S ig h tin g ( )  
method. The distance d i s t  between B S upT oD ate-L  and B S currenf L  is computed using the
10This could easily happen when a LB S  queries for the location of a  Target, once a day, at a  certain time 
during the day, when the Target is likely to be located at the same place.
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g e tL o n g e s tD is ta n c e ( )  method and the approximate speed of the T a rg e t is obtained by a call 
on the g e tS p e e d ( )  method.
We now consider three different cases :
- If the distance d i s t  is equal to 0, this means that the T a rg e t has not moved from her 
previous B lu r re d  L o c a lity . In this case the algorithm outputs B S upT 0D a te■ We note 
that B S upT o D a te -L  and B S curren t . L  represent the same area, however, B S upT o D a te -I is 
lower than B S c u rre n t. I . By not releasing B S current we prevent the T a rg e t from being 
tracked as soon as she quits B S curren t .L .  Indeed, a L B S  performing a continuous 
location tracking on a T a rg e t would notice that, when the T a r g e t stays in the same 
L o ca lity , a different I n s t a n t  is released for every query while as soon as she quits it, the 
same B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  is returned. As soon as the L B S  gets two identical consecutive 
B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s , he would be in a position to locate the T a rg e t near the borders of 
the corresponding B lu r r e d  L o c a lity .
- If the distance d i s t  is different from 0 but the speed is equal to 0, this means that the 
T a rg e t has traveled since the last B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  query, but that the algorithm needs 
to be reinitialized since the apparent speed of the T a rg e t is null. This corresponds to the 
case where the location tracking process had stopped and starts again. The previous 
stored B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  are out of date and the very low speed would engender non 
relevant other. B S curren t  is therefore released.
- if neither the distance nor the speed equals 0, it is still uncertain whether the B S current 
or B S uprp0Date will be released. In order to decide if B S current  is the good candidate, 
the maximum distance achievable by the T a rg e t at her current speed, departing from 
the furthest corner of B S upT 0D a te -L  is compared with d i s t .  If the former is lower 
than the latter, this means tha t B S current .L  is not ready yet to be released as the 
T a rg e t  needs more time to, in theory, be able to reach any of its P o s i tio n s .  As a 
consequence, B S curren t is stored together with the release time at which the T a rg et 
may have covered the distance mentioned above. B S upToD ate becomes therefore the 
released B lu r re d  S ig h tin g .  On the contrary, if the T a rg e t has traveled far enough, 
B S curren t can be released to the L B S .  This B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  is the most accurate a 
L B S  can be issued since it was created on the fly from its original S ig h tin g  without 
any delay regarding to its I n s ta n t .
Following every B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  release, a call on the u p d a te ( )  method ensures that B S s to r e  
contains only relevant B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s . A description of the g e tB lu r r e d S ig h tin g f)  method 
is given in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3 getBlurredSighting(/6s,T,a)
R e q u ire : T  is the T a rg e t for which the location should be blurred. T  must be locatable, 
R ia te s t contains the latest B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  released together with the original S ig h tin g  it 
was made from, a  represents the side length of the B lu r re d  L o c a lit ie s  chosen as a privacy 
preference, lb s  is the name of the L B S  carrying out the location request. s u b j e c t  is the 
name of the subject on behalf of which the location request is performed.
E n su re : The latest (most secure) B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  is returned.
I  now g e t C u r r e n t T i m e  ()
S cu rren t * g e t S i g h t i n g ( T )
L c u rren t < g e t  L o c a l i t y  ( S Cu r r e n t 'P )
Icu rren t * ^ c u r r e n t 'I
B S current * B S ( L current ,  Ic u rre n t) 
if  (h a s E n t r y ( s u b j e c t , l b s , T )) th e n  
i f  ( h a s E n t r y ( s u b j e c t , l b s , T ,  a ) )  th e n
( B S s t o r e ,  R iat est )  <— g e t E n t r y ( s u b j e c t , l b s , T , a )  
else
{ B S s t o r e ,  R e t e s t )  ( H ,  g e tR iatest { s u b j e c t , l b s , T ) )
e n d  if  
e lse
( B S s t o r e ,  R ia te s t)  i (['"H ) L i( S currcrii, B S rurrefLi ) 
e n d  if
(SupT oD ate , B S upToD ate) <— B S s t o r e . g e t M U T D B l u r r e d S i g h t i n g ( I now, R ia te s t) 
d i s t  < g e t L o n g e s t D i s t a n c e ( B S upT o D ate-L , B S current .L )
Speed * getSpeed(ScurTent, ^ upToDate) 
if  (d i s t  =  0) th e n  
B S s t o r e .u p d a t e ( B S upToD ate)
P-latest * R (,S u p T o D a te , B S UpToD ate) 
return B S upToDate 
else
i f  ( ( d i s t  >  s p e e d  x (I curren t ~  B S upToD a te - I ) )& & (s p e e d  ±  0)) th e n  
r e l e a s e T i m e  ^  / current +
B S s t o r e .a d d B l u r r e d S i g h t i n g ( S current ,  B S curren t ,  r e l e a s e T im e )  
B S s t o r e .u p d a t e ( B S upToD ate )
L^latest * R ^S u p T o D a te , B S u p T o D a te )
return B S u p T o D a te  
else
B S s t o r e .u p d a t e ( B S CUrren t)
R ia te s t * R ( S c u r r e n t ,  B S c u r r e n t)  
retuill B S c u r re n t  
e n d  if  
e n d  if
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6.8 Im plem entation
The L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm is implemented as part of the Location Management Unit 
of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m . Like for the other components, the Java language was used mainly 
because it achieves robustness and because it constitutes the programming environment 
used throughout the project. We also developed a  testing framework in order evaluate the 
algorithm’s behavior, assess its security and test different versions of its design. We note 
here that while the design of the algorithm remains relatively general, its implementation 
and evaluation was restrained to the geographical boundaries of Ireland as justified later 
on. This section introduces this framework and highlights specific issues regarding to the 
implementation of the algorithm.
6.8.1 Environment
The O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  prototype is fully implemented and its functionalities have been tested 
against proof-of-concepts L B S  in our test bed environment, see ca m e ro n . However, we 
cannot expect to have access to real time data such as T a r g e ts ’ S ig h tin g s , simply because 
this would require an agreement with a mobile operator and location-based services to be 
deployed. Instead, we decided to gather real location information independently from the 
O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  project and use it to evaluate our L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm.
D a ta
We primarily used a GPS receiver connected to the serial port of a laptop computer. This 
device was given to a set of participants for a certain period of time and these were asked 
to remember approximately their activity while the GPS system would track their outdoor 
movements. We also used a PDA and a mobile phone, both of them carrying a GPS sensor, 
as well as a wrist GPS device. We gathered the equivalent of 210 000 S ig h tin g s  and grouped 
them by se s s io n s  subdivided into a c tiv it ie s .  A se ss io r i is defined by the period during 
which the locatable device was allocated to a T a rg e t while an a c tiv i ty  represents a T a r g e t’s 
specific mobility pattern such as ’’commuting” , ’’hiking” , ’’doing the shopping” , e tc . For 
each a c tiv ity , we also logged the mode of transport used as well as a general description 
that reflected the context of the T a r g e t 's  path. The data gathered can thus be described 
as forty s e s s io n s  subdivided into a sixty a c tiv i t ie s  corresponding to the mobility traces of 
ten different T a rg e ts  tracked around Ireland and more precisely in the Dublin area. The 
T a rg e ts  considered were four female and six male individuals respectively aged 20,23,24,58 
and 23,27,27,33,45,58. Their S ig h tin g s  were recorded during disjoints periods of a week (from 
monday to Sunday) and their a c tiv i t ie s  mainly involved commuting and walking around in
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town. The T a rg e ts  were given the possibility to turn  off their tracking device or even delete 
some data recorded during periods they would consider as privacy-invasive. However, none 
of the T a rg e ts  expressed any interest in the latter option while they turned on the tracking 
device everytime they thought it would acquire relevant data. The data was collected at 
different frequencies, depending on the capabilities of the tracking devices, ranging from once 
every five seconds to once every minute. We visualized most a c t iv i ty  traces using a graphical 
interface and discarded obvious “off-course” S ig h tin g s  resulting from the lack of precision 
of the tracking device at that particular time. These mainly represented data acquired at 
the beginning of a s e s s io n ,  when GPS-based tracking devices need a certain amount of time 
to  initialize, or when sattelites were not directly visible to GPS tracking devices 11. All 
data collected was stored in a database following a schema reflecting the different groupings 
mentioned earlier on.
F ra m e w o rk
A testing framework was designed to evaluate various B lu r r in g  algorithms in the exact same 
conditions as if they were run within the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .  Since such algorithms would 
not be used in conjunction to real time data, there was a need to simulate a consistent 
release of S ig h tin g s  with regards to the time flow. We therefore decided to implement our 
testing framework based on a discrete event system simulator. Such a simulator reflects the 
dynamic behavior of a system by controlling the time advance using a centralized clock. In 
our context, the system can be described as a set of T a rg e ts  releasing S ig h tin g s  at different 
I n s ta n t s .  Figure 6.5 shows a detailed description of the system whose processes can be 
outlined as follows.
1. The S ig h tin g s  being stored in a database, an entity known as the L o c a tio n  S e r v e r  
makes the relevant records available upon query on a particular se ss io n .
2. The S im u la t io n  E x e c u t iv e  then collects the S ig h tin g s  from the L o c a tio n  S e r v e r  and 
starts ticking the clock at a pre-defined frequency.
3. The location tracking process is initiated when the L o c a t io n  T r a c k e r  entity starts 
querying the B lu r r in g  C o m p o n e n t  entity for a particular T a r g e t 's  B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s .
4. The B lu r r in g  C o m p o n e n t  in turn  queries the S im u la t io n  E x e c u t iv e  which sends back 
the latest S ig h tin g  available for the T a rg e t, according to the current time.
5. The B lu r r in g  C o m p o n e n t  then applies the B lu r r in g  A lg o r i th m  on the data received 
and sends it back to the L o c a tio n  T r a c k e r  entity.
11This usually happened when a Target entered a building or was traveling close to  high buildings
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------  Entity Relationship
-------  Time Reference A ccess
Figure 6.5: L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  Algorithms Testing Framework.
6. While querying the The B lu r r in g  C o m p o n e n t , the L o c a tio n  T r a c k e r  also queried the 
S im u la t io n  E x e c u t iv e  for a copy of the original S ig h tin g  in order to help the R e s u lt  
C o lle c tio n  component perform experiments regarding to the efficiency and security of 
the algorithm. The results of the experiments can then be displayed by the D isp la y  
sub component.
In order to reflect the reality of location tracking, the S im u la t io n  E x e c u t iv e  implements 
a time slicing approach of time management. Time is incremented by a factor that can help 
speeding up or slowing down the time flow. This time management strategy was preferred 
to the ’’next event” approach were the S im u la t io n  E x e c u t iv e  would jump in time in order 
to reach an I n s t a n t  when a new S ig h tin g  would be released. The main reason is that, while 
being time efficient, the latter approach makes it more difficult to analyze the results of 
experiments, especially when they have to be displayed in real time on a graphical interface 
for example.
6 .8 .2  A lg o r i th m
The L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm was implemented within the framework described above.
As it involves computations over distances, areas and T a r g e t 's  speeds , there was a need to
consider a bounded flat surface in order to perform accurate measurements. Most of the 
S ig h tin g s  gathered having their WGS84 coordinates [210] contained within the boundaries 
of Ireland, we opted for using the Irish Grid plane co-ordinate system [164] as a projection
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plan. In order to the get a sense of the output of the algorithms tested, we also implemented 
a graphical interface.
6.9 Evaluation
This section presents an evaluation of the L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm. We first discuss the 
security provided by the algorithm and then evaluate its efficiency in terms of Q u a lity .
6 .9 .1  S e c u r ity
The B lu r r in g  A lg o r i th m  is made publicly available as we saw throughout this thesis that 
security by obscurity was not an option. Therefore, we must ensure that it constitutes a 
true one way function in the sense th a t the B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  output should not leak any 
identity, time or location information that could enable an eavesdropper to gain a more 
precise B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  than  the one he was given, at real-time. A more precise S ig h tin g  is 
either:
- A B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  whose B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  is smaller than the original one’s but still 
reflects reality.
- A B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  whose I n s t a n t  is higher than any of the B lu r r e d  S ig h t in g ’s I n s ta n t s  
already received but still reflects reality.
A ttack e r M odel
The attacker is modeled as a L B S  attem pting to track a T a r g e t 's  movements. The attacker 
can query the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  and therefore the B lu r r in g  a lg o r ith m , at arbitrary intervals. 
This way, the L B S  can get newly generated B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  as soon as they are available.
A ttack s
R ea l-tim e  B o rd e r Issues. The algorithm releases a B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  to the L B S  when 
the T a r g e t it is trying to protect may be located uniformly anywhere within the correspond­
ing B lu r r e d  L o c a lity , according to the hypothesis formulated in Section 6.7.2. Therefore, if 
the T a r g e t travels at a sufficient speed, she may have already left the B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  when 
the L B S  receives the B lu r re d  S ig h tin g .  Indeed, the re lea se  t im e  of a B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  is 
calculated over the maximum distance that a T a rg e t can achieve between the two B lu rre d  
L o c a lit ie s  concerned. Also, if the T a r g e t  accelerates in between two B lu r r e d  L o c a litie s , there 
is even a higher probability th a t she is outside the area returned to the L B S  when the
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B lu r r e d  S ig h t in g  is released. However, a t this time, it is not possible to infer that the T a rg et 
has sped up since the speed taken into account in order to compute the release date of the 
B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  is lower than the one of the T a rg e t  when she reaches the border of the 
B lu r r e d  L o c a lity . Also, the projected B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s  12 are made irrelevant since they are 
always overridden by B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  created on the fly from the real S ig h tin g  received. If 
the T a rg e t  decelerates, the projected B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s  will be released one after the other 
and if the T a r g e t stops, a B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  with the same I n s t a n t  will be released for every 
L B S  query. This avoids disclosing the fact that the T a rg e t still resides in the B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  
or has left it. As a result, acceleration and deceleration do not seem to disclose any extra 
identity, time or location information enabling the attacker to exploit re a l- t im e  border issues 
(see Section 6.6).
R e tro sp e c tiv e  B o rd e r Issues. Concerning re tro sp e c tiv e  border issues however, it is easy 
to see that an attacker can infer a smaller B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  of a particular B lu r r e d  S ig h t­
in g  using, in some circumstances 13, the next B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  received. This is done by 
computing the distance d sep separating the two successive P o s i t io n s  of the T a r g e t from the 
Equation 6.1. The disc whose diameter is d.sep can then be used to work out the region 
where the T a rg e t is the most likely to be.
In te r s e c tio n  Issues. Intersection issues are prevented by the design of contiguous B lu rre d  
L o c a lit ie s , see Section 6.6. However, such issues may arise due to a change in the B lu rre d  
S ig h t in g ’s S p a t ia l  G r a n u la r ity  released for a particular T a rg et. Such a change may occur at 
a time t  when a T a rg e t sets her privacy preferences in order to be located at an accuracy 
lower than the one used before t . If a L B S  is performing a continuous location tracking on 
th a t particular T a rg e t at this time, the intersection of the two consecutive B lu r r e d  L o c a litie s  
may reveal a smaller area than either of them, enabling the L B S  to locate the T a rg e t more 
precisely than she is allowed to. Therefore, when it detects a decrease in the a ccu ra cy  
used from a \  to 14, the algorithm computes the next B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  using blit 
keeps releasing the latest B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  stored in R ia te st until the former becomes valid. 
This way, even though there might have been an intersection between the two B lu rre d  
L o c a lit ie s  consecutively released, the time delay introduced in between the two releases 
removes intersection issues.
12 Blurred, Sightings produced with a release date greater than the current date.
13 When the Blurred Sighting has not been repeatedly transmitted.
14When there are records of location tracking for a particular Target but not with the same accuracy.
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LBS C ollusion . As seen in Section 6.4, we consider L B S  that may differ from each other 
by the level of trust put into them. Thus, L B S  tha t belong to the F u lly  T r u s te d  L B S  category 
do not require any L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  since they are completely trusted not to misuse location 
information. S e m i  T r u s te d  L B S  are provided with B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s  but are trusted not to 
share them with other entities. N o n  T r u s te d  L B S  may share such a piece of information. 
They should therefore be the most penalized in terms of location information Q u a li ty  since 
they may cheat and disclose private details to non authorized entities. By colluding, two 
N o n  T r u s te d  L B S  can increase their knowledge of a particular T a r g e t 's  location:
- Firstly because if they query the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  successively and associate their 
results at real time, they can gain more relevant information (they indeed get a B lu r re d  
S ig h tin g  with the highest T e m p o r a l F r e s h n e s s ) .  They may thus be in a position to 
estimate more precisely the location of a T a r g e t since they know she is located close to 
the border of the two B lu r re d  L o c a lit ie s . See Figure 6.6 for more details on this B o r d e r  
issue.
Tfcay lafar that tha Tariat Is at tki biriir af tha twa Hlirrad Lacalttiaa.
Figure 6.6: Non Trusted LBS Collusion with same B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  accuracy.
- Secondly because they may cache B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  requested by different S u b je c ts  
requiring different levels of a c c u ra c y  for the same T a rg e t at the same time. They may 
also share this information with other L B S .  Only the N o n  T r u s te d  L B S  tha t had the 
less knowledge gains more knowledge in this case. See Figure 6.7 for more details. 
This is a natural consequence of I n t e r s e c t io n  is su e s .
Of course, N o n  T r u s te d  L B S  may also exploit re tro sp e c tiv e  border problems to infer more 
precise past location information. In order to prevent collusion between N o n  T r u s te d  L B S ,
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LBS 1 gels non Level 3 Kctncy
Figure 6.7: Non Trusted LBS Collusion with different B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  accuracy.
one solution may consist in providing them with the same location information. This would 
imply providing them with the same B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  for a predefined period of time and 
update this B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  every time a new period starts. We note that while lowering 
considerably the location information Q u a lity , it solves re tro sp e c tiv e  border problems since 
a B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  is no longer released according to the speed of the T arget. However in 
order to make sure this does not breach one of the algorithm requirements, i .e . using the 
maximum accuracy allowed by a T a rg e t for a particular L B S ,  the B lu r re d  L o c a lity  must be 
chosen as the maximal one in terms of area amongst all the ones required by N o n  T r u s te d  
L B S . Yet, we notice th a t none of these algorithms provide any real solution to the L o c a tio n  
T r a n s fe r  problem.
6 .9 .2  A c c u ra c y
In this section, we attem pt to demonstrate that our algorithm performs with reasonable 
efficiency. To do so, we conducted two experiments on three different sets of S ig h tin g s , which 
differ from each other by the mode of transport used by the T a rg et. Each set represents ten 
activities. On each of these sets, we applied our L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm for an a c cu ra cy  
value 15 that ranged from 10 to 40000 meters, and set the tracking frequency to one query 
per minute.
The first experiment aimed at evaluating the distance between the B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  re­
turned and its original S ig h tin g  in order to assess the Q u a li ty  of the location information 
provided to L B S .  We recall here that a L B S  always receives location information with a
15The side length of the Blurred Locality.
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S p a tia l  G r a n u la r ity  equal to the side length of the B lu r r e d  L o c a lity . However, the algorithm 
introduces a delay ( T e m p o r a l  F r e s h n e s s ) in the distribution of B lu r r e d  L o c a lit ie s  in order to 
protect the T a r g e t 's  privacy. Therefore, at an I n s t a n t  t, a T a rg e t may be located at a certain 
distance of the borders of the B lu r re d  L o c a lity  returned to the L B S .  If this distance is too 
significant, the Q u a li ty  of the location information provided to L B S  becomes weak since it 
does not reflect a relevant approximation of the current T a r g e t’s location. The results of this 
experiment can be found in a graph present in Figures 6.8(a), 6.9(a) and 6.10(a). Consider­
ing that the T a rg e t is responsible for choosing a relevant a c c u r a c y  for her B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  
in order to preserve her own privacy, we claim that a decent level of location information 
Q u a li ty  is reached when the distance separating a S ig h tin g  from its blurred version does not 
exceed the value of its a ccu ra cy .
By analyzing the results, we note that this level is reached for an a c cu ra cy  greater 
than 800 meters for both a cycling and a driving T a rg e t. For a walking T a rg e t though, the 
algorithm seems to perform a little bit better since it achieves this level for a c cu ra c ie s  greater 
than 100 meters. We also note that the distance between a S ig h tin g  and its blurred version 
slightly decreases until the accuracy reaches a certain value (50 meters for a walking T a rg e t  
and 100 meters for a cycling and driving T a r g e t) , and this, on the three graphs presented. 
This can be explained by bearing in mind that we calculate the distance between a particular 
S ig h t in g ’ P o s i t io n  and the closest side of the corresponding B lu r r e d  L o ca lity : the bigger the 
B lu r re d  L o c a lity  is, the closer it is from the P o s i t io n . At some stage, when it is big enough, 
it can even contain this particular S ig h t in g ’ P o s i t io n .
This last fact partially explains why the average distance between a S ig h tin g  and its 
blurred version augments after a certain limit (here 200 meters on the three graphs): there 
is indeed now less S ig h t in g ’ P o s i t io n s  outside their B lu r re d  L o c a lit ie s  than before. This can 
be observed by noticing how the significant difference between the minimum and maximum 
distance between S ig h tin g s  and B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  in the high accuracies influences the av­
erage value of this distance. The other factor influencing this increase is the fact that the 
distance d i s t  used to calculate whether a T a rg e t is able to reach any point in the next B lu r re d  
L o c a lity , see Section 6.7.2, becomes disproportionate compared to the real distance traveled 
by the T a rg e t 16. As a consequence, the release date of the next B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  is slightly 
overestimated, which leaves more time to the T a rg e t to travel further. This phenomenon is 
observed at least twice in every graph.
Finally, we note a similar behavior of the algorithm for both driving and cycling T a rg ets. 
This can be explained first by the fact that the average speed of a cyclist and a car in the
16The distance between the two furthest corners of two Blurred Localities is indeed closer to the real 
distance traveled by a Target when the accuracy chosen is small. In this case, the Blurred Localities can be 
approximated to the Position of the Sightings they have been generated from.
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Dublin area is higher than for a walker (respectively 42 km./i-1 , 20 k m i " 1 and 5km./i_1 
for non stationary entities). Also, a cyclist is less subject to traffic jam  than a driver, which 
may compensate in a way the fact that he travels slower. The behavior of the algorithm 
for a walking T a rg e t presents similarities with the two other kinds of T a rg e ts  considered 
in the low accuracies. However, it clearly hides any T a r g e ts ' movement when the a c cu ra cy  
used gets too high compared to the straight line distance actually traveled. As a result, one 
should not consider the results for accuracies greater than 10000 meters as relevant, for a 
walking T arget.
The second experiment illustrates the average T e m p o ra l F r e sh n e s s  of B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  
depending once again on the a c c u r a c y  decided by the T a rg et. Three graphs represent here 
again the results and can be found in Figures 6.8(b), 6.9(b) and 6.10(b). A qualitative 
analysis shows a phase whereby the T e m p o r a l F re sh n e ss  remains fairly constant on average 
for a c c u ra c ie s  lower than 100 meters (driving T a r g e t) to 200 meters (cycling T a rg e t) . This 
reflects the comments stated earlier on as in the distance d i s t  used to calculate the next 
B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  remains the same while the distance between the current S ig h tin g  and the 
last B lu r re d  L o c a lity  released decreases. The graph obtained for the walking T a rg e t presents 
many more up and down variations but still illustrates the same process as described above.
This series of graph reflects in general the same conclusions as the first series but they 
also give a quantitative estimation of the typical T e m p o ra l F r e sh n e s s  of the B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  
released. Thus, we notice th a t the average T e m p o ra l F re sh n e s s  recorded slightly exceeds 10 
minutes for a driving T a rg e t and 6 minutes for a cycling T a rg et. Concerning a walking T a rg e t 
though, it can reach 50 minutes but may on average be close to 17 minutes. These results 
are to be carefully considered since the more the accuracy grows the less likely it is that the 
T a r g e t is going outside its current B lu r r e d  L o ca lity . This is especially true in the case of a 
walking T a rg e t that may not travel very far away along a straight line but rather around the 
same place. Furthermore, a certain a c c u ra c y  may be used for a fast T a rg e t but would not 
satisfy a slow one because not adapted to her situation. While we do not have a clear idea 
on whether these delays are acceptable or can be considered as satisfying for most L B S , we 
claim it does not prevent most location-based services to provide a meaningful service.
Finally, we notice tha t the results of these simulations support the claim that a B lu r re d  
S ig h tin g  returned to the L B S  for a particular T a rg e t contains a B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  in which 
the T a rg e t can be uniformly located. The algorithm proposed approximated T a r g e ts ’1 lo­
cation paths to straight lines between two consecutive B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s . While this may 
be considered as somehow restrictive, it must be noted that the algorithm considered the 
longest straight line distance achievable between the corresponding two B lu r re d  L o ca lities . 
As a result, for the claim to hold, T a rg e ts  must at least be able to travel the distance d i s t
114
between the two extreme corners of the two B lu r re d  L o c a lit ie s  belonging to two consecutive 
B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  releases. According to the results presented in this section, we see that on 
average, T a rg e ts  not only passed through the B lu r re d  L o c a lit ie s  returned but also traveled 
further away from them when the corresponding B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  were released. This shows 
tha t our approximation was enough to guarantee the claim of equally likelihood of T a rg e ts ' 
locations inside the B lu r re d  L o c a litie s  of the B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  returned.
6.9.3 Limitations
The algorithm proposed works well in the environment described but looses its efficiency if 
analytical techniques 17 are applied. In their approach to I d e n t i t y  B lu r r in g ,  Beresford and 
Stajano (see Section 4.2 of this thesis or [37]) describe the attacks based on such techniques 
as being very complex to avoid since they involve a lot of parameters including the topology 
of the environment (buildings, roads, traffic flow directions) and user mobility patterns. 
Thus, if we assume an “a priori” knowledge of the T a r g e t’s  home and workplace locations, 
it is easy to detect and predict where a particular T a rg e t is heading to. Documents such as 
maps or other publicly available information can also be used to restrain the area covered by 
a B lu r r e d  L o c a lity , enabling L B S  to gain more knowledge on a T a r g e t ’s location than what 
they should be getting. Because of this, extending our algorithm to a three dimensional 
environment may prove to be difficult since a T a rg e t is very likely to be located either 
on the ground surface or in a restrained B lu r re d  L o c a lity  such as one of the floors of a 
particular building. Similarly, a T a rg e t traveling in a hilly region may expose herself to 
more privacy threats since the more she goes up in altitude, the less area she can be located 
in. Interpolation and Extrapolation can also be used in conjunction with publicly available 
information. Considering a T a rg e t traveling on a straight line, it may be possible to infer her 
next B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  and by using a map, to reduce the admissible area where the T a rg et 
can be located. Gruteser and Grunwald’s approach to I d e n t i t y  B lu r r in g  (see Section 4.2 of 
this thesis or [96]) overcome this issue by proposing a technique th a t depends on the T a rg et 
density rather than on a predefined area where a single T a rg e t can be uniformly located. 
However, their technique clearly does not meet the same requirements as ours in terms of 
T a r g e t privacy. For all these reasons, analytical attacks such as the ones pre-cited constitute 
an open problem considered outside the scope of this thesis. In Section 8 however, we give 
some research directions which may lead to some solutions to these problems.
Also, the claim that the T a rg e t can be located uniformly within the B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  as 
part of the B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  released only holds as far as the results reported in Section
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Figure 6.8: Accuracy of the Algorithm in a Location Tracking process carried out every
minute 011 a driving Taryet.
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Figure 6.9: Accuracy of the Algorithm in a Location Tracking process carried out every
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Figure 6.10: Accuracy of t he Algorithm in a Location Tracking process carried out. every
minute on a walking Target.
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6.9.2 are concerned. While we believe these simulation results are representative of realistic 
behaviors, we recognize the fact tha t more comprehensive datasets would further support 
this claim.
6.10 Conclusion
The design of the L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm presented here aimed primarily at solving 
the location inference problem at run-time, stated in Section 1.6. However, it is not clear 
to what extent the algorithm addresses the location path problem since re tro sp e c tiv e  border 
problems may become exploitable in some situations. Furthermore, while it intends to 
tackle the location transfer problem by discouraging entities to share the B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  
collected, it cannot effectively prevent them from doing so 18.
On the other hand, the approach taken to design our L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm protects 
S u b je c t s ’ privacy by maintaining a low but meaningful resolution of location information. 
It lets them specify the accuracy at which they wish to be located by S u b je c ts . For S e m i-  
T r u s te d  L B S ,  the algorithm provides a good a c c u ra c y  in terms of S p a tia l  and T e m p o ra l  
G r a n u la r ity  of the first B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  requested, with a maximal T e m p o ra l F resh n ess .  
If a second request is performed within the validity of the first B lu r re d  S ig h tin g , the same 
B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  is returned. This way lo c a tio n  tra c k in g  is penalized while sporadic location 
queries get accurate and secure information. In practice, S e m i  T r u s te d  L B S  may indeed 
only perform sporadic queries as opposed to F u lly  tr u s te d  L B S  such as a child tracker which 
would intensively poll for the location of a particular T a rg e t in order to monitor exactly 
where the child is located. Another approach provides also a way to penalize N o n  T r u s te d  
L B S  that may share their information by setting a common T e m p o r a l F re sh n e s s  and B lu r re d  
L o c a lity  for their B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g s .
The concept of overlapping grids used as part of our L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm has 
also recently proven successful in the field of location-based services discovery. In [165], 
Pashtan e t al. show how to determine a geographical area of relevance for a particular 
mobile user according to her mobility characteristics. While their main motivations do not 
include providing location privacy, their example shows that such an approach is practical 
and scalable. It is also worth mentioning that the concept of overlapping grids to provide 
privacy may be extended to a 3-dimensional environment where L o c a lit ie s  become cubes. 
The L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm would have to be slightly modified however, as the new 
added dimension could leak location information.
18AU Non Trusted LBS  requesting a Blurred Sighting during the same predefined period of time receive 
the same information. Since they are paying for it, they are, somehow, discouraged from sharing it. However, 
they can still do it if they wish.
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C h a p t e r  7
Public Key Infrastructure
7.1 Introduction
Traditional Public Key Infrastructures generally suffer from various issues as commented 
in Section 2.3.3 of this thesis. In the mobile environment, they tend to present even more 
drawbacks, mainly because mobile devices owned by end-users have less capabilities than 
desktop computers and because the network bandwidth used to transm it certificate chains 
or revocation information is rather low.
In this chapter, we first outline our motivations regarding to the design of a PKI suitable 
for the mobile environment in the context of location-based services. We then introduce 
the architecture of the PKI together with the algorithms involved, and comment on their 
implementation and performance. Finally, a scenario showing how the PKI integrates within 
the location-based services architecture is presented.
7.2 Motivations
In the context of location-based services deployment, the critical piece of information to 
be protected remains, of course, the T a r g e t location. This encompasses the identity of the 
T a r g e t  as well as her location together with a timestamp, referred to as a S ig h tin g . When 
handset-based technologies (see Section 2.5.1) are used as part of the location determination 
process, a S ig h tin g  may have to be transm itted through the mobile network. Apart from 
confidentiality, authentication services may also be required in order to certify the originator 
of a specific S ig h tin g . All this has serious physical and network layer security implications.
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7.2.1 Physical Layer Security
The underlying wireless radio networks (GSM, GPRS or UMTS) already provide some 
encryption and authentication mechanisms. These are low level and are usually utilized 
between M o b ile  S ta t io n s  and the N e tw o r k  S u b sy s te m .. However, they do not meet the re­
quirements of end-to-end security since the link between the M o b ile  N e tw o r k  and the L B S  
provider is unprotected. It is also worth mentioning that even if reliable encryption algo­
rithms may be in use in 2G networks between M o b ile  S ta t io n s  and B a s e  S ta t io n s ,  the weakest 
point of the architecture remains the link between those and B a s e  S ta t io n  C o n tro lle r s . Com­
munications are indeed transm itted in plaintext through microwave, which may allow for 
eavesdroppers to tap into 2G network users’ connections.
Furthermore, if we assume the radio link is secure despite the several flaws detailed in 
Section 2.4.1, a man-in-the-middle attack can still be performed between a M o b ile  S ta t io n  
and a B a s e  S ta t io n  in order to attem pt to turn  off encryption. Such an attack is achievable 
using commercially available devices known as “IMSI Catchers” . These devices, primarily 
used to perform network configuration tests, can act as a fake B a s e  S ta t io n  and force M o b ile  
S ta t io n s  to use the A5/0 version of the encryption algorithm, resulting in no encryption of 
the data stream sent to the M o b ile  N e tw o r k . The device then establishes a normal connection 
with a real base station and relays the communications.
End-to-end communication security is clearly not achieved at the physical layer. There­
fore, this needs to be taken care of at a upper layer.
7.2.2 Network Layer Security
Initially, the WAP forum introduced a wireless PKI (WPKI) in order to secure communi­
cations at the transport layer. However, as explained in Section 2.4.4, the approach taken 
could not guarantee end-to-end security between a mobile user and a WAP server since the 
WAP gateway had to relay communications between the WTLS layer and the TLS layer. 
This involved decrypting received data and re-encrypting it in order to forward it to the 
corresponding party using the right protocol. The presence of this so-called “WAP gap” 
presented a significant security issue th a t had to be addressed in some way (see figure 7.1).
The authors of the WAP2.0 specifications opted for the use of Internet protocols in 
general and TLS in particular as the security layer directly on the mobile device, removing 
the need for protocol translation at the WAP gateway level. It now guarantees end-to-end 
security since data sent between mobile users and content providers remain encrypted while 
passing through the WAP gateway (see Figure 7.2).
The architecture proposed in this thesis shares similarities with the WAP architecture.
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M o b ile  S ta t io n s  W A P  G a te w a y  W ap  S e r v e r




Figure 7.1: The WAP Gap.
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Figure 7.2: End-to-end secure communications in the WAP Architecture.
In particular, the WAP gateway and the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  both act as transcoding proxies 
whose aim is to assist wireless communications to some extent. However, they differ by at 
least one significant fact: the WAP2.0 Gateway no longer provides any security services to 
any of the parties involved, but simply acts as an intelligent router. On the other hand, one 
of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m 's  main role is to perform S u b je c t s ’ and T a r g e ts ' identity translation 
from their real identity to the pseudonym they wish to use when connecting to a particular 
L B S .  Interaction with the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  is therefore always necessary to ensure pseudo­
anonymity, and so every time a LS5-related request occurs. As a result, while secure 
end-to-end communications may still be required, in particular for sensitive data other than 
identities, a TLS tunnel is not applicable in this configuration, see Figure 7.3.
M o b ile  S ta t io n s  O r ie n t P la tfo rm  W ap  S e r v e r





Figure 7.3: End-to-end secure communications in the Orient Platform’s environment.
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The physical and network layer issues outlined in this section demonstrate that there 
is definitely a need for an application level security layer guaranteeing end-to-end secure 
communications between a S u b je c t /T a r g e t  and the L B S  she is connecting to. Using a con­
ventional X509 PKI in this context may indeed be a solution but, as explained earlier on, 
it requires the client to perform resource intensive operations such as cryptographic compu­
tations and certificate validations. In the mobile environment, client devices are generally 
considered as lightweight, have low computational capabilities and have access to limited 
network bandwidth. In order to provide location-based services to such devices over the 
Internet, we introduced in Section 5 the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m ,  which factors out all the function­
alities related to location information management and makes it transparent and lightweight 
for S u b je c ts  to connect to location-based services using a simple web browser. Following this 
philosophy, we believe that some PKI-related operations can be off-loaded to a trusted en­
tity such as the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .  Of course, encryption and signature processes must be 
carried out on the mobile device since they are the building blocks of authentication mech­
anisms needed to connect securely to the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .  However, certificate validation 
is fundamental in the context of a PKI but is rarely carried out on desktop PCs and almost 
never carried out on mobile devices because it is considered too much time and resource 
consuming. Furthermore, certificate revocation is a process that may occur more often in 
the mobile environment than in the fixed one since mobile devices get more easily stolen or 
lost. As a result, this provides the right justification to off-load certificate validation to the 
O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .
7.3 Architecture
In light of the facts mentioned in the previous section, we opted for a PKI design based on 
a mediated server architecture.
7.3.1 Principles
In Section 2.3.4, we briefly described what a S E M  ( S e c u r i ty  M e d ia to r )  architecture was. To 
put it in a nutshell, it consists of deploying an architecture where a user private key is split 
between two entities, one of them being a trusted S E M .  An entity that wishes to encrypt a 
message uses the public key of her counterpart to cipher her message. The S E M  will then 
assist the decryption process provided the security credentials of the recipient are consid­
ered as valid. Concerning digital signatures, the S E M  will only assist the signing process 
if the signer’s security capabilities have not been revoked. As a result, the encryption and 
decryption processes can be defined as follows:
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L e t  p k i  a n d  p k s E M  be th e  tw o  p r iv a te  k ey  sh a re s  o f  a p a r t ic u la r  e n t i t y  a n d  P k i  h e r  p u b lic  
k ey . L e t  P  be a p la in t e x t  a n d  C  be th e  c o rre sp o n d in g  c ip h e r te x t ,  E  b e in g  th e  e n c r y p t io n  
p ro c e ss  a n d  D  th e  d e c r y p t io n  p ro c e ss .
E P k l ( P )  =  C .
D p k i (D p ka u m  ( C ) )  =  P .
Similarly, we define the signing and verification processes as follows:
L e t  p k i  a n d  p k s E M  be th e  tw o  p r iv a te  k e y  sh a r e s  o f  a p a r t ic u la r  e n t i t y  a n d  P k i  h e r  p u b lic  
k ey . L e t  P  be th e  m e s s a g e  to  be s ig n e d  a n d  S  be th e  c o rre sp o n d in g  s ig n a iu re ,  S i g n  be ing  th e  
s ig n in g  p ro c e ss  a n d  V e r i f  th e  v e r i f ic a t io n  p ro cess .
Si.g n.pksE M (S ig r ip k ! (-f*)) S .
V e r i f (S ) =  T r u e  o r  F a l s e .
We note that neither of the two parties involved can generate a valid signature or recover 
a plaintext from a ciphertext by themselves. Instead, they are required to cooperate with 
each other to achieve this.
7.3.2 Description
The architecture of the Public Key infrastructure considered in our context involves three 
different entities (see Figure 7.4):
- the U ser. This entity represents the parties that wish to conduct secure transactions. 
Therefore, a U se r  can be a S u b je c t  wishing to securely access a L B S ,  a T a rg e t that 
requires to securely send her location or a L B S  that receives connections from the two 
other types of U sers  cited.
- the S e c u r i ty  M e d ia to r  (SEM). This is the entity tha t helps complete the decryption 
and signing processes depending on the U s e r ’s key pair revocation status. It will refuse 
to do so if her security capabilities have been revoked. This entity owns a share of 
every U s e r 's  private key.
- the P r iv a te  K e y  G e n e r a to r  (P K G ). Because the design of the PKI is based on a 
identity-based threshold cryptosystem, the private key shares of the two entities men-
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tioned previously need to be mathematically related. The P r iv a te  K e y  G e n e r a to r  is 
in charge of the generation of the decryption and signing private key shares and also 
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Figure 7.4: Public Key Infrastructure deployed in the Orient Platform ’s environment.
A S E M  security architecture is very suitable in the environment considered. First and 
foremost, it solves the key revocation problem by enabling instant revocation of security 
capabilities. This is achieved by instructing the S E M  not to assist cryptographic oper­
ations if the credentials of one of the parties have been revoked. The other reason that 
justifies such a choice is that the topology of the S E M  architecture is very similar to the 
architecture to provide location-based services on the Internet considered in this thesis (see 
Figure 7.3). This results in a seamless integration of the Security Mediator as th e  O r ie n t  
P la t fo r m  already acts as an intermediary in the location-based services provision. One of 
the benefits of such an integration is tha t O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  is able to  transparently provide 
pseudo-anonymity services by redirecting a specific L B S  request to the corresponding entity 
using the appropriate pseudonym, while allowing end-to-end communication security. This 
is detailed in Section 7.5.
Different configurations in which the entities described are owned by different parties 
may coexist. However, the most likely configuration is the one where the M o b ile  O p e ra to r  
owns the P K G  and where the S E M  is considered as a component of the O r ie n t  P la tfo rm .
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7.4 Encryption and Signature Algorithm s
In this section, we present the core algorithms used as part of the encryption and signing 
processes. The Baek and Zheng’s threshold decryption algorithm as well as a newly designed 
mediated version of Hess’ identity-based signature constitute the building blocks for provid­
ing encryption and signing services. We first formally define the algorithms used. Since 
they are based on mathematical groups defined over elliptic curves, we then recall some 
notions outlined in Section 2.2.2 and study more in depth some mathematical concepts in 
order to explain how to safely choose the system parameters and provide a concrete example 
specification.
7.4.1 Formal Specification
In this section, we will consider two cyclic groups in which the discrete logarithm problem 
(DLP) is considered as hard. (G, + ) represents an additive group while (V,.) is a multiplica­
tive group, both of order I. We will also consider a non-degenerate bilinear map e. This 
function is defined such tha t e : G x G  —> V ,  and has the following properties:
- B il in e a r i ty  : V#i, g 2 , g z , 3 4  S G, e ( g i  + 9 2 , 3 3 ) =  e { g i ,g 3 ) .e ( g 2 , g 3 )
Also, e ( g 1 , g 3  +  g i ) =  e ( g 1 , g 3 ) . e ( g i , g i ).
- N o n  d e g e n e ra c y  : 3 g l y g 2 e G :  e ( g i , g 2 ) /  1
- C o m p u ta b i li ty  : V g i , g 2 £ G, there exist an efficient algorithm to compute e ( g i , g 2).
In addition to this, we also assume that given <ji 6 G, e ( g i , g 2 ) € V ,  finding g 2 € G
remains hard. This is known as the B il in e a r  P a ir in g  I n v e r s io n  P r o b le m  ( B P I P ) .  Finally, 
the C o m p u ta t io n a l  B il in e a r  D if fie  H e i lm a n  P r o b le m  ( C B D H ), which proposes to compute 
a .b .g i given a generator g  1  of G, a ,b  €  h i*  and the values a .g \  £ G and b .g  1  £  G, must also 
be computationally intractable. Details on how to obtain such a bilinear map are provided 
later on in Section 7.4.2 of this chapter.
We now define the following functions used as part of the algorithms proposed. X *  de­
notes X  — {O} where O is the i d e n t i t y  element of the law associated to the group X .
- H-l : {0,1}* -> G * .
- H 2 : V  —> {0, l} ieni where l e n  1  is the length of the plaintext to be encrypted.
- H 3 -.G *  x {0, l} ieni -» G*
- H i  : {0,1 }ie"2 x V  —> h i*  where l e n 2 is the length of the message to be signed.
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H i is used to map a string (representing an identity for example) to a element of the 
group G . H i  hashes the result of the pairing to a string of length le n  and Hyt combines it 
with an element of the group G  in order to output an element in the same group. H4  is used 
to hash the message to be signed together with the result of a pairing.
E n c r y p t io n  A lg o r i th m
We give here a formal description of the threshold encryption algorithm taken from [29] and 
used as part of the PKI in our architecture.
P u b lic  P a r a m e te r s  G e n e ra tio n . The P K G  is in charge of generating and making the 
public parameters available to the other entities. The P K G  first picks uniformly at random 
a number x  in h i*  and keeps it secret, x  will be referred to as the P K G  m a s te r  key . The 
P K G  also picks uniformly at random an element P  6  G *, generator of G  and computes 
Ypkg — X P> where Y pkg constitutes its public key. Then, he makes available to the other 
entities the following parameters : H y . I I 2 . H $ , g \  and Y pkg, together with the any information 
related to the groups used.
K e y  G e n e ra t io n . The key generation process is also left to the P K G .  For each user 
identity, the P K G  computes:
• Q i d  =  H i ( I D ) ,  where I D  represents the identity (public key) of a user.
•  D i d  =  x Q i d , where D i d  represents the private key corresponding to a single user 
identity, to be split between her and the S E M .
While L a g ra n g e  I n te r p o la t io n  is generally used in threshold cryptosystems in order to 
split private credentials, the S E M  and user private key shares are derived here from D i d  
by a simple arithmetic operation since the threshold and the number of parties involved are 
equal to two. is chosen as a uniformly random elment in G  and D i d ,user is given
by:
D i d  ,user —  D i d  DiD,sem
The private shares D i d ,user and D iD ,se m  are then safely delivered to the corresponding 
parties.
E n c ry p t io n . A Sender that wishes to issue an encrypted message then computes the 
following :
• A uniformly distributed random number r  £ h * .
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•  U  =  r P
• k  =  e ( H \ ( I D ) , Y pkg )r , where ID is the identity of the corresponding receiver.
• V  =  i?2 (&) ® M ,  where M is the message to be encrypted.
• W  =  r H 3 ( U , V )
The ciphertext C  =  (U , V , W )  is now ready to be sent to the S E M  for assisted decryp­
tion1 .
D ecry p tio n . The decryption process occurs in two phases.
- The S E M  first checks whether the user identity ID has been revoked. If this is the 
case, it forwards a message to the recipient of the original message, stating that he 
could not decrypt the ciphertext since ID has been revoked. On the contrary, if the 
identity has not been revoked, the S E M  performs the following operations:
• h 3  =  H 3 ( U , V )
• Check of whether the ciphertext received is valid by computing e (P , W )  =  e (U , h 3 ) .  
If the ciphertext is invalid, a message is forwarded to the recipient of the original 
message in order to inform him of the status of the decryption. If it is valid, 
the S E M  computes k sem — e (D jD ,s e m i U )  and forwards it to the recipient of the 
message, together with C .
- The Receiver performs the same check as the S E M  in order to verify whether the 
ciphertext received is valid. She then computes k user =  e (D jD ^ u ser ,U ) ,  reconstitutes 
k  =  k user * k aem and recovers the message M  by computing M  =  H ^ k )  ® V .
S ig n a tu re  A lg o rith m
In [132], Libert and Quisquater detail an approach to provide a S E M  architecture with
pairing-based signature capabilities. The authors point out that only a few signature schemes
can be practically adapted to the S E M  architecture. The first reason is that such signature
schemes must allow for a secure threshold version to be derived from them, i.e, a scheme
whereby neither of the private key shares of the parties involved are disclosed. The second
reason reflects the practicability of the deployment of such a scheme in the S E M  architecture.
Indeed, most threshold signature schemes are probabilistic in the sense that they require
signers to collaborate in order to perform a distributed random number generation. Such a
1In the scenario depicted in [29], the receiver is first given the ciphertext and interacts with the SEM  in 
order to decrypt it. In our architecture, the SEM  is implemented on the Orient Platform  proxy server and 
performs transparently the key pair revocation status verification and ciphertext decryption.
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secret sharing protocol, see [190], introduces communication overheads and would indeed, in 
our context, be clearly unacceptable as the S E M  must remain as transparent as possible to its 
U sers. As a solution, the authors propose a mediated version of the GDH signature scheme. 
However, this scheme is not identity-based which means that using it would complicate 
key management and defeat the purpose of using the identity-based encryption algorithm 
detailed in this section.
In this section, we propose to extend Hess’ identity-based signature scheme [108] in order 
to provide the S E M  architecture with identity-based signature capabilities. The identity- 
based signature scheme further described in Section 7.4.1 does not qualify as a threshold 
identity-based signature scheme, but rather as a server aided signature generation scheme 
(the S E M  does not process the message to be signed but rather its signature). The signer 
produces a signature using her private key share, and this token is then processed by the 
S E M  upon verification of the signer credentials in order to generate a signature verifiable 
by the corresponding public key identifier. This section is divided as follows: we start 
by a description of Hess’ original scheme and then describe our contributions. Security 
considerations are discussed in Section 7.7.2 of this chapter.
H e s s ’ Id e n t i ty -b a s e d  S ig n a tu re  S ch em e
S y s te m  P a r a m e te r s  G e n e ra tio n . The P K G  is in charge of generating and making the 
public parameters available to the other entities. The P K G  first picks uniformly at random 
a number x  in Z;* and keeps it secret. As previously mentioned, x  is referred to as the P K G  
m a s te r  k e y . The P K G  also chooses a random element P  defined on the group G  and computes 
Ypkg  =  x P ,  where Y pkg constitutes its public key. Then, he makes available to the other 
entities the following parameters : H i , H ± , P  and Y pkg , together with the any information 
related to the groups used. These parameters are formally defined at the beginning of Section 
7.4.1 of this thesis.
K e y  G e n e ra tio n . The P K G  then performs the following computation for each user iden­
tity: S i d  =  x . H i ( I D ) ,  where I D  represents the identity or public key of a user, and S i d  
the corresponding private key.
S ig n a tu re .  The Hess’ signature process can be described as the computation of the fol­
lowing elements:
• An element P \ G G* picked uniformly at random.
• An element k  € TLC picked uniformly at random.
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.  r = e(Pu P)h
•  v  —  H ,\ ( m .  r) , where m is the message to be signed.
•  u  =  v S j  a  +  k P i
(u, v )  represents the signature associated w ith the message m.
Verification. T he verifier com putes r  =  e ( u ,  P ) . e ( H l ( I D ) .  — Y p k y ) v . She then verifies the 
signature  by checking w hether v  =  r ) .
O u r  m e d ia te d  v e rs io n  o f  H e s s ’ Id e n t i ty -b a s e d  S ig n a tu re  S ch em e
S y s te m  P a r a m e te r s  G e n e ra t io n . This phase remains identical as tor the original ver­
sion of Hess' Identity-based Signature Scheme.
K e y  G e n e ra tio n . After having calculated the values S /p  =  x . H \ ( I D ) for each identity 
I D  considered, the P K G  derives the  following private key shares, as for the identity-based 
encryption algorithm presented earlier on:
S/D.user = &ID ~ S (D , « r a
S id ,u s e r  represents the  private key share of the U s e r  identified by I D  while S u > ..se m  
is the  corresponding private key share given to the S E M .  Sio.sem is picked as a uniformly 
random  element in G .
S ig n a tu re . The signing process now involves two entities : a U s e r  and a S E M .  The U s e r  
signs a  message with her private key share and the signature is then completed by the S E M  
using its share.
User. This entity  computes:
•  An element Pi €  G *  picked uniformly a t random.
•  An number k \  e  Z/* picked uniformly a t random.
•  r i  =  e ( P \ , P ) k t
•  v =  H ,\ ( m ,  n ), where m  is the  message to be signed.
•  Ml =  v S i  D.utier +  k \P i
( i n ,  v )  represents the signature share associated with the message i n .  (w i,v) is forwarded 
to  the  S E M .
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SEM. This entity computes:
• A element P 2 £ G* picked uniformly at random.
• A number picked uniformly at random.
• r2 = e{P2-, P)~k'2
• U2 =  “t- +  '^2-^ 2
(■«2 , v ,  ro )  represents the full signature associated with the message m  and is forwarded to a 
verifier.
V e rif ic a tio n . Finally, a S u b je c t  wishing to verify the signature performs the following ac­
tions: she computes r  =  r 2.e(«2 , — Y pkg )v ■ She then verifies the signature by
checking whether v  =  H i ( m , r ) .
We note here that the signing process is identical for the signer, both in the original and in 
the S E M  version of the scheme. However, it is slightly different for the S E M  since it just 
needs to  complete the signature using its own private key share. The correctness together 
with a discussion on the security of the scheme presented are discussed in Section 7.7.2.
7.4.2 Group and Parameter Selection
The two cryptographic schemes presented in the above section use bilinear maps as part 
of their algorithms. Such bilinear maps can be efficiently implemented using mathematical 
functions defined over groups of points on elliptic curves. In this section, we provide some 
definitions based on the basic concepts outlined in Section 2.2.2. We then show how to choose 
the cryptographic parameters necessary to efficiently implement bilinear maps. We do not 
intend to be exhaustive in our explanations regarding to elliptic curve terminology or pairing- 
based cryptography. Instead, we will provide the reader with the minimum information for 
his better understanding. We wish to acknowledge Martijn Maas for his very interesting 
thesis on pairing-based cryptography [138] and base our explanations on his work.
E ll ip t ic  C u rv e s
An elliptic curve E  is a mathematical object defined over a finite field F q . The letter q 
represents the number of elements in the field (the o rd e r  o f  th e  f ie ld ) and is usually a large 
prime or a power of a large prime q =  p m , where p  is called the c h a r a c te r is t ic  of the field.
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Likewise, the number of elements of the group formed by the points on the elliptic curve 
(denoted E ( F q )) defined over the underlying field F q is denoted as the o rd e r  o f  th e  c u rv e  
and is referred to as # E ( F q). For each element P  of this group, the o rd e r  o f  a  p o in t  P  can 
be defined as the least positive integer r  such tha t r P  =  O  where O  is the i d e n t i ty  of the 
group also known as the p o in t  o f  in f in i ty .  Also, a point P  whose o rd e r  divides a particular 
n  is known as a n - to r s io n  p o in t. Thus, for a particular n, a subgroup formed by all the 
n - to r s io n  p o in ts  of E ( F q) can be defined as a n - to r s io n  p o in t  group. We will refer to it as 
.E(-F)[n] such that :
E ( F ) [ n \  =  { P e  E ( F )  : [n ]P  =  O }
Finally, an elliptic curve is also defined by a constant t  called the T ra ce  o f  F ro b e n iu s  and 
which is given by the following relation:
t  =  q  +  1 -  # E ( F q)
When the characteristic p  of a curve E / F q divides its T ra ce  o f  F ro b e n iu s , i.e. t  =  0 mod 
p, the curve is said to be su p e rs in g u la r . This property has some implications in the reminder 
of this section.
B ilin e a r  M a p s
The underlying mathematical structure of the encryption and signature algorithms also relies 
on bilinear maps (see Section 7.4.1 for a formal definition of a bilinear map). From such a 
bilinear map, one can construct a bilinear pairing on the group of points on an elliptic curve 
such as the Tate pairing. The Tate pairing is defined as follows :
Let E  be an elliptic curve defined over a field F q . Let I be relatively prime to q and 
such that there exists a point P  €  E ( F q) th a t has order I. We now define k  as the smallest 
integer assumed to be greater than 1 such th a t I divides (q h — 1). k  is often referred to as 
the e m b e d d in g  degree  of the curve with respect to I. The smaller k  is, the more efficient the 
algorithm will be but k  should also be large enough to guarantee a  good level of security, 
i .e . so that the discrete logarithm problem in F qk remains intractable (see Section 2.2.2 for 
a description on attacks on the discrete logarithm problem). A simplified version2 of the 
Reduced Tate paring of order I , as defined in [33], is the bilinear map e; given as:
ei ■ E ( F q)[l] x E ( F q, )  -  F*qk
In addition to b ilin e a r ity , the Tate Pairing has also the following properties :
2This definition slightly differs from the standard one given in [138] but is considered as more suitable 
for cryptography purposes [33]
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- VP e  E (F g )[ l] ,  e i ( P , P )  =  1 ( id e n t i ty )
- VP G E ( F q)[l] and Q  6 E ( F qw), e i ( P ,Q ) =  e i ( Q ,  P ) -1 . ( a l te r n a t io n )
- VP G E ( F q)[l], 3 Q  G E ( F qk) : e i ( P ,Q ) ^  1. ( n o n  d e g e n e ra c y )
The first, argument of the bilinear pairing is a point P  on the elliptic curve E  defined 
over the finite field F q and whose order is I. The second argument is taken from a separate 
subgroup, here the group of points on the same elliptic curve defined on the extension field 
F qk . The choices of I and k  ensure that the two points P  and Q  remain linearly independent 
from each other in order to satisfy the n o n -d e g e n e r a c y  property. Finally, the Tate Pairing 
outputs a result in the extension field F *k .
M o d ifie d  T a te  P a i r in g
The Tate pairing takes its arguments in two groups of points on the same elliptic curve 
defined over two finite fields, so that they remain linearly independent from each other. 
Choosing these two points involve working on two separate subgroups and over different 
fields and while this does not present any insurmountable challenge, being able to pick those 
two elements from the same group of points is certainly more convenient. This can be 
achieved by slightly modifying one of the two point’s coordinates using a map known as a 
d is to r t io n  m a p . A d is to r t io n  m a p  can be defined as follows.
In our context, a d is to r t io n  m a p  with respect to Q  G E ( F q) is a group endomorphism 
4> G E n d ( E )  tha t maps the point Q  to a point defined on the curve E  over the extension 
field F qi, that is linearly independent from Q .
</> : E ( F q ) -  E ( F qk )
Additionally, this d is to r t io n  m a p  facilitates the choice for the Tate pairing arguments as 
they do not need to be points defined on a curve over separate fields anymore. This leads 
to the definition of the M o d ifie d  Tate pairing:
e t : E ( F q)[l\ x E ( F q) -» F * ,  
e i(P , Q ) =  e;(P, <f>{Q)) =  fJ, where fj, G F *k
We note here that the Modified Tate pairing does not satisfy the id e n t i ty  property men­
tioned earlier on, since P  and tj>(P) are now linearly independent. Therefore, computing 
e/(P ,P ) will always lead to a non-trivial result. Also, the a l te r n a t io n  property is no longer 
true since the pairing is now symmetric (e i ( P ,Q ) =  e i ( Q ,P ) ) .  In fact, this s y m m e t r y  prop­
erty makes the Modified Tate pairing even more convenient since most points in E ( F q) will 
qualify as its second argument.
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The computation of the Modified Tate pairing is considered as more efficient, not only 
compared to the traditional Tate pairing but also considering other admissible pairings such 
as the Weil pairing and its variants.
P a r a m e te r s
Given all the notions introduced through out this section, we define here the system param­
eters that will be used to compute the Modified Tate pairing as part of the cryptographic 
algorithms used. Extreme caution is to be exercised when choosing these parameters since 
a mistake could lead to a total break of the system.
We wish to design a system based on the Modified Tate pairing, mainly for implemen­
tation efficiency. As seen earlier on, the e m b e d d in g  degree k  of the chosen curve needs to be 
small enough for efficiency purpose but large enough to guarantee a good level of security. In
[138], we note that curves that satisfy these constraints are very sparse. Only s u p e r s in g u la r  
curves and so called M N T  curves seem to fulfill these requirements (please refer to [138] for 
more information on M N T  curves). Also, the Modified Tate pairing necessitates d is to r t io n  
m a p s , which do exist for all s u p e r s in g u la r  curves but only for some M N T  curves.
We therefore select the following s u p e r s in g u la r  curve, defined on a field F q , where q is a 
large prime:
E ( F q ) : y 2 =  x 3 + x
q is chosen as q =  3 mod 4 as stated in [118] to ensure the s u p e r s in g u la r  character of the 
curve. In order to avoid attacks on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, q needs to 
be chosen large enough. The authors of [189] advocate that q k should be at least 1024 bits, 
where k  is the e m b ed d in g  degree  of the curve. They also advise to  choose I, the group order 
of the first element, so that it is at least 160 bits long in order to avoid the Pohlig-Hellman 
attack mentioned in Section 2.2.2 of this thesis. I also needs to be relatively prime to q and 
must divide # E ( F q). Since # E ( F g ) =  q +  l 3, we are now left with the computation of the 
values of q and I. While picking values for q and I that satisfy the properties previously 
cited is relatively easy, finding the ones that will make the most efficient computation of the 
pairing remains tricky. In [33], the authors advocate the use of a Solinas4 prime for I. I has 
therefore a very low Hamming weigh relatively to its size, which speeds up considerably the 
Miller algorithm used to compute the Tate pairing, q is computed such that I is a prime 
factor of q +  1, such that q =  3 mod 4 and such that it is a prime. Therefore, we have:
I =  2159 +  217 +  1 =  730750818665451459101842416358141509827966402561 (160 bits)
3See [33] and Section 5.3 on Curves with Small Embedding Degree in [138] for a proof of this result.
4A Solinas prime is a prime number that is the sum or difference of a small number of powers of 2.
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q =  129018690069575864324485985108131770743485602383987917238774467
9410223637747927135459754309676838115385576301663720391335593750780 
4962628312606218934271059 (512 bits)
We have I divides (q  +  1), which divides (q +  l)(g — 1), which also divides (q 2 — 1). The 
e m b e d d in g  degree k  of the curve with respect to I is therefore 2 and we will denote F q2 as 
the extension field. An element of such a field can be seen as the operation a  +  ib  where 
a ,b  G F q and i  defined such that i 2 — —1. The d is to r t io n  m a p 5 to be used is defined in [138] 
and reads as follows:
E ( F q )  -» E ( F qi )
{x,y) -> (- x , i y )
As a result, if we recall the formal parameters used to described groups in Section 7.4.1, 
we will, from now on, use E ( F q)[l] as G  and F*2 as V  and implement these algorithms in 
consequence.
7.5 Prototype Implementation
In this section, we present a prototype implementation of the public key infrastructure used 
as part of our architecture. While the implementation may require some optimizations, we 
believe it achieves reasonable performance as shown in Section 7.7. The Java language was 
chosen to implement the PK I for two main reasons: first because Java achieves robustness 
and portability and also because this is the language used to implement the O r ie n t  P la t fo rm .  
We show here how it was used to implement the low level cryptographic operations as well 
as the high level components of the infrastructure.
7.5.1 Cryptographic Operations
There are very few Java cryptographic libraries available that implement pairing-based cryp­
tography. One reason may be that the technology is fairly new. Another reason might be 
tha t the computations involved are resource consuming and that therefore, implementations 
in C or C + +  are preferred. The authors of [72] propose a Java-based API that provides 
building blocks in order to help developers design identity-based cryptosystems. While being
5 We note here that such a  distortion map does not map every points to a separate subgroup since for 
y=0 the resulting point is linearly dependent to the argument of the map. Also, the identity of E(Fq) (the 
so-called point of infinity) is mapped to itself so the distortion map works for all the points but those two.
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very well thought in terms of design and easily extendable, this API remains painfully slow 
when it comes to implementing a single pairing using secure enough parameters.
Our first approach has been to try to extend their library in order to support native calls. 
Indeed, since some operations such as the execution of the Miller algorithm are considered 
as the bottleneck of pairing-based cryptographic implementations, implementing them in C 
would certainly improve their performance. This was achieved very easily from the Java 
library point of view as it only required to extend the class called M o d if ie d T a te P a ir in g  and 
to provide the native method signatures, methods that would be called through the Java 
Native Interface (JNI). On the other hand, the native code implementation proved to be a 
little bit more tricky. It was carried out using the MIRACL C big number library [192] and 
necessitated to implement part of the F qi  field arithmetic as the library only provides an 
incomplete set of functions. Also, all the optimizations mentioned in [33] were implemented 
in order to gain in speed of execution. While we achieved reasonable results on a desktop PC, 
it proved too slow on the mobile device. It was later decided to abandon this Java API and 
to implement all the cryptographic operations in a C + +  library tha t could be called using 
JNI from Java. The work presented was however very useful for understanding the basics 
of pairing-based cryptography and testing the correctness of some example cryptographic 
schemes.
Our second approach was therefore to build a complete native implementation of an 
API th a t would be used to encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify messages using the algorithms 
presented in 7.4.1. Here again, we used the MIRACL library to implement it as it pro­
vides optimized code for field operations. In particular, it provides an example of a C ++  
implementation of an optimized M o d ifie d  T a te  P a ir in g  along with the corresponding Miller 
algorithm. Building on these examples, we implemented the encryption and signature algo­
rithms using this library. The API interface is described in Appendix C. We then created 
two software dll libraries:
- One compiled for x86 processors that can be used on Windows 98/2000/XP operating 
systems. It is used by the Private Key Generator, the Security Mediator and L B S .
- One compiled for StrongARM processors that can be used on the Windows CE oper­
ating system. It is used by the mobile devices held by T a rg e ts  or S u b je c ts .
We realize that we lose the portability of the code by using dll libraries. However, the 
performance of the implementation of the algorithms improved by a factor of 10 compared 
to the first approach.
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This entity is implemented as a Java component and belongs to the M o b ile  O p e ra to r 's  
infrastructure.
P riv a te  key  sh a re  m an ag em en t issue. We recall here that one of the main functions 
of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  is to allow S u b je c ts  to hide their real identity using a pseudonym. 
When encrypting a piece of information or verifying a signature, L B S  need utilize a public 
identifier for the S u b je c t /T a r g e t  they are dealing with. The most appropriate solution for 
them is therefore to use the pseudonym of the S u b je c t /T a r g e t  to perform these operations. 
While this constitutes a neat solution for L B S , it forces S u b je c ts  and T a rg e ts  to possess 
one encrypting and one signing private key share for each L B S  they may connect to. This 
poses significant key management problems, in particular concerning private key generation, 
transmission and revocation.
Solu tion . In order to resolve this issue, we propose a process whereby a S u b je c t  or T a rg e t  
owns one and only one private key share while any of her pseudonyms may be used as her 
corresponding public key by L B S .  This can be achieved by having the P K G  generate as many 
S E M  private key shares per S u b je c t /T a r g e t  as needed in order to accommodate the number 
of L B S . In other words, when a S u b je c t  or a T a rg e t wishes to communicate with a particular 
L B S , the S E M  will assist the corresponding cryptographic operation by choosing the private 
key shares that correspond to the pseudonym. This is made possible by the fact that the 
P K G  can derive as many private key shares as required from the U s e r 's  one, provided the 
underlying mathematical structure of the scheme is large enough. This approach is valuable 
for two main reasons:
- Firstly, because as stated earlier on, it preserves S u b je c ts  and T a r g e ts ' privacy by using 
their pseudonyms as their public key.
- Secondly because it does not increase the complexity of key management. U sers  do 
not have to request a new private key share every time they wish to connect to a new 
L B S .  They do not have to revoke a large number of key pairs but only one if, for 
example, their mobile device is stolen.
Im p lem en ta tio n . In order to achieve this, the P K G  initially generates a unique decryp­
tion private key for every U ser, namely D n m  =  x H i ( R j o )  where R i d  constitutes the U ser 's  
real identity. Then by picking uniformly at random a number D r id  uaf,r which will represent 
the U se r 's  private key share corresponding to R i d ,  the P K G  derives the corresponding S E M
7.5.2 Private Key Generator
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private key share as follows D i D , s e m  = D r ]d — D r i u  <ir. The D r [d llaer private key share is 
delivered to  the  User and from now on, every time a  Subject registers to  a L B S  and obtains 
a pseudonym I D ,  the  P K G  performs the following operations:
- It com putes Q i d  = H \( ID ) .
- It com putes D i d  — x Q i d  where x  is the P K G ’s private key.
- It then  retrieves th e  Subject's private key share D r i d ub(1. and computes -D/o.sem =  
D id  ~  D Rm „ a r r .
- The PKG  then  delivers the private key share corresponding to  the pseudonym ID ,  
namely DjD,Sem to  the  SEM.
In other words, the  User receives a unique private key share D r , d r r , and this key is used 
by the PKG  to  generate or derive SE M  private key shares every tim e a new pseudonym 
is required. We note th a t  the exact same key generation process is applied regarding the 
signing private key shares.
The encryption and signature processes th a t follow key generation are similar to  the ones
already detailed (see Section 7.4.1) for Users. The Security Mediator, however, m ust now
actively search for the  appropriate signing or decryption private key share to  use, i.e. the 
one corresponding to  the  User's pseudonym to be used.
The next section details how the private key shares are m anaged by the Security Media­
tor  in order to  provide an  end-to-end secure channel between Users while enabling their 
pseudo-anonymity.
7.5.3 Security M ediator
The Security Mediator (SEM )  is implemented as a Java component of the Orient Platform  
and acts as a filter on its proxy interface. W hen Users connect to L B S  through the  Orient 
Platform, they  transm it ciphertexts or partia l signatures as H T T P PO ST variables. The 
S E M  retrieves those variables and checks th a t the User’s key pair has not been revoked. 
The S E M  then  looks up a table th a t m aps Users ’identity, their pseudonym used for a 
particular LBS, and the private key share to  be used in this precise case and completes the 
cryptographic process. We note th a t the S E M  only assists cryptographic operations when 
the  revocation sta tu s  of the  corresponding key pair is valid. Figure 7.5 illustrates the key 
distribution and usage between the different entities in an  encryption process.
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Figure 7.5: P rivate key share selection in the  encryption process.
7.6 Scenario
In this section, we present a scenario in which a mobile user, acting both as a S u b je c t and 
T a rg et, connects to  a Point-of-Interest Locator L B S  and transm its her location securely.
We consider a S u b je c t  th a t uses an application on her mobile device in order to  securely 
send and receive location inform ation about herself and her relatives. We describe here a 
confidential transaction  between a S u b je c t  and a L B S .
- The S u b je c t is registered with the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m . The middleware is identified by a 
dom ain name “orientplatform  1. com” .
- The S u b je c t  connects to  a L B S  called “ATMfinder” under the pseudonym “mum” and 
wants to  find out how far away she is located from the nearest ATM.
- Her mobile device uses a GPS sensor in order to  determ ine its location.
- She wishes to  know exactly how long she needs to  walk to  find the nearest ATM. She is 
also concerned about the security implications for lier own safety regarding her request 
being intercepted by somebody else. Hence, she wishes to  use end-to-end encryption 
w ith the L B S  in order to  transm it her location 6, even if this means bypassing the 
privacy modules im plem ented as p art of the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m .  Of course, she fully 
tru sts  the  LBS not to share her details.
As soon as she connects to the LBS, a S ig h tin g , which is a piece of information composed 
of her location details and a tim estam p is produced. In order to  send it securely to  the
6Note : the PK I can be used to  transm it any confidential piece of inform ation between the  two entities 
such as a  session key for exam ple, bu t we will use location inform ation here as an example.
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L B S ,  she encrypts it using the  L B S '  public key : “atinfinder@ orientplattbrm l.coin” . The 
ciphertext is then transm itted  using the H TTP protocol as a  PO ST variable part of the 
H TTP request. The O r ie n t  P la t fo r m ’s  proxy server receives the  request, the S E M  retrieves 
the  ciphertext from the PO ST  variable and partially  decrypts it depending on the L B S ’ 
security capabilities’ status. Then the middleware in itiates the  Client Initiated Service 
(CIS) of the O r ie n t  P ro to c o l (see Section 5.4 for more inform ation about the protocol) with 
the L B S  and forwards the H T T P request together w ith all the  PO ST variables including 
the updated ciphertext as p a rt of the first message. As shown in Appendix A, the CIS 
service is composed of a series of four messages. Generally, the four messages are used 
since the L B S  needs to enquire about some T a r g e ts ’ location. In  the present case, since the 
location of the  S u b je c t  (also acting as a T a r g e t) is included as p a rt of the request, only the 
first and the last message of the service will be used. Upon reception of the first message, 
the L B S  completes the decryption of the ciphertext, generates the  appropriate information 
including the S u b je c t ’s  location as well as the  one of the  nearest ATM and encrypts it using 
the S u b je c t ’s public key : “m um@ atinfinder@ orientplatforml.com” . The content is then 
encoded in base64, inserted in the fourth XML message of the  CIS service and is sent back 
to  the corresponding O r ie n t  P la t fo r m . The middleware ex tracts the value added content 
of the message, partially  decrypts the ciphertext and forwards it to the S u b je c t , who is 
left w ith the decryption using her private key share. In this scenario, we notice th a t the 
O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  only acts as an pseudo-anonymising proxy as opposed to a secure pseudo- 
anonymising location server.
7.7 Evaluation
This section provides an  evaluation of the overall Public key Infrastructure. Some experi­
m ents have been carried out to  assess the performance of the  algorithms described, both  on 
desktop and mobile devices. Security issues are then  discussed at the end of the section.
7.7.1 Performance
T he experiments were conducted on :
- A desktop PC  to sim ulate the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m ’s behavior as well as L B S '  s. It consists 
of a 1.7Ghz Intel Pentium  4 with 1G of memory, running Windows 2000 as well as the 
Java V irtual M achine 1.4.2.
- A PDA to sim ulate a S u b je c t 's  or T a r g e t’s mobile device. I t consists of a 206 MHz 
Intel StrongARM  32 b it RISC Processor w ith 32M of RAM, running Windows CE 3.0.
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We report here the results for th e  following operations carried ou t on the relevant devices. 
T he experiment consists of ten  runs of the same operation in order to  calculate the mean 
and the standard  deviation for each of them . The results are sum m arized in Table 7.1.
The Java Virtual Machine used is the IBM j9 1.4.
Operation Mobile Device Desktop P C
encrypt 4583 (44.1) 148 (8.86)
decryptSEM - 141 (0.48)
decrypt. 3720 (4.22) 142 (5.26)
sign 1475 (5.46) 47 (0)
signSEM - 47 (0)
verify 3305 (34.9) 114 (7.53)
encrypt (optimized) 1680 (7.83) 51.5 (7.49)
Table 7.1: Performance results for M ediated Identity-Based C ryptography operations in 
milliseconds. The standard  deviation is given within brackets.
W hile it may be difficult to  assess the  security equivalence in term s of key length between 
the  M ediated Identity-based P K I and  an RSA-based PK I, we report here the timings of RSA 
operations on the same platform s in Table 7.2. We intend here to  com pare the performances 
of the  widely used RSA algorithm  against the implementation of our m ediated identity- 
based cryptographic algorithm s on a mobile device in order to see if the  execution times are 
significantly different.
Operation Mobile Device Desktop P C
encrypt (1024 bit key) 25 (0.3) 0 (0)
decrypt (1024 bit key) 893 (4.81) 25 (8)
sign (1024 b it key) 895 (3.4) 22 (7.9)
verify (1024 bit key) 22.6 (0.7) 0 (0)
encrypt (2048 b it key) 92.3 (1.1) 7.9 (8.33)
decrypt (2048 bit key) 6875 (8.4) 189 (15.4)
sign (2048 bit key) 6885 (10.1) 188 (14.6)
verify (2048 bit key) 80.7 (0.4) 6.3 (8)
Table 7.2: Performance results for RSA operations in milliseconds. The standard deviation 
is given w ithin brackets.
The experiments carried ou t clearly dem onstrate that:
- The M ediated Identity-based P K I (MIB-PKI) cryptographic operations carried out on 
the mobile device are relatively slow compared to  RSA. This can be explained by the 
number of ECC point m ultiplication, m odular exponentiation and Tate pairing com­
putations to be carried out as opposed to only one m odular exponentiation for RSA.
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Also, these tim ing m easurements are considered in addition to  the JN I overhead. We 
note however th a t the  M IB-PKI encryption process can be sped up by pre-computing 
some operations, see Table 7.1.
- W hile being slow, the M IB-PKI rem ains however practicable, offering good enough 
performance on the desktop platform . Furtherm ore, it removes the need of finding out 
th e  certificate revocation sta tu s by enabling the Security M ediator to  revoke instantly 
th e  security capabilities of one of the parties involved. Therefore, in order to compare 
rigorously the two PK I, the  tim e to retrieve and check the validity of a RSA public 
key certificate against the  corresponding CRL should be taken  into account. This 
experim ent has not been carried out bu t one could expect a significant delay resulting 
from the  CRL discovery, download, verification and parsing for potentially  every single 
certificate concerned.
7.7.2 Security Analysis
T he security analysis of the  P K I first recalls the  m athem atical problems on which the thresh­
old decryption and signature algorithm s are built on. We also review the security features 
offered to  U sers  by the overall system, focusing in particular on th e  public key revocation.
A lg o rith m s
E n c ry p tio n . The threshold decryption algorithm  specified in [29] is based on the assump­
tion th a t the  C o m p u ta t io n a l  B i l in e a r  D if f ie  H e i lm a n  P ro b le m  ( C B D H )  is computationally 
intractable. [29] provides a detailed formal proof of security of th is result. The scheme 
ensures in particular security against c h o se n  c ip h e r te x t  a t ta c k s  whereby an attacker is al­
lowed to ask decryption shares for messages and identities of its choice o ther than those 
corresponding to  the challenge, being in possession of a U s e r ’s private share. This result 
makes this scheme unique in the  setting of m ediated cryptography in the sense th a t it is the 
only one so far th a t provides this level of security.
S ig n a tu re . The m ediated Hess’ identity-based signature scheme m ust satisfy some security 
properties in order to qualify as a secure and efficient scheme. In particular, we are interested 
in dem onstrating th a t the  following notions hold in our context:
- K ey  Secrecy. Neither the U s e r ’s private key share, nor the S E M 's  should be derivable 
from any inform ation available to  any entity, excluding the P K G .  This includes public 
param eters, signature shares, or any information given to  a particu lar entity. We do
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not consider the  case where the SE M  colludes w ith any other entity as it acts as an 
honest player in our setting.
- U nfo rgeab ility . It should not be possible to  generate a valid signature for a particular 
message w ithout the  cooperation of a User and a SEM.
- N o n  re p u d ia tio n . Neither the User nor the S E M  should be able to  deny having 
signed a message, provided a valid signature verifiable using one of the User's identity 
exists.
We first prove here the  correctness of the scheme by showing th a t the first operation of the 
signature verification leads to  the relevant param eter r, necessary to  produce the  digest in 
order to verify the  signature.
r  =  r2.e(u2,P ) . e ( H 1( I D ) , - Y pkgY
=  e(P2) P ) - fc2.e(Ul +  v S iD,sem + k2P2,P ) .e (H i( ID ) ,  x P f  
=  e (P 2) P )~ k2.e{uu P).e{vSID,sem,P)-e{k2P2, P ) .e{xH 1( I D ) ,P ) ~ v 
=  e(P2, P )~ k2.e(P2, P ) k2,e(vSiD,user + k iP i ,P ) .e ( v S iD,sem ,P ) .e (S ID , P y v 
= e ( v ( S m  ,user + S i d  ,sem)) P ).e (k1P 1,P ) .e (S ID,P ) ~ v 
=  e(S ID, P ) v.e(SID, P r v .e(k1P l ,P )
=  e ( P ! ,P ) fc‘
The Hess’ identity-based signature scheme relies on the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman prob­
lem in the random  oracle model. We argue th a t its m ediated version also relies 011 the 
hardness of th e  CBDH problem. Relying on these assumptions, we discuss the  following 
properties in its m ediated adaptation.
K ey  Secrecy. Upon receipt of the token (u i ,v )  generated by a User, the S E M  is not 
able to infer any inform ation on the User's private key share. The signing process being 
the same as in the  original signature scheme, inferring a User's private key share from her 
ID would am ount to  the  DLP problem being tractab le  as it requires to  determ ine x  in 
Ypkg — x P  to be able to  generate private key shares. The token (u2, v , r 2) issued by the 
S E M  does not disclose any more information. r 2, ju st as r i ,  contains information necessary 
to  verify the signature. In the original protocol, n  is not transm itted  as it is recovered 
during the  first step of the  verification process. If it was sent however, the  scheme would 
rely on th e  hardness of the CBDH problem since recovering P i and k\ would result in the 
to ta l break of the  system . The release of r2 does not disclose any relevant inform ation to
143
a U ser, no m atter if this U ser  is also the original signer. Indeed, from 1/2, the la tter can 
recover v S io , s e m  +  &2-P2- Even though, she knows the value of v , she still needs h i  and 
P i  to  infer the S E M ’s private key share. Finding these two values from r i  is considered as 
intractable provided the hardness of the CBDH problem holds. Therefore, an attack 011 the 
mediated Hess’ identity-based signature scheme can be viewed as a reduction to the attack 
on the original scheme.
U nforgeability . We consider here three different cases. F irst, we assume a U ser  wishing 
to  forge a valid signature on behalf of another U ser , bu t still using the S E M  to  complete 
the signature. In order to  be valid, the U ser  m ust be able to  produce a value S i d , user 
which, when combined w ith S iD ,Sem would result as S i d  ■ The U ser  must therefore either 
have the knowledge of S i d  and SiD,sem or have the knowledge of SiD,sem alld being able 
to  com pute S i d • Since S i d  and SiD,Sem are kept secret from all U sers, this means th a t the 
attacker m ust be able to  com pute 5 /d ,  which is com putationally infeasible since ECDLP is 
intractable, unless the  P K G 's private key is disclosed. Secondly, the  S E M  alone trying to 
forge a valid signature leads to  the same situation, as in he m ust either find the appropriate 
S i d ,user corresponding to  a particu lar I D  or generate a new S i d , the  la tte r problem being 
intractable considering the hardness of the DLP problem. Finally, a U ser  trying to bypass 
the S E M  in order to  produce a valid signature will encounter the  same problems as if the 
S E M  alone was trying to  forge a signature.
N o n -rep u d ia tio n . In our context, N on-repudiation is achieved bearing in mind th a t 
the P K G  is fully trusted  not to  use the private key shares he generates. Indeed, the value 
S id  is needed to  generate a valid signature and as seen earlier on, both the U ser  and the 
S E M  are required in order to  jointly compute it. Since the private key shares used are 
unique, secretly kept by their U sers  and S E M  and m athem atically related, a valid signature 
can only be produced by the U ser  owning the private key share corresponding to  the I D  
used to verify it. This also means th a t the S E M  completed the  signature, which puts its 
responsibility at stakes.
The cryptographic algorithms used as part of the  m ediated identity-based signature 
scheme are based on Hess’ formally proved identity-based signature scheme. In fact, the 
U s e r 's  signature process in the m ediated identity-based P K I remains rigorously the same 
as in Hess’ original scheme, while the S E M  interaction only consists in completing the 
signature using the same scheme, both  entities using a m athem atically related private key 
shares. While we commented 011 the  security of the  overall protocol by attem pting, with no 
success, to  find scenarios whereby an attacker could break the scheme, we recognize the need 
for further investigation in order to  find out w hether any inform ation leakage is possible. In 
particular, techniques such as model checking could be used in order to formally prove th a t
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the protocol defined is secure.
S y s te m
Key generation is performed by the P K G .  Since it is responsible for the generation of the two 
private key shares of a particu lar U s e r 's  private key, the P K G  could in theory impersonate 
any U ser  of the system. Hence, this entity  needs to be fully tru sted  and should preferably 
be p u t offline. As seen earlier in Section 7.3, each user only owns one key pair for encryption 
and one for signature, no m atte r how m any L B S  they are registered with.
The security analysis of the  algorithm s shows th a t the decryption and signing processes 
m ust involve both a U s e r  and a S E M  in order to  produce a relevant result. A S E M  will 
only participate in a decryption or signature process if the security capabilities of the cor­
responding U ser  have not been revoked. Therefore, if a S E M  is instructed to  stop assisting 
cryptographic jjrocesses, I n s t a n t  ( o r  im m e d ia te )  R e v o c a tio n  is provided in the sense th a t a 
U se r  wishing to  decrypt a message w ith a compromised private key share will not be issued 
w ith the decrypted token generated by the S E M . Also, a U ser  trying to  im personate another 
en tity  will not be able to  generate a full signature on a message since the S E M  will refuse 
to  cooperate w ith its corresponding private key share.
Following such a public key revocation, a U ser  is required to  ob tain  a new private key 
share for the corresponding revoked pseudonym, following the same key pair generation 
process as described earlier on. She can however still use her identity as her public key since 
the new private key shares will be derived from the original D i d , see Section 7.5.2. We 
note also tha t, in the case of a S E M 's key pair revocation, only the S E M  will necessitate 
a new private key share. However, if both  the S E M 's and the U s e r ’s private key shares 
have been compromised, a digital signature produced by these two entities will always be 
verifiable, no m atter if a new set of private key shares have been generated and issued to 
the  relevant parties. This is due to  the fact th a t only the P K G 's  public key and the U s e r ’s 
identity  are used to verify a signature. In this case, the P K G  will be required to  generate a 
new key pair for itself, m aking its public key available to  all parties, and to  re-generate and 
d istribu te  all the U s e r s ’ private key shares. In traditional identity-based encryption schemes, 
the revocation of one’s private key implies th a t the corresponding public key can no longer 
be used (or at least for a certain  period of tim e if it contained an expiry date 7) unless the 
P K G 's  system param eters are re-initialized. In our setting, such a situation may occur if 
and only if both U s e r ’s  and S E M ’s private key shares have been disclosed. This is obviously 
less likely to  happen and, therefore, constitutes an advantage of using identity-based server
7A short lived public key m ay be defined as an expiry date concatenated to  an identity, such as 
bob@orientplatforml.com-01012005.. T h is approach requires however frequent updates of private keys.
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aided cryptography.
Once the revocation process is achieved, we note however that messages signed by the 
revoked key pair prior to their revocation and for which the signature was assisted by the 
S E M  can still be validated. Plaintexts th a t were encrypted by both the U s e r ’s  and the 
S E M ’s private key shares cannot however be recovered with the new private key share. This 
is a natural consequence inherent to our design resulting from the fact, that the same public 
key is always used while the corresponding private key may change.
7.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we attempted to provide the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  with a security infrastructure 
that would remain as transparent as possible to U sers. In particular, our main objectives 
were to:
- Identify a suitable mechanism providing end-to-end security at the application level.
- Attem pt to simplify key management by minimizing the impact of key revocation.
- Provide a solution that could be integrated in a distributed Orient Platform architec­
ture.
To achieve this, we employed a threshold asymmetric key encryption algorithm, whereby 
two parties are required to work in conjunction in order to produce a valid ciphertext decryp­
tion. As for the signature capabilities, we extended an identity-based signature algorithm to 
achieve the same goals without requiring the second party to actually sign the message but 
rather assist the signing process. By using mediated cryptography, we allow for the O r ie n t  
P la t fo r m  to check the validity of the U s e r s ’ key pair every time a message passes through its 
proxy architecture and to provide therefore, I n s t a n t  R e v o c a tio n  of security capabilities. The 
identity-based character of the encryption and signature algorithms simplifies the public key 
retrieval process since the public identifiers used are pseudonyms, known to all the parties 
involved. A slightly modified key generation process has also been designed in order to al­
low the pseudo-anonymity character of the transactions between U sers. This process allows 
S u b je c ts  and T a rg e ts  to own a single private key share corresponding to as many public key 
identifiers or pseudonyms as needed by the system.
We notice however that such a PKI fails to provide its U sers  with a way to sign and 
encrypt a message at the same time. There is therefore a necessity for signcryption schemes 
applicable in the context of mediated cryptography to be designed in the future. This may 
prove to be a complex problem since the S E M ,  upon verification of a U s e r 's  key pairs status,
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would have to assist both the decryption and the signature of a message at the same time. 
Also, key escrow is inherent to the PKI design which, in some circumstances, could be 
problematic. However, since the PKG is trusted by all entities, it is understood that it will 
not try to impersonate any Users or tap into their communications. A possible solution 
would be to distribute the process of key generations between several PKG so that none of 
them is fully aware of a User's or SEM's private key share.
Whereas reasonably efficient on desktop computers, the PKI implementation on mobile 
devices demonstrates modest results, even though comparable to existing systems’ perfor­
mances. However, it remains more secure than  currently used PKI since it provides instant 
revocation capabilities when other systems fail to enforce public key revocation checking. 
Also, improvements in the algorithms used and deployment of identity-based encryption 
technologies on embedded devices 8 will certainly contribute to enhance the performances 
of systems similar to ours 9.
s See h t t p : //uww.gemplus. co m /p ress /a rch lves/2004 /id_secu rity /02 -11-2004-Id an ti ty-Based_
Encryption.html, where Gemplus announces the world’s first Identity-Based Encryption implementation 
for sm art cards.
®In this context, the PKI presented iu this section would allow mobile users to store their private key 
shares in the SIM card. Mobile users would be issued a new SIM card every time their key pair is to he 
revoked.
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C h a p t e r  8
C o n c l u s i o n s  a n d  F u t u r e  W o r k
8.1 Introduction
Software services th a t take into account the location of a particular entity already exist and 
are currently used in some applications. The first and best example remains the proximity 
services accessible through a 2G mobile network from a WAP-enabled mobile phone. Cine­
mas, restaurants and other points of interest can be located in the vicinity of the requestor 
using location technologies already implemented within mobile network architectures. An­
other example is the deployment of fleet management services where GPS devices are em­
bedded in vehicles in order to track their position over time. The locations of vehicles are 
then transm itted to  a central server using technologies such as SMS or MMS, depending on 
the radio network used. Stand-alone software or a Web interface may then be used to view, 
in real-time, the location of the tracked entities. Car insurance companies are also starting 
to  use similar systems in order to provide their customers with tailored rates tha t depend 
0 1 1  their driving habits.
For all these examples, the L B S  are trusted not to misuse the location data of the entities 
tracked. Because they operate in a relatively closed environment, people tend to minimize 
their privacy concerns regarding the disclosure of their location information. However, the 
development of location determination technologies within mobile operators’ architectures 
may change this attitude. Indeed, new regulations now require mobile operators to pre­
cisely locate their subscribers for emergency purposes. In order to minimize the costs of 
deploying such technologies and generate new revenue streams, mobile operators will open 
their networks to third parties, enabling them to use their resources and share their data. 
On one hand, this fosters the development of a new kind of L B S ,  where people can now, 
for example, enquire for the location of a mobile subscriber directly over the Internet. On
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the other hand, this raises significant privacy issues regarding who can access this location 
information, how it will be used and how long it will be stored. The European Union, the 
U.S.A and Japan have already defined some privacy regulations in an attempt to protect 
mobile subscribers. However, implementation of these guidelines remain sporadic and it is 
proving to be a daunting task.
The research work carried out and summarized in this thesis identifies the privacy risks 
inherent to location information disclosure and discusses some interesting approaches that 
tackle related problems. It then proposed a possible solution implemented as a middleware 
platform and focuses on two of its main components. In this chapter, the main contributions 
of the work are summarized, along with some possible future research directions.
8.2 Thesis Summary
In the introductory Chapter 1, we explored how connected mobility, i. e. mobile devices with 
Internet access, together with the development and deployment of location-based technolo­
gies gave birth to a new range of mobile services based on location. After having stressed the 
growing privacy related concerns with regards to personal location information disclosure, 
we presented a first legal attem pt to regulate location information handlers’ practices in 
the European Union, the U.S.A. and Japan. We then defined the scope of this thesis by 
identifying the main problem it intends to tackle and outlined the expected contributions of 
the research work together with its limitations.
This thesis addresses user privacy in the context of location-based services. This field 
encompasses a broad range of concepts that find their roots in the three main areas of 
computer security, mobile telecommunications and Internet computing. In Chapter 2, we 
introduced the field of computer security, stressing the main principles of security algorithm 
design, describing the main infrastructures used and pointing out the two interesting areas 
of elliptic curve and threshold cryptography. We then provided a detailed description of 
currently used mobile phone networks. In particular, we identified their shortcomings in 
terms of security and discussed how they handled cellular-based location information. This 
chapter provided the background knowledge necessary to comprehend the notions developed 
in the following chapters.
Chapter 2 outlined the software and hardware environments in which location-based 
services operate. In Chapter 3, we refined the definition of this environment by analyzing 
the role of each entity and proposed a threat model. We then stated three main problems 
related to location privacy and pointed out the need for a middleware platform in order 
to interface mobile users with location-based services. The requirements for an application
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level protocol in order to help L B S  communicate with the middleware were also described, 
together with the requirements of a Public Key Infrastructure required for the environment 
considered.
After having defined what we expected in terms of research outcome in Chapter 3, we 
analyzed where the current research efforts were directed and how they could benefit the 
project. Chapter 4 presented an exhaustive review of the research related to location privacy 
in general, spanning from high level protocols and algorithms used to provide privacy, to 
mechanisms ensuring confidentiality and access control to location information. We refer 
the reader to Section 8.4 for a more precise description of this contribution.
In Chapter 5, we presented a prototype of the middleware and protocol devised in the 
previous sections, namely the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  and the O r ie n t  P ro to co l, and showed how 
they fulfilled the corresponding requirements. We then illustrated their use by providing 
the reader with an explanation of their integration amongst the various entities. A scenario 
was finally provided in order to show how a typical L B S  request was handled by the newly 
defined architecture.
Chapter 6 introduced an algorithm called the L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm that intention­
ally downgrades the quality of location information in order to provide L B S  with the mini­
mum acceptable accuracy in terms of mobile users’ location while still remaining meaningful. 
This chapter provided the motivations, description of the main design issues, implementation 
and evaluation of this algorithm.
Finally, in Chapter 7, we described a Public Key Infrastructure that may be used in the 
environment considered. The algorithms outlined provide the architecture with the basic 
security services such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation, by 
enabling an entity to perform encryption and digital signatures in an efficient way. We refer 
the reader to Section 8.3 for a more precise description of this contribution.
8.3 Major Contributions
8.3.1 A  L ocation B lurring algorithm
The algorithm proposed in Chapter 6 is used to blur the location of a mobile user by 
returning an area containing her location in such a way that it is not possible for a L B S  
or any other entity to compute a more accurate location. This presents the advantage of 
maintaining a low but meaningful resolution of location information while preserving mobile 
users’ privacy. The algorithm penalizes the location tracking process by providing cached 
location information when detected. On the contrary, it enables sporadic location queries
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to get maximum location information accuracy. The L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm solves 
the location inference problem in real-time. Along with the algorithm, we designed and 
implemented a testing framework as a discrete event system simulator that can be used to 
assess the efficiency of L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithms.
8.3 .2  A  Public K ey Infrastructure
The PK I proposed in Chapter 7 is based on a Security Mediator (SEM) architecture that in­
tegrates seamlessly within the architecture we have designed in order to enable L B S  provision 
over the Internet. The cryptographic algorithms used as part of the PKI are identity-based, 
which considerably simplifies public key management. In particular, the PKI implements a 
novel identity-based signature scheme based on Hess’, which is, to our knowledge, the first 
identity-based signature scheme proposed in the SEM context. As a result, the PKI en­
ables I n s t a n t  r e v o c a tio n  of security capabilities and removes the need to perform certificate 
retrieval, path validation and revocation in our setting. Also, a special private key gener­
ation process enables PKI users to use the same private key in conjunction with multiple 
pseudonyms as their public key. This way, they can access L B S  under different identities 
without having to use different private keys.
8.4 Other contributions
8.4.1 A critical survey o f con text inform ation security
In Chapter 4, we provided a detailed survey of the research efforts carried out to date in order 
to protect context information. We analyzed in particular the notions of I d e n t i t y  B lu r r in g  
and L o c a t io n  B lu r r in g , some approaches to context privacy policy definitions and different 
access control models for location information. Finally, we studied secure architectures 
designed for context aware applications and provided the reader with a description of the 
relevant standards.
8.4 .2  A  prototype for a secure architecture delivering LB S  over the  
Internet
Chapter 5 presents a joint work carried out with Cameron Ross Dunne [73]. This work 
constitutes the basis for the research outlined in this thesis. It presents a proxy-based 
platform, O r ie n t  P la t fo r m ,  that handles LB,?-related requests, performs identity translation 
and location presentation to L B S .  A privacy interface lets users provision their privacy details
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and a protocol called the O r ie n t  P ro to c o l  is proposed as a way to interface L B S  with the 
O r ie n t  P la t fo rm -
8.5 Future work
8.5.1 T he Orient P latform
There are three main areas that may need further research.
First, the middleware does not currently handle area-based queries; such queries would 
return all the locatable entities currently located in a specific area. Some L B S  may indeed 
require this kind of information to provide a service. Some further versions of L o c a tio n  
B lu r r in g  algorithms may also require the knowledge of other entities’ location and conceal 
or disclose blurred location information in consequence. Therefore, there would be a need to 
extend both the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  and the O r ie n t  P ro to c o l  in order to support this change. 
Technically, this would involve extending the XML schemas specifying the O r ie n t  P ro toco l, 
and more particularly, the schema of the L B S  I n i t ia te d  S e rv ic e  (LIS) of the O r ie n t  P ro toco l. 
Instead of incorporating a location query for one individual, the T a r g e t 's  identity XML 
object would be replaced by a shape XML object already used to define the location area 
returned by the L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm. From the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m ’s  point of view, the 
technical upgrade would involve invoking the appropriate MLP [163] area query service and 
applying the L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm to every T a r g e t’s  S ig h tin g  returned. The C h a rg in g  
U n it internal calculations would need to be amended in order to take into account the new 
charging schemes supporting this kind of queries.
Secondly, fourth Generation networks (4G) are currently being defined. One of their 
main characteristics is that they aim to extend the roaming concept to different mobile 
network technologies, see [137]. For example, they may handle hand-overs between WiFi 
and UMTS networks. In our context, this means that the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  may need to 
cope with new kinds of users traveling in new environments. Technically, any wireless 
network involved in such hand-overs may individually locate its T a rg ets . In the case of 
WiFi networks for example, T a rg e ts  could be located relatively to their base stations using 
triangulation methods similar to those defined in Section 2.5.1. The same concept as the 
Location Translation tables defined in Section 5.3.2 could be used by the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  
when acquiring location information from such a WiFi network : they would translate the 
relative positioning of a T a r g e t within the network into an absolute location by considering 
the fixed location of the network’s access points.
Finally, there may be a need to inform the mobile user that she is being tracked and
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give him the possibility to acknowledge the positioning request. At present, users can only 
access location request logs and cannot interactively influence the result of a request, by, for 
example, denying it. While this may prove to be awkward to implement and unnecessary 
since users may not wish to receive a notification every time their location is requested, some 
research in Human Computer Interaction may lead to an interface tha t could help provide a 
feedback on the information collected without disturbing the user experience. An example 
of such interface could be described as a simple web form pushed by the O r ie n t  P la t fo r m  to 
the online T a rg e t everytime a request is performed in order to get her location, letting her 
grant or deny the access permission.
8.5.2 L ocation  Blurring algorithm
The L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm presented in this thesis constitutes the first step towards 
solving the daunting problem of location tracking. In particular, while it intends to solve 
real-time border issues, there is still research to be done in order to determine how to tackle 
retrospective border issues in order to make sure that a mobile users’ past locations cannot 
be accurately inferred. One possible research direction may involve the study of the behavior 
of a variant of the algorithm presented in Section 6. This algorithm pre-computes B lu r r e d  
S ig h tin g s  from the last B lu r r e d  L o c a lity  released using the T a r g e t’s actual P o s i t io n  in order 
to get a value for the parameter d i s t .  It then stores them in a B S S t o r e  repository. The 
variant of the algorithm would perform the same calculation but using the latest B lu r r e d  
S ig h tin g  stored in the repository together with the T a r g e t’s  actual P o s i t io n . This would 
present the advantage of producing B lu r re d  S ig h tin g s  more readily available and may defeat 
some retrospective border attacks when the B S S t o r e  repository is not empty. Indeed the 
distance d i s t  may not be accessible to the attacker since the B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  it is calculated 
from might not have been released from the B S S t o r e  repository.
The most significant challenge to tackle remains, however, to propose a L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  
algorithm that is not subject to analytical attacks 1. Some approaches already proposed in 
[96] rely on the assumption that the privacy of an individual depends on the number of 
people he can be mistaken with. Therefore, B lu r r e d  L o c a lit ie s  do not have a constant shape 
and do not depend on the environment characteristics but more on people’s behaviors. Our 
L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm releases a new B lu r re d  S ig h tin g  depending on the time it takes a 
T a rg e t to travel the longest straight line distance achievable between two consecutive B lu r r e d  
L o c a litie s . The size of B lu r r e d  L o c a lit ie s  is fixed and corresponds to a privacy preference set 
by the T a rg et. One possible approach to tackle analytical attacks may therefore consist in
A ttack s that use environment characteristics such as the presence of buildings, roads, direction of traffic 
flow, etc. to  infer somebody’s location.
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dynamically calculating B lu r r e d  L o c a lit ie s  depending on the effective area a T a rg e t can be 
located in. For example, when a T a rg e t specifies she wishes to be located with an accuracy of 
100 meters (or located in a disc of area approximatively equal to 3141m2), the next B lu r re d  
S ig h tin g  released for this T a r g e t will have its B lu r re d  L o c a lity  computed such that the T a rg et  
can be located uniformly in an acceptable area of dimension 3141m2. By acceptable area, 
we mean an area where the T a rg e t is the most likely to be located (a road when travelling 
at a certain speed with a direction parallel to tha t road for example). This will involve 
carrying out calculations with vector maps in real-time and may significantly increase the 
size of B lu r re d  L o c a litie s . However, this approach, combined with other techniques such as 
T e m p o ra l B lu r r in g , may lead to a practical solution to analytical attacks.
Finally, there is also a need for a mathematical model to be developed in order to for­
mally assess the security and efficiency of L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithms. In order to do so, 
research fields such as Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Spatial Analysis [62] may 
provide a basis to design such model. In particular, one approach could indeed consist in 
applying probability theory to the current L o c a tio n  B lu r r in g  algorithm in order to assess 
to what extent retrospective border issues can leak privacy sensitive location information. 
Furthermore, by using location estimation techniques [110], it may be possible to predict 
the probability of presence of a T a rg e t in a particular B lu r r e d  L o c a lity , which would provide 
a valid reason to release or to retain the corresponding B lu r r e d  S ig h tin g  to the requestor.
8.5.3 PK I
We believe that the concept of a SEM architecture suits perfectly the security needs of 
mobile users in the context of location-based services delivery. However, we also believe that 
several aspects of the work presented in Chapter 7 need to be further investigated in order 
to improve on the PKI current performance. In particular, there is a need to investigate 
cryptographic algorithms tha t use less pairings and less scalar multiplications in order to 
enable mobile devices to quickly perform cryptographic operations. These two operations 
are indeed considered as the most resource consuming ones in the algorithm proposed.
Also, signcryption schemes may represent a possible future research direction since they 
do not exist yet in the context of a SEM architecture and constitute an open problem in 
this field. The issues lies in the fact that while a PKI U s e r  may perform the signing and 
encryption processes at the same time, the S E M  would have to partially sign the token 
received and partially decrypt it at the same time. One possible approach may involve 
researching a cryptographic primitive that allows the encryption and signing operations to 
commute in order to allow for this to happen.
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Finally, we recognize th a t the Public Key Infrastructure developed may suffer from a 
certain number of issues. One of them is the key escrow problem, whereby a private key 
is generated by the P r iv a te  K e y  G e n e r a to r  and kept such that it can generate new private 
key shares every time a S u b je c t  needs a new pseudonym when registering to a new L B S .  
Certificateless public key encryption [51] advocates the use of a user generated private key 
together with a public identifier published by the same user, but which does not need to 
be validated, in order to remove the key escrow problem in identity-based cryptosystems. 
Adapting such a concept to our environment could remove the need for a P K G  and therefore 
the need for key escrow. The other main issue that faces our mediated PKI is scalability. 
Indeed, only one central instance of the Security Mediator in not conceivable since it may go 
down or even become compromised. Some solutions to this problem have been proposed in
[212], where the authors present some designs that allow for backup and migration processes 
between S E M  instances. Since IBE-mRSA (see Section 2.3.4) is used as the main crypto­
graphic primitive, it would be interesting to investigate whether their approach is adaptable 
to our context and how it can be extended in order to provide services such as protection 
against Denial-Of-Service attacks.
8.6 Concluding remarks
In the introduction of this chapter, we provided the reader with some examples of L B S  and 
pointed out the possible risks of location tracking. In this thesis, we have attempted to 
introduce new approaches in order to tackle these location privacy issues. However, one 
could wonder whether all these privacy enhancing techniques are really necessary. Tracking 
an individual using her mobile phone may indeed raise privacy concerns amongst the general 
public. However, as noted in [141] by Martin Dodge, people are already being tracked in 
their day-to-day life and do not seem to be concerned about it. According to this study, 
there exist three main forms of people tracking:
- Sporadic tracking by transactions. Transactions made with debit or credit cards, 
digitally controlled physical access can disclose one’s location with a precise space and 
time resolution.
- Visual tracking by cameras. The best example remains London’s “Ring Of Steel” 
network of surveillance where CCTV cameras are installed in most buses, trains but 
also at crossroads and roundabouts in order to monitor traffic and ensure people safety.
- Mobile tracking, as defined in this thesis.
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The author points out however that mobile tracking may prove to be more harmful than the 
other two since it potentially allows for more continuous and complete geosurveillance2. This 
provides the adequate justification to pursue research in this field and attem pt to prevent 
Big Brother from watching us.
2A mobile phone subscriber is known to the mobile network operator it is connected to, in terms of 
identity and location.
L i s t  o f  A c r o n y m s
3 G P P  3rd Generation Partnership Project
A C L  Access Control List
A E S  Advanced Encryption S tandard
A -G P S  Assisted GPS
A M P S  Advanced Mobile Phone System
A N S I American National Standards Institute
A P I  Application Programming Interface
A P N  Access Point Name
A P P E L  A P3P Preference Exchange Language
A R P U  Average Revenue Per User
A -S Anti-spoofing
A u C  Authentication Center
B S C  Base Station Controller
B S S  Base Station Subsystem
B S T  Base S tation  Transceiver
C A  Certificate Authority
C D M A  Code Division Multiple Access
C D P  CRL Distribution Point
C L  Capabilities List
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C R S  C ertificate Revocation S tatus
C R T  C ertificate Revocation Tree
D A C  D iscretionary Access Control
D A P  Directory Access Protocol
D E S  D ata  Encryption Standard
D H C P  Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
D IT  Directory Inform ation Tree
D L P  Discrete Logarithm  Problem
D N S  Domain Name System
D P D  Delegated P a th  Discovery
D P V  Delegated Path  Validation
D S A  Directory System Agent
D U A  D irectory User Agent
E C C  Elliptic Curve Cryptography
E C D L P  Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm  Problem
E -O T D  Enhanced Observed Time Difference
E T S I European Telecommunications S tandards Institu te
F C C  Federal Com m unications Commission
F D M A  Frequency Division M ultiple Access
G E A  G PRS Encryption Algorithm
G G S N  Gateway G PRS Support Node
G M L C  Gateway Mobile Location Center
G P R S  General Packet Radio Service
CRL Certificate Revocation List
GPS Global Positioning System
G S M A  GSM Association
H L R  Home Location Register
IB E  Identity-Based Encryption
IE T F  In ternet Engineering Task Force
IM E I  International Mobile Equipment. Identity
IM S I International Mobile Subscriber Identity
IS D N  Integrated Services Digital Network
IS P  In ternet Service Provider
J N I  Java  Native Interface
L A I Location Area Identity
L A N  Local Area Network
LB S Location-Based Service
L D A P  Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LL C  Logical Link Layer
L M U  Location M easurem ent Unit
L M U  Location M anagem ent Unit
M A C  M andatory Access Control
M A C  Message A uthentication Code
M E  Mobile Equipm ent
M IM E  M ultipurpose In ternet Mail Extensions 
M L P  Mobile Location Protocol 
M M P G  Mobile Message Packet Gateway 
M S  Mobile Station 
M S C  Mobile Switching Center
GSM Global System for Mobile communication
N IS T  National In stitu te  of S tandards and Technology
N S A  National Security Agency
N S S  Network Subsystem
O C S P  Online Certificate S ta tu s  Protocol
O M A  Open Mobile Alliance
P 3P  Platform  for Privacy Preferences P roject
P C U  Packet Control Unit
P D C -P  Personal Digital Cellular Packet
P G P  P retty  Good Privacy
P I N  Personal Identification Number
P K G  Public Key G enerator
P K I  Public Key In frastructure
P L M N  Public Land Mobile Network Area
P M U  Profile M anagem ent U nit
P S T N  Public Switched Telephone Network
R A  R egistration A uthority
R A D IU S  Remote A uthentication Dial In User Service
R B A C  Role-based Access Control
R D N  Reduced Distinguish Name
R F  Radio Frequency
R T T  Round Trip T im e
S A  Selective Availability
SB  Suicide Bureau
MSISDN Mobile Station International ISDN Number
SDSI Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure
S E T  Secure Electronic Transact ion
SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node
S IM  Subscriber Identity  M odule
S M L C  Serving Mobile Location Center
S M S  Short Message Service
S O A P  Simple O bject Access Protocol
S P K I  Simple Public Key Infrastructure
S S H  Secure Shell
SSL  Secure Socket Layer
T A  Tim ing Advance
T A C S  Total Access Communication System 
T D M A  Time Division M ultiple Access 
T L S  T ransport Layer Security 
T M S I  Tem porary Mobile Subscriber Identity 
T A  Tim e of Advance
U M T S  Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
U R I  Uniform Resource Identifier
U R L  Uniform Resource Locator
U S IM  UMTS Subscriber Identity Module
U T R A N  UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network
V L R  Visitor Location Register
W 3C  World W ide Web Consortium
W A P  Wireless Application Protocol
W IM  Wireless Identity M odule
SEM Security Mediator
W i-F i Wireless Fidelity
W L A N  Wireless LAN
W P K I  Wireless PKI
W T L S  Wireless Transport Layer Security
W W W  World Wide Web
W CDM A Wideband CDMA
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H e a d e r s ,  L o c a t i o n s ,  I d e n t i t i e s ,  C h a r g e s , ..
T r a n s p o r t
L a y e r H T T P , S O A P , ...
Figure A.l: The O r ie n t  P ro to c o l Stack.
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A p p e n d i x  B
T h e  P r i v a c y  E n g i n e  U s e r  
I n t e r f a c e s
Register w ith  a Location-Based 
Service
Choose a Location-Based Service in the





Friend Finder is a Location Based Service that 
intends to help users locate their friends. The 
minimal location accuracy required by this LBS is 
10 000 m. The location information collected is 
used on-the-fly and is n o t  s to r e d .
Choose the maximum accuracy allowed for this 
LBS in any circumstances. This is used as a basis 
to create various privacy profiles that may be 
selected later on.
110m 3  Register |
Figure B .l: Interface for registering privacy preferences for a particular L B S .
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A u th o rize  a  S u b je c t to  tra c k  you 
th ro u g h  F rien d  F inder
Choose a Subject in the following list i 
ftibo 3
Choose a profile for this pseudonym :
Figure B.2: Interface for choosing the S u b je c t  and assigning her to a cluster.
Privacy Preferences for tibo through Friend Finder
: Monday
j From tKJ:00:00 To 07:59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [Modify]
! From 08:00:00 To 11:59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [Modify]
; From 08:00:00 To 11:59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [Modify]
! From 12:00:00 To 13:59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [Modify]
| From 14:00:00 To 17:59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [Modify]
! From 18:00:00 To 23:59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [Modify]
T uesday
From 00:00:00 To 07:59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [Modify]
From 08:00:00 To 11:59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [Modify]
From 08:00:00 To 11:59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [Modify]
From 12:00:00 To 13:59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [JiAodify]
From 14:00:00 To 17;59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [Modify]
From 18:00:00 To 23:59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [Modify]
j Wednesday
; From 00:00:00 To 07:59:59 at an accuracy of 0 meters [Modify]
Figure B.3: Interface for visualizing and modifying privacy preferences for a particular 
S u b je c t  and L B S .
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Privacy P references Change.
: Modify the following timeslot
Monday
Tlia currant starting time of this timeslot b  08:00:00 , 
Change : | 08 w I : J 00 ^  j [ 00 S i Change I
The current ending time of this timeslot ts 11:59:59 . 
Chang« : 111 ¡ 159 [S3:159 II  Change ]
The accuracy for this timeslot is set to 0 .
Change : |o____ |_^ J Change I
0







Figure B.4: Interface for modifying a specific timeslot.
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C r y p t o g r a p h i c  A P I
A p p e n d i x  C
C .l User API
vo id  s e tU s e r P a r tP r iv a te D e c r y p t io n K e y ( S tr in g  x, S tr in g  y)
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  s e t ,  u p  t h e  U s e r ’s  p r i v a t e  d e c r y p t i o n  k e y  s h a r e .
v o id  s e tU s e r P a r tP r iv a te S ig n a tu r e K e y  (S tr in g  x , S tr in g  y)
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  s e t  u p  t h e  U s e r ’s  p r i v a t e  s i g n a t u r e  k e y  s h a r e .
vo id  s e tU s e rP u b l ic P a ra m e te r s K e y  (S tr in g  x , S tr in g  y)
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  s e t  u p  t h e  U s e r ’s  p u b l i c  s ig n a tu r e .  k e y .
S trin g []  e n c ry p t  (by  te[] p la in , S tr in g  Id )
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  e n c r y p t  a  m e s s a g e  w i t h  t h e  i d e n t i t y  “I d ” o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  U s e r .  
byte[] d e c ry p t(S tr in g [ ]  c ip h e r ,  S trin g [] ksom )
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  d e c r y p t  a  m e s s a g e  u s i n g  u  p a r a m e t e r  “k s e m ” r e c e i v e d  f r o m  t h e  S E M .
S trin g f] s ig n (b y te [] m e ssa g e )
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  s i g n  a  m e s s a g e .
b o o le a n  v e rify (b y te [] m e ssa g e , S tring [] s ig n a tu re ,  S tr in g  Id )
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  v e r i f y  t h e  s i g n a t u r e  o f  a  m e s s a g e  w i t h  t h e  i d e n t i t y  “I d ” o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
u s e r  r e c e i v e d  f r o m  t h e  S E M .
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C.2 Private Key Generator API
v o id  s e tU p P a r a in e te r s ( S t r in g  p , S tr in g  q , S tr in g  x , S tr in g  P x ,  S tr in g  P y )
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  s e t  u p  t h e  e l l i p t i c  c u r v e  r e l a t e d  p a r a m e t e r s  p  a n d  q , t h e  P K G  p r i v a t e  
k e y  x  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  p o in t .  P .
v o id  k ey G en (S t.r in g  Id )
'P h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  g e n e r a t e  t h e  s e t ,  o f  k e y s  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  i d e n t i t y  “I d ”. 
v o id  s e tU p Q
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  g e n e r a t e  d e f a u l t  s a m p l e  p a r a m e t e r s  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  o n e s  g e n e r a t e d  b y  
s e t U p P a r a m e t e r s ( )  a n d  k e y g e n Q .
S trin g []  g e tP o in tP ( )
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  g e t t e r  f o r  t h e  p o i n t  P .
S trin g []  g e tP o in tY k p g ()
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  g e t t e r  f o r  t h e  p u b l i c  k e y  o f  t h e  P K G .
S trin g ]]  g e tP o in tD Id ( )
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  g e t t e r  f o r  t h e  d e c r y p t i n g  p r i v a t e  k e y  o f  a  U s e r .
S trin g ]]  g e tP o in tD Id S e m Q
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  g e t t e r  f o r  t h e  d e c r y p t i n g  p r i v a t e  k e y  s h a r e  o f  t h e  S E M  f o r  t h e  U s e r  
c o n s i d e r e d .
S trin g ]] g e tP o in tD Id U s e r ( )
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  g e t t e r  f o r  t h e  d e c r y p t i n g  p r i v a t e  k e y  s h a r e  o f  t h e  U s e r  c o n s i d e r e d .
S tr in g  g e tP o in tS Id Q Q
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  g e t t e r  f o r  t h e  s i g n i n g  p r i v a t e  k e y  o f  a  U s e r .
S tr in g  g e tP o in tS Id U s e r ( ) ( )
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  g e t t e r  f o r  t h e  s i g n i n g  p r i v a t e  k e y  s l i a n ;  o f  t h e  U s e r  c o n s i d e r e d .
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S trin g f] g e tP o in tS Id S e rn Q
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a g e t t e r  f o r  t h e  s i g n i n g  p r i v a t e  k e y  s h a r e  o f  t h e  S E M  f o r  t h e  U s e r  c o n s i d e r e d .  
S tr in g  g e tX ()
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  g e t t e r  f o r  t h e  p r i v a t e ,  k e y  o f  t h e  P K G .
S tr in g  g e tP ( )
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  g e t t e r  f o r  t h e  e l l i p t i c  c u r v e  r e l a t e d  p a r a m e t e r  p .
S tr in g  g e tQ ()
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  g e t t e r  f o r  t h e  e l l i p t i c  c u r v e  I 'c la t c d  p a r a m e t e r  q .
S tr in g  g e tL Q
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  a  g e t t e r  f o r  t h e  e l l i p t i c  c u r v e ,  r e l a t e d  p a r a m e t e r  I.
C.3 Security Mediator (SEM) API
v o id  s e tS e m P a r tP r iv a te D e c ry p t io n K e y ( S tr in g  x , S tr in g  y)
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  s e t  t h e  S E M ’s  p r i v a t e  d e c r y p t i o n  k e y  s h a r e .
vo id  s e tS e m P a r tP r iv a te S ig n a tu r e K e y (S tr in g  x , S tr in g  y)
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  t o  s e t  the . S E M ’s  p r i v a t e  s i g n a t u r e  k e y  s h a r e .
S trin g [] d e c ry p tS e m (S tr in g []  c ip h e r , S tr in g  Id )
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  b y  t h e  S E M  t o  p a r t i a l l y  d e c r y p t  a  c ip h e r t e x t ,  u s i n g  i t s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
p r i v a t e  k e y  s h a r e .
S trin g [] s ig n S e m (S tr in g []  u se rS ig )
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  i s  u s e d  b y  t h e  S E M  t o  h e l p  a  U s e r  s i g n  a  c i p h e r t e x t  u s i n g  i t s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
p r i v a t e  k e y  s h a r e .
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v o id  lo a d U p P a ra m e te r s (S tr in g  p , S tr in g  q , S tr in g  P x , S tr in g  P y , S tr in g  Y p k g x , 
S tr in g  Y p k g y )
T h is  f u n c t i o n  is  u se d  by m o s t  p a r t ie s  in  o rd e r  to  lo a d  u p  th e i r  d e fa u lt  p a r a m e te r s .
C.4 Com m on A P I
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